Stress testing credit risk: the Great Depression scenario

By employing Moody’s corporate default and rating transition data spanning the last 90 years we explore how much capital banks should hold against their corporate loan portfolios to withstand historical stress scenarios. Specifically, we will focus on the worst case scenario over the observation period, the Great Depression. We find that migration risk and the length of the investment horizon are critical factors when determining bank capital needs in a crisis. We show that capital may need to rise more than three times when the horizon is increased from 1 year, as required by current and future regulation, to 3 years. Increases are still important but of a lower magnitude when migration risk is introduced in the analysis. Further, we find that the new bank capital requirements under the so-called Basel 3 agreement would enable banks to absorb Great Depression-style losses. But, such losses would dent regulatory capital considerably and far beyond the capital buffers that have been proposed to ensure that banks survive crisis periods without government support.

Credit risk in covered bonds

Covered bonds are a promising alternative for prime mortgage securitization. In this paper, we explore risk premia in the covered bond market and particularly investigate whether and how credit risk is priced. In extant literature, yield spreads between high-quality covered bonds and government bonds are often interpreted as pure liquidity premia. In contrast, we show that although liquidity is important, it is not the exclusive risk factor. Using a hand-collected data set of cover pool information, we find that the credit quality of the cover assets is an important determinant of covered bond yield spreads. This effect is particularly strong in times of financial turmoil and has a significant influence on the issuer's refinancing cost.

Credit and liquidity components of corporate CDS spreads

This paper investigates the role of credit and liquidity factors in explaining corporate CDS price changes during normal and crisis periods. We find that liquidity risk is more important than firm-specific credit risk regardless of market conditions. Moreover, in the period prior to the recent “Great Recession” credit risk plays no role in explaining CDS price changes. The dominance of liquidity effects casts serious doubts on the relevance of CDS price changes as an indicator of default risk dynamics. Our results show how multiple liquidity factors including firm specific and aggregate liquidity proxies as well as an asymmetric information measure are critical determinants of CDS price variations. In particular, the impact of informed traders on the CDS price increases when markets are characterised by higher uncertainty, which supports concerns of insider trading during the crisis.

Price discovery of credit spreads in tranquil and crisis periods

In this paper we investigate the price discovery process in single-name credit spreads obtained from bond, credit default swap (CDS), equity and equity option prices. We analyse short term price discovery by modelling daily changes in credit spreads in the four markets with a vector autoregressive model (VAR). We also look at price discovery in the long run with a vector error correction model (VECM). We find that in the short term the option market clearly leads the other markets in the sub-prime crisis (2007-2009). During the less severe sovereign debt crisis (2009-2012) and the pre-crisis period, options are still important but CDSs become more prominent. In the long run, deviations from the equilibrium relationship with the option market still lead to adjustments in the credit spreads observed or implied from other markets. However, options no longer dominate price discovery in any of the periods considered. Our findings have implications for traders, credit risk managers and financial regulators.

The impact of energy performance certificates on the rental and capital values of commercial property assets: some preliminary evidence from the UK

This paper focuses on the effect of energy performance ratings on the capital values, rental values and equivalent yields of UK commercial property assets. Of which a small number are also BREEAM rated, the study is based upon 708 commercial property assets held in the IPD UK Universe drawn from across all PAS segments. Incorporating a range of controls such as unexpired lease term, vacancy rate and tenant credit risk, hedonic regression procedures are used to estimate the effect of EPC rating. The study finds no evidence of a strong relationship between environmental and/or energy performance and rental and capital value. Bearing in mind the small number of BREEAM rated assets, there was a small but statistically significant effect on equivalent yield only. Similarly, there was no evidence that the EPC rating had any effect on Market Rent or Market Value with only minor effects of EPC ratings on equivalent yields. The preliminary conclusion is that energy labelling is not yet having the effects on Market Values and Market Rents that provide incentives for market participants to improve the energy efficiency of their commercial real estate assets.

Residential property loans and bank performance during property price booms: evidence from Europe

Understanding the performance of banks is of the utmost importance due to the impact the sector may have on economic growth and financial stability. Residential mortgage loans constitute a large proportion of the portfolio of many banks and are one of the key assets in the determination of their performance. Using a dynamic panel model, we analyse the impact of residential mortgage loans on bank profitability and risk, based on a sample of 555 banks in the European Union (EU-15), over the period from 1995 to 2008. We find that an increase in residential mortgage loans seems to improve bank’s performance in terms of both profitability and credit risk in good market, pre-financial crisis, conditions. These findings may aid in explaining why banks rush to lend to property during booms because of the positive effect it has on performance. The results also show that credit risk and profitability are lower during the upturn in the residential property cycle.

The impact of liquidity on senior credit index spreads during the subprime crisis

This paper examines the effects of liquidity during the 2007–09 crisis, focussing on the Senior Tranche of the CDX.NA.IG Index and on Moody's AAA Corporate Bond Index. It aims to understand whether the sharp increase in the credit spreads of these AAA-rated credit indices can be explained by worse credit fundamentals alone or whether it also reflects a lack of depth in the relevant markets, the scarcity of risk-capital, and the liquidity preference exhibited by investors. Using cointegration analysis and error correction models, the paper shows that during the crisis lower market and funding liquidity are important drivers of the increase in the credit spread of the AAA-rated structured product, whilst they are less significant in explaining credit spread changes for a portfolio of unstructured credit instruments. Looking at the experience of the subprime crisis, the study shows that when the conditions under which securitisation can work properly (liquidity, transparency and tradability) suddenly disappear, investors are left highly exposed to systemic risk.