3 resultados para information noncooperative game
em CentAUR: Central Archive University of Reading - UK
Resumo:
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to consider Turing's two tests for machine intelligence: the parallel-paired, three-participants game presented in his 1950 paper, and the “jury-service” one-to-one measure described two years later in a radio broadcast. Both versions were instantiated in practical Turing tests during the 18th Loebner Prize for artificial intelligence hosted at the University of Reading, UK, in October 2008. This involved jury-service tests in the preliminary phase and parallel-paired in the final phase. Design/methodology/approach – Almost 100 test results from the final have been evaluated and this paper reports some intriguing nuances which arose as a result of the unique contest. Findings – In the 2008 competition, Turing's 30 per cent pass rate is not achieved by any machine in the parallel-paired tests but Turing's modified prediction: “at least in a hundred years time” is remembered. Originality/value – The paper presents actual responses from “modern Elizas” to human interrogators during contest dialogues that show considerable improvement in artificial conversational entities (ACE). Unlike their ancestor – Weizenbaum's natural language understanding system – ACE are now able to recall, share information and disclose personal interests.
Resumo:
An efficient market incorporates news into prices immediately and fully. Tests for efficiency in financial markets have been undermined by information leakage. We test for efficiency in sports betting markets – real-world markets where news breaks remarkably cleanly. Applying a novel identification to high-frequency data, we investigate the reaction of prices to goals scored on the ‘cusp’ of half-time. This strategy allows us to separate the market's response to major news (a goal), from its reaction to the continual flow of minor game-time news. On our evidence, prices update swiftly and fully.
Resumo:
Probabilistic hydro-meteorological forecasts have over the last decades been used more frequently to communicate forecastuncertainty. This uncertainty is twofold, as it constitutes both an added value and a challenge for the forecaster and the user of the forecasts. Many authors have demonstrated the added (economic) value of probabilistic over deterministic forecasts across the water sector (e.g. flood protection, hydroelectric power management and navigation). However, the richness of the information is also a source of challenges for operational uses, due partially to the difficulty to transform the probability of occurrence of an event into a binary decision. This paper presents the results of a risk-based decision-making game on the topic of flood protection mitigation, called “How much are you prepared to pay for a forecast?”. The game was played at several workshops in 2015, which were attended by operational forecasters and academics working in the field of hydrometeorology. The aim of this game was to better understand the role of probabilistic forecasts in decision-making processes and their perceived value by decision-makers. Based on the participants’ willingness-to-pay for a forecast, the results of the game show that the value (or the usefulness) of a forecast depends on several factors, including the way users perceive the quality of their forecasts and link it to the perception of their own performances as decision-makers.