Rethinking the powers of truth commissions in light of the ICC statute

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is silent on the issue of national truth commissions. How the ICC might treat these bodies and the information they may hold is uncertain. The overlapping nature of the investigations likely to be carried out by the ICC and future truth-seeking bodies may, however, give rise to areas of tension, particularly where truth commissions hold confidential or self-incriminating information. This article questions whether the traditional truth-seeking powers to grant confidentiality and compel the provision of self-incriminating statements are compatible with the prosecutorial framework of the ICC. It considers how such information is likely to be dealt with by the ICC and analyses whether effective truth seeking can be carried out in the absence of such powers.

The automatic identification and prioritisation of criminal networks from police crime data

The identification of criminal networks is not a routine exploratory process within the current practice of the law enforcement authorities; rather it is triggered by specific evidence of criminal activity being investigated. A network is identified when a criminal comes to notice and any associates who could also be potentially implicated would need to be identified if only to be eliminated from the enquiries as suspects or witnesses as well as to prevent and/or detect crime. However, an identified network may not be the one causing most harm in a given area.. This paper identifies a methodology to identify all of the criminal networks that are present within a Law Enforcement Area, and, prioritises those that are causing most harm to the community. Each crime is allocated a score based on its crime type and how recently the crime was committed; the network score, which can be used as decision support to help prioritise it for law enforcement purposes, is the sum of the individual crime scores.

Error analysis of a Monte Carlo algorithm for computing bilinear forms of matrix powers

In this paper we present error analysis for a Monte Carlo algorithm for evaluating bilinear forms of matrix powers. An almost Optimal Monte Carlo (MAO) algorithm for solving this problem is formulated. Results for the structure of the probability error are presented and the construction of robust and interpolation Monte Carlo algorithms are discussed. Results are presented comparing the performance of the Monte Carlo algorithm with that of a corresponding deterministic algorithm. The two algorithms are tested on a well balanced matrix and then the effects of perturbing this matrix, by small and large amounts, is studied.

Comparison of the computational cost of a Monte Carlo and deterministic algorithm for computing bilinear forms of matrix powers

In this paper we consider bilinear forms of matrix polynomials and show that these polynomials can be used to construct solutions for the problems of solving systems of linear algebraic equations, matrix inversion and finding extremal eigenvalues. An almost Optimal Monte Carlo (MAO) algorithm for computing bilinear forms of matrix polynomials is presented. Results for the computational costs of a balanced algorithm for computing the bilinear form of a matrix power is presented, i.e., an algorithm for which probability and systematic errors are of the same order, and this is compared with the computational cost for a corresponding deterministic method.

A police state? The Nyasaland emergency and colonial intelligence.

The Nyasaland Emergency in 1959 proved a decisive turning point in the history of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which from 1953 to 1963 brought together the territories of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) under a settler-dominated federal government. The British and Nyasaland governments defended the emergency by claiming to have gathered intelligence which showed that the Nyasaland African Congress was preparing a campaign of sabotage and murder. The Devlin Commission, appointed to investigate the emergency, dismissed the evidence of a ‘murder plot’, criticised the Nyasaland government's handling of the Emergency and, notoriously, described Nyasaland as a ‘police state’. This article has two principal aims. First, using the recently declassified papers of the Intelligence and Security Department (ISD) of the Colonial Office, it seeks to provide the first detailed account of what the British government knew of the intelligence relating to the ‘murder plot’ and how they assessed it, prior to the outbreak of the emergency. It demonstrates that officials in the ISD and members of the Security Service adopted a far more cautious attitude towards the intelligence than did Conservative ministers, and had greater qualms about allowing it into the public domain to justify government policy. Second, the article examines the implications of Devlin's use of the phrase ‘police state’ for Nyasaland and for the late colonial state in general. It contrasts Devlin's use of the term with that of security experts in the ISD, who routinely applied it to policing systems that diverged from their own preferred model. Hence, whereas Devlin compared policing in Nyasaland unfavourably with that in Southern Rhodesia, implying, ironically, that Nyasaland was ‘under-policed’ (because there were fewer police per head of population in Nyasaland than in Southern Rhodesia), the ISD regarded the intensive system of policing operated by the British South Africa Police in Southern Rhodesia as characteristic of a ‘police state’. The article suggests that the frequent use of the term ‘police state’ was indicative of broader anxieties about what Britain's legacy would be for the post-independence African state.

Are informed citizens more trusting? Transparency of performance data and trust towards a British police force

In Britain, substantial cuts in police budgets alongside controversial handling of incidents such as politically sensitive enquiries, public disorder and relations with the media have recently triggered much debate about public knowledge and trust in the police. To date, however, little academic research has investigated how knowledge of police performance impacts citizens’ trust. We address this long-standing lacuna by exploring citizens’ trust before and after exposure to real performance data in the context of a British police force. The results reveal that being informed of performance data affects citizens’ trust significantly. Furthermore, direction and degree of change in trust are related to variations across the different elements of the reported performance criteria. Interestingly, the volatility of citizens’ trust is related to initial performance perceptions (such that citizens with low initial perceptions of police performance react more significantly to evidence of both good and bad performance than citizens with high initial perceptions), and citizens’ intentions to support the police do not always correlate with their cognitive and affective trust towards the police. In discussing our findings, we explore the implications of how being transparent with performance data can both hinder and be helpful in developing citizens’ trust towards a public organisation such as the police. From our study, we pose a number of ethical challenges that practitioners face when deciding what data to highlight, to whom, and for what purpose.

Reply to Christine Sylvester, “Terro rWars: Boston Iraq”: An examination of differences between counter-terrorism and war as seen through the Iraqi experience of occupation

This response examines what is overlooked in Sylvester’s analysis of similarities between the US police security response to the Boston marathon bombings (2013) and Kevin Powers’ fictionalized account of the US war operations in Al Tafar, Iraq (2004) and evaluates the consequences for our understanding of contemporary war. This is done by highlighting differences between the experience of residents in Boston and the (real) town of Tal Afar, key among them the insecurity, fear and calamity that result from the distinct political realities in these locations. The experience of war from the perspective of the victims adds an important dimension to the debate over the changing nature of war. At a time that is marked by an unprecedented level of technologization and visual mediation, it brings into focus the fragmentary and often one-sided evidence on which our knowledge of contemporary war is based. It reminds us to ask not only what we know about war, but how we know it.

Finality revived: powers and intentionality

Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of intentionality highlighted by Brentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics worry that this idea is metaphysically obscure at best, and at worst leads to panpsychism or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which both the mental and the physical are kinds, namely finality. This is the finality of ‘final causes’, the long-discarded idea of universal action for an end to which recent proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether or not they realise it. I explain finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference, arguing that in the case of the mental, specific indifference is realised by the process of abstraction, which has no correlate in the case of physical powers. This analysis, I conclude, reveals both the strength and weakness of rational creatures such as us, as well as demystifying (albeit only partly) the way in which powers work.