Mathematical relationships between scoring parameters in capped tendering

Mathematical relationships between Scoring Parameters can be used in Economic Scoring Formulas (ESF) in tendering to distribute the score among bidders in the economic part of a proposal. Each contracting authority must set an ESF when publishing tender specifications and the strategy of each bidder will differ depending on the ESF selected and the weight of the overall proposal scoring. This paper introduces the various mathematical relationships and density distributions that describe and inter-relate not only the main Scoring Parameters but the main Forecasting Parameters in any capped tender (those whose price is upper-limited). Forecasting Parameters, as variables that can be known in advance before the deadline of a tender is reached, together with Scoring Parameters constitute the basis of a future Bid Tender Forecasting Model.

Detecting abnormal and collusive bids in capped tendering

Recent developments in the area of Bid Tender Forecasting have enabled bidders to implement new types of easy-to-use tools for increasing their chances of winning contracts. Although these new tools (such as iso-Score Curve Graphs, Scoring Probability Graphs, and Position Probability Graphs) are designed for bidders in capped tendering (tenders with an upper price limit), some of their principles can also be applied by a Contracting Authority to detect which bidders do not follow a standard pattern, that is, their bids are extremely high or low. Since a collusive bid generally needs to be sufficiently high or low to make an impact on the bid distribution, any person in charge of supervising capped tenders can be alerted to any bidder that might be involved in a cartel after identifying the same abnormal behavior in a series of tenders through simple calculations and a new type of graph.

Estimating future bidding performance of competitor bidders in capped tenders

Research in Bid Tender Forecasting Models (BTFM) has been in progress since the 1950s. None of the developed models were easy-to-use tools for effective use by bidding practitioners because the advanced mathematical apparatus and massive data inputs required. This scenario began to change in 2012 with the development of the Smartbid BTFM, a quite simple model that presents a series of graphs that enables any project manager to study competitors using a relatively short historical tender dataset. However, despite the advantages of this new model, so far, it is still necessary to study all the auction participants as an indivisible group; that is, the original BTFM was not devised for analyzing the behavior of a single bidding competitor or a subgroup of them. The present paper tries to solve that flaw and presents a stand-alone methodology useful for estimating future competitors’ bidding behaviors separately.

Subcontract and supply enquiries in the tender process of contractors

In the tender process, contractors often rely on subcontract and supply enquiries to calculate their bid prices. However, this integral part of the bidding process is not empirically articulated in the literature. Over 30 published materials on the tendering process of contractors that talk about enquiries were reviewed and found to be based mainly on experiential knowledge rather than systematic evidence. The empirical research here helps to describe the process of enquiries precisely, improve it in practice, and have some basis to support it in theory. Using a live participant observation case study approach, the whole tender process was shadowed in the offices of two of the top 20 UK civil engineering construction firms. This helped to investigate 15 research questions on how contractors enquire and obtain prices from subcontractors and suppliers. Forty-three subcontract enquiries and 18 supply enquiries were made across two different projects with average value of 7m. An average of 15 subcontract packages and seven supply packages was involved. Thus, two or three subcontractors or suppliers were invited to bid in each package. All enquiries were formulated by the estimator, with occasional involvement of three other personnel. Most subcontract prices were received in an average of 14 working days; and supply prices took five days. The findings show 10 main activities involved in processing enquiries and their durations, as well as wasteful practices associated with enquiries. Contractors should limit their enquiry invitations to a maximum of three per package, and optimize the waiting time for quotations in order to improve cost efficiency.

Commercial reviews in the tender process of contractors

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to show the extent to which clients amend standard form contracts in practice, the locus of the amendments, and how contractors respond to the amendments when putting together a bid. Design/methodology/approach – Four live observational case studies were carried out in two of the top 20 UK construction firms. The whole process used to review the proposed terms and conditions of the contract was shadowed using participant observation, interview and documentary analysis. Findings – All four cases showed strong evidence of amendments relating mostly to payment and contractual aspects: 83 amendments in Case Study 1 (CS1), 80 in CS2, 15 in CS3 and 29 in CS4. This comprised clauses that were modified (37 per cent), substituted (23 per cent), deleted (7 per cent) and new additions (33 per cent). Risks inherent in the amendments were mostly addressed through contractual rather than price mechanisms, to reflect commercial imperatives. “Qualifications” and “clarifications” were included in the tender submissions for post-tender negotiations. Thus, the amendments did not necessarily influence price. There was no evidence of a “standard-form contract“ being used as such, although clients may draw on published “standard-form contracts” to derive the forms of contract actually used in practice. Practical implications – Contractors should pay attention to clauses relating to contractual and financial aspects when reviewing tender documents. Clients should draft equitable payment and contractual terms and conditions to reduce risk of dispute. Indeed, it is prudent for clients not to pass on inestimable risks. Originality/value – A better understanding of the extent and locus of amendments in standard form contracts, and how contractors respond, is provided.

Risk accountability in the tender process of contractors in Ghana and UK

The process of how contractors take account of risk when calculating their bids for construction work is investigated based on preliminary investigations and case studies in Ghana and UK. Ghana and UK were chosen, more or less arbitrarily, for the purpose of case studies, and to test the idea that there are systematic differences between the approaches in different places. Clear differences were found in the risk pricing approaches of contractors in the two countries. The difference appeared to emanate from the professional knowledge and competence of the bid team members, company policy, corporate accountability and the business environments in which the contractors operate. Both groups of contractors take account of risk in estimates. However, risk accountability was found to be higher on the agenda in the tender process of UK contractors, documented more systematically, and assessed and managed more rigorously with input from the whole bid team. Risk accountability takes place at three levels of the tender process and is dictated strongly by market forces and company circumstances.

How contractors price risk in bids: theory and practice

Formal and analytical models that contractors can use to assess and price project risk at the tender stage have proliferated in recent years. However, they are rarely used in practice. Introducing more models would, therefore, not necessarily help. A better understanding is needed of how contractors arrive at a bid price in practice, and how, and in what circumstances, risk apportionment actually influences pricing levels. More than 60 proposed risk models for contractors that are published in journals were examined and classified. Then exploratory interviews with five UK contractors and documentary analyses on how contractors price work generally and risk specifically were carried out to help in comparing the propositions from the literature to what contractors actually do. No comprehensive literature on the real bidding processes used in practice was found, and there is no evidence that pricing is systematic. Hence, systematic risk and pricing models for contractors may have no justifiable basis. Contractors process their bids through certain tendering gateways. They acknowledge the risk that they should price. However, the final settlement depends on a set of complex, micro-economic factors. Hence, risk accountability may be smaller than its true cost to the contractor. Risk apportionment occurs at three stages of the whole bid-pricing process. However, analytical approaches tend not to incorporate this, although they could.

Quality of tender documents: case studies from the UK

Tendering is one of the stages in construction procurement that requires extensive information and documents exchange. However, tender documents are not always clear in practice. The aim of this study was to ascertain the clarity and adequacy of tender documents used in practice. Access was negotiated into two UK construction firms and the whole tender process for two projects was shadowed for 6-7 weeks in each firm using an ethnographic approach. A significant amount of tender queries, amendments and addenda were recorded. This showed that quality of tender documentation is still a problem in construction despite the existence of standards like Co-ordinated Project Information (1987) and British Standard 1192 (1984 and 1990) that are meant to help in producing clear and consistent project information. Poor quality tender documents are a source of inaccurate estimates, claims and disputes on contracts. Six recommendations are presented to help in improving the quality of tender documentation. Further research is needed into the recommendations to help improve the quality of tender documents, perhaps in conjunction with an industry-wide investigation into the level of incorporation of CPI principles in practice.

Back from beyond the bid-ask spread: perspectives on liquidity

Research into the topic of liquidity has greatly benefited from the availability of data. Although bid-ask spreads were inaccessible to researchers, Roll (1984) provided a conceptual model that estimated the effective bid-ask prices from regular time series data, recorded on a daily or longer interval. Later data availability improved and researchers were able to address questions regarding the factors that influenced the spreads and the relationship between spreads and risk, return and liquidity. More recently transaction data have been used to measure the effective spread and researchers have been able to refine the concepts of liquidity to include the impact of transactions on price movements (Clayton and McKinnon, 2000) on a trade-by-trade analysis. This paper aims to use techniques that combine elements from all three approaches and, by studying US data over a relatively long time period, to throw light on earlier research as well as to reveal the changes in liquidity over the period controlling for extraneous factors such as market, age and size of REIT. It also reveals some comparable results for the UK market over the same period.

Back from beyond bid-ask spread: estimating liquidity in international markets

Research on the topic of liquidity has greatly benefited from the improved availability of data. Researchers have addressed questions regarding the factors that influence bid-ask spreads and the relationship between spreads and risk, return and liquidity. Intra-day data have been used to measure the effective spread and researchers have been able to refine the concepts of liquidity to include the price impact of transactions on a trade-by-trade analysis. The growth in the creation of tax-transparent securities has greatly enhanced the visibility of securitized real estate, and has naturally led to the question of whether the increased visibility of real estate has caused market liquidity to change. Although the growth in the public market for securitized real estate has occurred in international markets, it has not been accompanied by universal publication of transaction data. Therefore this paper develops an aggregate daily data-based test for liquidity and applies the test to US data in order to check for consistency with the results of prior intra-day analysis. If the two approaches produce similar results, we can apply the same technique to markets in which less detailed data are available and offer conclusions on the liquidity of a wider set of markets.

Quick abnormal-bid-detection method for construction contract auctions

Noncompetitive bids have recently become a major concern in both public and private sector construction contract auctions. Consequently, several models have been developed to help identify bidders potentially involved in collusive practices. However, most of these models require complex calculations and extensive information that is difficult to obtain. The aim of this paper is to utilize recent developments for detecting abnormal bids in capped auctions (auctions with an upper bid limit set by the auctioner) and extend them to the more conventional uncapped auctions (where no such limits are set). To accomplish this, a new method is developed for estimating the values of bid distribution supports by using the solution to what has become known as the German Tank problem. The model is then demonstrated and tested on a sample of real construction bid data, and shown to detect cover bids with high accuracy. This paper contributes to an improved understanding of abnormal bid behavior as an aid to detecting and monitoring potential collusive bid practices.

Scoring rules and abnormally low bids criteria in construction tenders: a taxonomic review

In the global construction context, the best value or most economically advantageous tender is becoming a widespread approach for contractor selection, as an alternative to other traditional awarding criteria such as the lowest price. In these multi-attribute tenders, the owner or auctioneer solicits proposals containing both a price bid and additional technical features. Once the proposals are received, each bidder’s price bid is given an economic score according to a scoring rule, generally called an economic scoring formula (ESF) and a technical score according to pre-specified criteria. Eventually, the contract is awarded to the bidder with the highest weighted overall score (economic + technical). However, economic scoring formula selection by auctioneers is invariably and paradoxically a highly intuitive process in practice, involving few theoretical or empirical considerations, despite having been considered traditionally and mistakenly as objective, due to its mathematical nature. This paper provides a taxonomic classification of a wide variety of ESFs and abnormally low bids criteria (ALBC) gathered in several countries with different tendering approaches. Practical implications concern the optimal design of price scoring rules in construction contract tenders, as well as future analyses of the effects of the ESF and ALBC on competitive bidding behaviour.

Analysis of the distribution of the number of bidders in construction contract auctions

The number of bidders, N, involved in a construction procurement auction is known to have an important effect on the value of the lowest bid and the mark-up applied by bidders. In practice, for example, it is important for a bidder to have a good estimate of N when bidding for a current contract. One approach, instigated by Friedman in 1956, is to make such an estimate by statistical analysis and modelling. Since then, however, finding a suitable model for N has been an enduring problem for researchers and, despite intensive research activity in the subsequent 30 years, little progress has been made, due principally to the absence of new ideas and perspectives. The debate is resumed by checking old assumptions, providing new evidence relating to concomitant variables and proposing a new model. In doing this and in order to ensure universality, a novel approach is developed and tested by using a unique set of 12 construction tender databases from four continents. This shows the new model provides a significant advancement on previous versions. Several new research questions are also posed and other approaches identified for future study.