Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts: experimental evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk preferences or incentives. Even when compensated through restricted company stock, experimental CEOs take large amounts of excessive risk. This contradicts classical financial theory, but can be explained through risk preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. Compensation through options further increases risk taking as expected. We show that this effect is driven mainly by the personal asset position of the experimental CEO, thus having deleterious effects on company performance.

Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability

Performance-contingent compensation by means of stock options may induce risk-taking in agents that is excessive from the point of view of the company or the shareholders. We test whether increasing shareholder control may be an effective checking mechanism to rein in such excessive risk-taking. We thus tell one group of experimental CEOs that they may have to justify their decision-making processes in front of their shareholders. This indeed reduces risk-taking and increases the performance of the companies they manage. Implications are discussed.

Stakeholder-defined corporate responsibility for a pre-credit-crunch financial service company: lessons for how good reputations are won and lost

This paper presents a study that identifies a stakeholder-defined concept of Corporate Responsibility (CR) in the context of a UK financial service organisation in the immediate pre-credit crunch era. From qualitative analysis of interviews and focus groups with employees and customers, we identify, in a wide-ranging stakeholder-defined concept of CR, six themes that together imply two necessary conditions for a firm to be regarded as responsible— both corporate actions and character must be consonant with CR. This provides both empirical support for a notable, recent theoretical contribution by Godfrey (in Acad Manag Rev 30:777–798, 2005) and novel lessons for reputation management practice.