Reaching a verdict

Two experiments, using a mock legal case, confirmed the causal role of arguments in verdict decisions and explored the process involved. Experiment I showed that verdicts varied with the strength of counter-arguments and Experiment 2 showed that the use of background information that undermined such arguments determined the verdict reached. Such results confirm the causal role of arguments but do not speak to the representations constructed. In both experiments we analysed the reasons proposed for verdicts. Participants generally represented the state of affairs, and conjectured state of affairs, to which the arguments referred. Experiment 2 also asked participants about the number of causal possibilities they envisaged. Confidence in the verdict was moderated by the strength of counter-arguments but in different ways for those who envisaged a single causal account as opposed to two causal accounts. In the former case, confidence decreased with the rated strength of counter-arguments. In the latter case, confidence increased. We suggest that verdicts are abductive explanations of the events generated through a process of mental simulation.

Could the presumption of innocence protect the guilty?

At criminal trial, we demand that those accused of criminal wrongdoing be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond any reasonable doubt. What are the moral and/or political grounds of this demand? One popular and natural answer to this question focuses on the moral badness or wrongness of convicting and punishing innocent persons, which I call the direct moral grounding. In this essay, I suggest that this direct moral grounding, if accepted, may well have important ramifications for other areas of the criminal justice process, and in particular those parts in which we (through our legislatures and judges) decide how much punishment to distribute to guilty persons. If, as the direct moral grounding suggests, we should prefer under-punishment to over-punishment under conditions of uncertainty, due to the moral seriousness of errors which inappropriately punish persons, then we should also prefer erring on the side of under-punishment when considering how much to punish those who may justly be punished. Some objections to this line of thinking are considered.

Are mortgage lenders guilty of the housing bubble? A UK perspective

Existing theoretical models of house prices and credit rely on continuous rationality of consumers, an assumption that has been frequently questioned in recent years. Meanwhile, empirical investigations of the relationship between prices and credit are often based on national-level data, which is then tested for structural breaks and asymmetric responses, usually with subsamples. Earlier author argues that local markets are structurally different from one another and so the coefficients of any estimated housing market model should vary from region to region. We investigate differences in the price–credit relationship for 12 regions of the UK. Markov-switching is introduced to capture asymmetric market behaviours and turning points. Results show that credit abundance had a large impact on house prices in Greater London and nearby regions alongside a strong positive feedback effect from past house price movements. This impact is even larger in Greater London and the South East of England when house prices are falling, which are the only instances where the credit effect is more prominent than the positive feedback effect. A strong positive feedback effect from past lending activity is also present in the loan dynamics. Furthermore, bubble probabilities extracted using a discrete Kalman filter neatly capture market turning points.

Time and retribution

Retributivists believe that punishment can be deserved, and that deserved punishment is intrinsically good. They also believe that certain crimes deserve certain quantities of punishment. On the plausible assumption that the overall amount of any given punishment is a function of its severity and duration, we might think that retributivists (qua retributivists) would be indifferent as to whether a punishment were long and light or short and sharp, provided the offender gets the overall amount of punishment he deserves. In this paper I argue against this, showing that retributivists should actually prefer shorter and more severe punishments to longer, gentler options. I show this by focusing on, and developing a series of interpretations of, the retributivist claim that not punishing the guilty is bad, focussing on the relationship between that badness and time. I then show that each interpretation leads to a preference for shorter over longer punishment.