How large is congressional dependence in agriculture. Bayesian inference about ‘scale’ and ‘scope’ in measuring a spatial externality

The political economy literature on agriculture emphasizes influence over political outcomes via lobbying conduits in general, political action committee contributions in particular and the pervasive view that political preferences with respect to agricultural issues are inherently geographic. In this context, ‘interdependence’ in Congressional vote behaviour manifests itself in two dimensions. One dimension is the intensity by which neighboring vote propensities influence one another and the second is the geographic extent of voter influence. We estimate these facets of dependence using data on a Congressional vote on the 2001 Farm Bill using routine Markov chain Monte Carlo procedures and Bayesian model averaging, in particular. In so doing, we develop a novel procedure to examine both the reliability and the consequences of different model representations for measuring both the ‘scale’ and the ‘scope’ of spatial (geographic) co-relations in voting behaviour.

Evaluation of cumulative externality: environmental economics, oligopoly and the private provision of public goods

This paper evaluates environmental externality when the structure of the externality is cumulative. The evaluation exercise is based on the assumption that the agents in question form conjectural variations. A number of environments are encompassed within this classification and have received due attention in the literature. Each of these heterogeneous environments, however, possesses considerable analytical homogeneity and permit subscription to a general model treatment. These environments include environmental externality, oligopoly and the analysis of the private provision of public goods. We highlight the general analytical approach by focusing on this latter context, in which debate centers around four issues: the existence of free-riding, the extent to which contributions are matched equally across individuals, the nature of conjectures consistent with equilibrium, and the allocative inefficiency of alternative regimes. This paper resolves each of these issues, with the following conclusions: A consistent-conjectures equilibrium exists in the private provision of public goods. It is the monopolistic-conjectures equilibrium. Agents act identically, contributing positive amounts of the public good in an efficient allocation of resources. There is complete matching of contributions among agents, no free-riding, and the allocation is independent of the number of members within the community. Thus the Olson conjecture—that inefficiency is exacerbated by community size—has no foundation in a consistent-conjectures, cumulative-externality, context (212 words).

Landscape gene flow, coexistence and threshold effect: The case of genetically modified herbicide tolerant oilseed rape (Brassica napus)

Globally there have been a number of concerns about the development of genetically modified crops many of which relate to the implications of gene flow at various levels. In Europe these concerns have led the European Union (EU) to promote the concept of 'coexistence' to allow the freedom to plant conventional and genetically modified (GM) varieties but to minimise the presence of transgenic material within conventional crops. Should a premium for non-GM varieties emerge on the market, the presence of transgenes would generate a 'negative externality' to conventional growers. The establishment of maximum tolerance level for the adventitious presence of GM material in conventional crops produces a threshold effect in the external costs. The existing literature suggests that apart from the biological characteristics of the plant under consideration (e.g. self-pollination rates, entomophilous species, anemophilous species, etc.), gene flow at the landscape level is affected by the relative size of the source and sink populations and the spatial arrangement of the fields in the landscape. In this paper, we take genetically modified herbicide tolerant oilseed rape (GM HT OSR) as a model crop. Starting from an individual pollen dispersal function, we develop a spatially explicit numerical model in order to assess the effect of the size of the source/sink populations and the degree of spatial aggregation on the extent of gene flow into conventional OSR varieties under two alternative settings. We find that when the transgene presence in conventional produce is detected at the field level, the external cost will increase with the size of the source area and with the level of spatial disaggregation. on the other hand when the transgene presence is averaged among all conventional fields in the landscape (e.g. because of grain mixing before detection), the external cost will only depend on the relative size of the source area. The model could readily be incorporated into an economic evaluation of policies to regulate adoption of GM HT OSR. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Quantifying the effect of buffer zones, crop areas and spatial aggregation on the externalities of genetically modified crops at landscape level

The development of genetically modified (GM) crops has led the European Union (EU) to put forward the concept of 'coexistence' to give fanners the freedom to plant both conventional and GM varieties. Should a premium for non-GM varieties emerge in the market, 'contamination' by GM pollen would generate a negative externality to conventional growers. It is therefore important to assess the effect of different 'policy variables'on the magnitude of the externality to identify suitable policies to manage coexistence. In this paper, taking GM herbicide tolerant oilseed rape as a model crop, we start from the model developed in Ceddia et al. [Ceddia, M.G., Bartlett, M., Perrings, C., 2007. Landscape gene flow, coexistence and threshold effect: the case of genetically modified herbicide tolerant oilseed rape (Brassica napus). Ecol. Modell. 205, pp. 169-180] use a Monte Carlo experiment to generate data and then estimate the effect of the number of GM and conventional fields, width of buffer areas and the degree of spatial aggregation (i.e. the 'policy variables') on the magnitude of the externality at the landscape level. To represent realistic conditions in agricultural production, we assume that detection of GM material in conventional produce might occur at the field level (no grain mixing occurs) or at the silos level (where grain mixing from different fields in the landscape occurs). In the former case, the magnitude of the externality will depend on the number of conventional fields with average transgenic presence above a certain threshold. In the latter case, the magnitude of the externality will depend on whether the average transgenic presence across all conventional fields exceeds the threshold. In order to quantify the effect of the relevant' policy variables', we compute the marginal effects and the elasticities. Our results show that when relying on marginal effects to assess the impact of the different 'policy variables', spatial aggregation is far more important when transgenic material is detected at field level, corroborating previous research. However, when elasticity is used, the effectiveness of spatial aggregation in reducing the externality is almost identical whether detection occurs at field level or at silos level. Our results show also that the area planted with GM is the most important 'policy variable' in affecting the externality to conventional growers and that buffer areas on conventional fields are more effective than those on GM fields. The implications of the results for the coexistence policies in the EU are discussed. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Pesticides, preference heterogeneity and environmental taxes

In this paper we present results from two choice experiments (CE), designed to take account of the different negative externalities associated with pesticide use in agricultural production. For cereal production, the most probable impact of pesticide use is a reduction in environmental quality. For fruit and vegetable production, the negative externality is on consumer health. Using latent class models we find evidence of the presence of preference heterogeneity in addition to reasonably high willingness to pay (WTP) estimates for a reduction in the use of pesticides for both environmental quality and consumer health. To place our WTP estimates in a policy context we convert them into an equivalent pesticide tax by type of externality. Our tax estimates suggest that pesticide taxes based on the primary externality resulting from a particular mode of agricultural production are a credible policy option that warrants further consideration.

How big is your neighbourhood? Spatial implications of market participation among Filipino smallholders

We present a procedure for estimating two quantities defining the spatial externality in discrete-choice commonly referred to as 'the neighbourhood effect'. One quantity, the propensity for neighbours to make the same decision, reflects traditional preoccupations; the other quantity, the magnitude of the neighbourhood itself, is novel. Because both quantities have fundamental bearing on the magnitude of the spatial externality, it is desirable to have a robust algorithm for their estimation. Using recent advances in Bayesian estimation and model comparison, we devise such an algorithm and illustrate its application to a sample of northern-Filipino smallholders. We determine that a significant, positive, neighbourhood effect exists; that, among the 12 geographical units comprising the sample, the neighbourhood spans a three-unit radius; and that policy prescriptions are significantly altered when calculations account for the spatial externality.

Growth and public infrastructure

The paper analyzes a multicountry extension of the Barro model of productive public expenditure. In the presence of positive infrastructural externalities between countries, the provision of infrastructure will be inefficiently low if countries do not coordinate. This provides a role for a supranational body, such as the European Union, to coordinate the policies of the individual governments. It is shown how intervention by a supranational body can raise welfare by internalizing the infrastructural externality. Infrastructural externalities increase the importance of tax policy in the growth process and distribute the benefits of taxation across countries.

On the regulation of spatial externalities: coexistence between GM and conventional crops in the EU and the 'newcomer principle'

Pollen-mediated gene flow is one of the main concerns associated with the introduction of genetically modified (GM) crops. Should a premium for non-GM varieties emerge on the market, ‘contamination’ by GM pollen would generate a revenue loss for growers of non-GM varieties. This paper analyses the problem of pollen-mediated gene flow as a particular type of production externality. The model, although simple, provides useful insights into coexistence policies. Following on from this and taking GM herbicide-tolerant oilseed rape (Brassica napus) as a model crop, a Monte Carlo simulation is used to generate data and then estimate the effect of several important policy variables (including width of buffer zones and spatial aggregation) on the magnitude of the externality associated with pollen-mediated gene flow.

Farm productivity and efficiency in rural Bangladesh: the role of education revisited

This article reassesses the debate over the role of education in farm production in Bangladesh using a large dataset on rice producing households from 141 villages. Average and stochastic production frontier functions are estimated to ascertain the effect of education on productivity and efficiency. A full set of proxies for farm education stock variables are incorporated to investigate the ‘internal’ as well as ‘external’ returns to education. The external effect is investigated in the context of rural neighbourhoods. Our analysis reveals that in addition to raising rice productivity and boosting potential output, household education significantly reduces production inefficiencies. However, we are unable to find any evidence of the externality benefit of schooling – neighbour's education does not matter in farm production. We discuss the implication of these findings for rural education programmes in Bangladesh.

Economic rationale for interventions to control livestock disease

Disease in farm animals has significant economic impacts on livestock production and incurs substantial costs for societies. Impacts affect not only livestock farms and the livestock industries but also sectors outside of farming. Important negative externalities of livestock disease include impacts on the health of other producers’ livestock, on human health, and on animal welfare. Good disease risk management/biosecurity and good animal welfare are public goods. Not taking account of these externality and public good aspects can lead to a misallocation of resources for livestock disease control. In such instances, there may be a strong case for government or other authority to intervene to ensure a better use of resources. There are a number of policy instruments that can be implemented for this purpose. One potential instrument is a Farm Animal Health and Welfare Stewardship Scheme funded under Pillar II of the CAP. A number of countries have public–private partnership cost-sharing schemes that aim to share appropriately both responsibilities and costs of epidemic livestock disease. There is a strong future agenda for appropriate intervention by governments in the management of livestock disease risks, including responsibility and cost sharing for livestock disease control, within the European Union and elsewhere.

Congestion models with consistent conjectures

This paper demonstrates that, in situations in which a cumulative externality exists, the basic nature and extent of resource misallocation may be substantially less than we imagine. This conclusion stems from deriving consistent conjectures in a unified framework in which congestion is present. Experiments support the conclusion that, when numbers of agents are small, when there is little heterogeneity among them, and when they have the opportunity to observe each other during repeated experiment, the market allocation may be efficient

Innovations for enabling urban climate governance: evidence from Mumbai

Climate change is a ‘wicked’ problem. No central authority manages climate change, and those creating the problem are also trying to solve it. Climate change brings uncertainty in ways that cities have not tackled previously. There is a need to explore new governance forms able to deal with change and to enable transformations. In this paper we explore seven local climate innovations to better understand the enabling conditions underpinning success and the governance barriers that are encountered. We connect the more formal and emergent climate governance ‘innovations’ through adaptation and mitigation experiments in Mumbai, India. Case studies indicate an emerging development model. Effective climate governance has to be an inevitable part of new development in the South. While climate externality exists in all development planning and implementation, smaller community-level efforts indicate how opportunities are offered within existing systems to integrate with larger institutional climate governance.

Corruption and individual ethics: insights from a public procurement auction

This article proposes an auction model where two firms compete for obtaining the license for a public project and an auctioneer acting as a public official representing the political power, decides the winner of the contest. Players as firms face a social dilemma in the sense that the higher is the bribe offered, the higher would be the willingness of a pure monetary maximizer public official to give her the license. However, it implies inducing a cost of reducing all players’ payoffs as far as our model includes an endogenous externality, which depends on bribe. All players’ payoffs decrease with the bribe (and increase with higher quality). We find that the presence of bribe aversion in either the officials’ or the firms’ utility function shifts equilibrium towards more pro-social behavior. When the quality and bribe-bid strategy space is discrete, multiple equilibria emerge including more pro-social bids than would be predicted under a continuous strategy space.

Impact of externalities on sustainable development: evidence from public-private partnerships in Kazakhstan and Russia

Purpose – This paper aims to investigate the influence of public-private partnerships (PPPs) on social and economic conditions in Kazakhstan and Russia from a public economics perspective, namely, through the lens of a market failure and PPPs’ negative externalities. Design/methodology/approach – Drawing on the concept of a market failure and using the externalities perspective, the paper investigates whether partnerships are instrumental in solving market problems, which is illustrated by the evidence from ongoing PPP projects in Kazakhstan and Russia. Findings – Results show that citizens face expansion of monopolistic trends in the service provision and decreased availability of public services. Additionally, the government support to partnerships recreates a negative externality in the form of a higher risk premium on loan interest rates that banks use to finance PPPs. The partnerships’ impact on sustainable development often appears detrimental, as they significantly intensify the struggle between sub-national governments for increased transfers from the national budget. Practical implications – The government agencies must incorporate the appraisal of the PPP externalities and their effects on the society in the decision-making regarding the PPP formation. Originality/value – The authors suggest that, although government is interested in PPPs’ positive externalities, in reality many negative externalities may offset the positive spillover effects. As a result, the partnerships’ contributions to economic and social sustainability remain controversial. Extending the value-for-money concept to incorporate the assessment of PPP externalities might significantly enhance the partnership conceptualisation by more comprehensive and accurate assessment of PPPs’ economic and social value.