Cost-benefit analysis model of badger (Meles meles) culling to reduce cattle herd tuberculosis breakdowns in Britain, with particular reference to badger perturbation

Bovine tuberculosis (TB)is an important economic disease. Badgers (Meles meles) are the wildlife source implicated in many cattle outbreaks of TB in Britain, and extensive badger control is a controversial option to reduce the disease. A badger and cattle population model was developed, simulating TB epidemiology; badger ecology, including postcull social perturbation; and TB-related farm management. An economic cost-benefit module was integrated into the model to assess whether badger control offers economic benefits. Model results strongly indicate that although, if perturbation were restricted, extensive badger culling could reduce rates in cattle, overall an economic loss would be more likely than a benefit. Perturbation of the badger population was a key factor determining success or failure of control. The model highlighted some important knowledge gaps regarding both the spatial and temporal characteristics of perturbation that warrant further research.

Should we be utopophobes about democracy in particular?

In his book Democratic Authority, David Estlund puts forward a case for democracy, which he labels epistemic proceduralism, that relies on democracy's ability to produce good – that is, substantively just – results. Alongside this case for democracy Estlund attacks what he labels ‘utopophobia’, an aversion to idealistic political theory. In this article I make two points. The first is a general point about what the correct level of ‘idealisation’ is in political theory. Various debates are emerging on this question and, to the extent that they are focused on ‘political theory’ as a whole, I argue, they are flawed. This is because there are different kinds of political concept, and they require different kinds of ideal. My second point is about democracy in particular. If we understand democracy as Estlund does, then we should see it as a problem-solving concept – the problem being that we need coercive institutions and rules, but we do not know what justice requires. As democracy is a response to a problem, we should not allow our theories of it, even at the ideal level, to be too idealised – they must be embedded in the nature of the problem they are to solve, and the beings that have it.

Im Interesse der Macht: Ungarns neues Wahlsystem

Until December 2011, Hungary had the most stable electoral system in Eastern Europe: except for an increase in the electoral threshold in 1994, no significant change had taken place since the transition from communism in 1989. On 23rd December 2011, however, Parliament passed a wholly new electoral law, which will first be used in the elections due in 2014. The purposes of this article are twofold. The first is to outline the change of electoral system that took place. The previous electoral law was, famously, one of the most complex in the world. The new law is somewhat simpler, but nevertheless retains many of the old law’s features. The second purpose is to analyse the origins and implications of the new law. Did it simply reflect the interests of those in power or did it also respond to public concerns? Can it be expected to enhance or detract from the quality of Hungarian democracy?