Acute stroke predisposes to oral gram-negative bacilli - a cause of aspiration pneumonia?

Objectives: To assess any change in the oral flora in the mouths of stroke patients during the acute and rehabilitation phases and to determine whether this is related to episodes of aspiration pneumonia and clinical outcome. Materials and Methods: This observational study was carried out in hospital wards in a University teaching hospital. The subjects were patients immediately post-stroke and during the rehabilitation period, acute admissions and a group of healthy volunteers. An assessment of dentition and swallow in the presence or absence of oral aerobic gram-negative bacilli (AGNB) was correlated. Results: Of the acute stroke patients 52% had an unsafe swallow. AGNB carriage was documented in 34% of the acute stroke group. Of the 11 patients who died 55% had AGNB, 73% had an unsafe swallow and 36% had a combination of both. Conclusion: AGNB is a common finding in acute stroke patients. It is not a consequence of age or acute hospitalisation and is associated with an unsafe swallow and a higher mortality. Copyright (C) 2003 S. Karger AG, Basel.

An Experiment on Prisoner's Dilemma with confirmed Proposals

We apply an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of signing a cooperative agreement in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players’ willingness to cooperate and on their beliefs about the others’ type.

An experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with confirmed proposals

We suggest an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner's Dilemma game. We interpret players' proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of cooperation in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players' willingness to cooperate and as signals pursuing individualistic objectives like publicizing one's bargaining abilities or eliciting those of the opponent.

Managing a duopolistic water market with confirmed proposals. An experiment

We report results from experimental water markets in which owners of two different sources of water supply water to households and farmers. The final water quality consumed by each type of consumer is determined through mixing of qualities from two different resources. We compare the standard duopolistic market structure with an alternative market clearing mechanism inspired by games with confirmed strategies (which have been shown to yield collusive outcomes). As in the static case, complex dynamic markets operating under a confirmed proposals protocol yield less efficient outcomes because coordination among independent suppliers has the usual effects of restricting output and increasing prices to the users. Our results suggest that, when market mechanisms are used to allocate water to its users, the rule of thumb used by competition authorities can also serve as a guide towards water market regulation.

Environmental agreements as a Hawk-Dove game with confirmed proposals

This paper aims at two different contributions to the literature on international environmental agreements. First, we model environmental agreements as a generic situation, characterized as a Hawk-Dove game with multiple asymmetric equilibria. Second, the article applies the theory on non-cooperative games with confirmed proposals, based on an alternating proposals bargaining protocol, as a way of overcoming the usual problems of coordination and bargaining failures in environmental agreement games, due to payoff asymmetry and equilibrium multiplicity.