Environmental agreements as a Hawk-Dove game with confirmed proposals

This paper aims at two different contributions to the literature on international environmental agreements. First, we model environmental agreements as a generic situation, characterized as a Hawk-Dove game with multiple asymmetric equilibria. Second, the article applies the theory on non-cooperative games with confirmed proposals, based on an alternating proposals bargaining protocol, as a way of overcoming the usual problems of coordination and bargaining failures in environmental agreement games, due to payoff asymmetry and equilibrium multiplicity.

Very short delays prior to escape from potential predators may function efficiently as adaptive risk-assessment periods

Periods between predator detection and an escape response (escape delays) by prey upon attack by a predator often arise because animals trade-off the benefits such a delay gives for assessing risk accurately with the costs of not escaping as quickly as possible. We tested whether freezing behaviour (complete immobility in a previously foraging bird) observed in chaffinches before escaping from an approaching potential threat functions as a period of risk-assessment, and whether information on predator identity is gained even when time available is very short. We flew either a model of a sparrowhawk (predator) or a woodpigeon (no threat) at single chaffinches. Escape delays were significantly shorter with the hawk, except when a model first appeared close to the chaffinch. Chaffinches were significantly more vigilant when they resumed feeding after exposure to the sparrowhawk compared to the woodpigeon showing that they were able to distinguish between threats, and this applied even when time available for assessment was short (an average of 0.29 s). Our results show freezing in chaffinches functions as an effective economic risk assessment period, and that threat information is gained even when very short periods of time are available during an attack.

Zinc chelatase in human lymphocytes: detection of the enzymatic defect in erythropoietic protoporphyria

We describe a fluorometric assay for heme synthetase, the enzyme that is genetically deficient in erythropoietic protoporphyria. The method, which can readily detect activity in 1 microliter of packed human lymphocytes, is based on the formation of zinc protoheme from protoporphyrin IX. That zinc chelatase and ferrochelatase activities reside in the same enzyme was shown by the competitive action of ferrous ions and the inhibitory effects of N-methyl protoporphyrin (a specific inhibitor of heme synthetase) on zinc chelatase. The Km for zinc was 11 micrograms and that for protoporphyrin IX was 6 microM. The Ki fro ferrous ions was 14 microM. Zinc chelatase was reduced to 15.3% of the mean control activity in lymphocytes obtained from patients with protoporphyria, thus confirming the defect of heme biosynthesis in this disorder. The assay should prove to be useful for determining heme synthetase in tissues with low specific activity and to investigate further the enzymatic defect in protoporphyria.

Genetic heterogeneity in erythropoietic protoporphyria: a study of the enzymatic defect in nine affected families

Erythropoietic protoporphyria (EPP) is associated with a deficiency of protohaem ferrolyase. We have used a novel assay for this enzyme based on its ability to utilize zinc as a substrate to investigate the inheritance of EPP in nine affected families. Zinc chelatase activity was markedly reduced in peripheral blood mononuclear cells from 14 EPP patients (mean, 3.3 nmol Zn protohaem/h/mg protein; range, 0.3-8.0) when compared with 41 controls (16.8 +/- 3.6) p less than 0.01. In three families with parent-to-child transmission of disease, the asymptomatic parent had an enzymatic activity within the normal range. In three pedigrees where the parents were asymptomatic, enzymatic activities were below the 95% confidence limits in both. Zinc chelatase activity was below the mean control value in 17 of the 18 parents in nine affected pedigrees, and six of seven asymptomatic offspring of patients with protoporphyria. The findings suggest that EPP is not transmitted as a simple dominant trait and that inheritance of more than one gene may be required for disease expression.

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.