Envy, facts and justice: a critique of the treatment of envy in justice as fairness

A common anti-egalitarian argument is that equality is motivated by envy, or the desire to placate envy. In order to avoid this charge, John Rawls explicitly banishes envy from his original position. This article argues that this is an inconsistent and untenable position for Rawls, as he treats envy as if it were a fact of human psychology and believes that principles of justice should be based on such facts. Therefore envy should be known about in the original position. The consequences for Rawlsian theory—both substantive and methodological—are discussed.

Victory, peace, and justice : the neglected trinity

The assumption that the most important aim of war is to create a better peace than existed before the war, i.e. a peace with justice, was self-evident for writers prior to Clausewitz. This does not mean that princes saw this as their priority, but theoreticians did. This changed dramatically with the Napoleonic Wars: Clausewitz initiated an era where writers on strategy paid no heed to what would come after military victory, now seen as the be-all and end-all of war. Terrible consequences flowed from this, and a series of ephemeral victories leading to new wars. It was only around the Second World War, to some in itself the consequence of this obsession with victory and not with peace, that it began to dawn on writers that peace, not military victory must be the ultimate aim to be kept in sight.

Reflections on the sociology of law: A rejection of law as 'socially marginal'

Rejecting the concept of law as subservient to social pathology, the principle aim of this article is to locatc law as a critical matter of social structure - and power - which requires to be considered as a central element in the construction of society and social institutions. As such, this article contends that wider jurisprudential notions such as legal procedure and procedural justice, and juridical power and discretion are cogent, robust normative social concerns (as much as they are legal concerns) that positively require consideration and representation in the ernpifical study of sociological phenomena. Reflecting upon scholarship and research evidence on legal procedure and decision-making, the article attempts to elucidate the inter-relationship between power, 'the social', and the operation of law. It concludes that law is not 'socially marginal' but socially, totally central. (c) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Understanding the seriousness of corporate crime: Some lessons for the new 'corporate manslaughter' offence

The measurement of public attitudes towards the criminal law has become an important area of research in recent years because of the perceived desirability of ensuring that the legal system reflects broader societal values. In particular, studies into public perceptions of crime seriousness have attempted to measure the degree of concordance that exists between law and public opinion in the organization and enforcement of criminal offences. These understandings of perceived crime seriousness are particularly important in relation to high-profile issues where public confidence in the law is central to the legal agenda, such as the enforcement of work-related fatality cases. A need to respond to public concern over this issue was cited as a primary justification for the introduction of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. This article will suggest that, although literature looking at the perceived seriousness of corporate crime and, particularly, health and safety offences is limited in volume and generalist in scope, important lessons can be gleaned from existing literature, and pressing questions are raised that demand further empirical investigation.