Shrubs, granivores and annual plant community stability in an arid ecosystem

Compensatory population dynamics among species stabilise aggregate community variables. Inter-specific competition is thought to be stabilising as it promotes asynchrony among populations. However, we know little about other inter-specific interactions, such as facilitation and granivory. Such interactions are also likely to influence population synchrony and community stability, especially in harsh environments where they are thought to have relatively strong effects in plant communities. We use a manipulative experiment to test the effects of granivores (harvester ants) and nurse plants (dwarf shrubs) on annual plant community dynamics in the Negev desert, Israel. We present evidence for weak and inconsistent effects of harvester ants on plant abundance and on population and community stability. By contrast, we show that annual communities under shrubs were more species rich, had higher plant density and were temporally less variable than communities in the inter-shrub matrix. Species richness and plant abundance were also more resistant to drought in the shrub under-storey compared with the inter-shrub matrix, although population dynamics in both patch types were synchronised. Hence, we show that inter-specific interactions other than competition affect community stability, and that hypothesised mechanisms linking compensatory dynamics and community stability may not operate to the same extent in arid plant communities.

Allocating community-level payments for ecosystem services initial experiences from a REDD pilot in Tanzania

Payments for ecosystem services (PES) typically reward landowners for managing their land to provide ecosystem services that would not otherwise be provided. REDD—Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation—is a form of PES aimed at decreasing carbon emissions from forest conversion and extraction in lower-income countries. A key challenge for REDD occurs when it is implemented at the community rather than the individual landowner level. Whilst achieving this community-level reduction relies on individuals changing their interaction with the forest, incentives are not aligned explicitly at the individual level. Rather, payments are made to the community as a single entity in exchange for verified reduced forest loss, as per a PES scheme. In this paper, we explore how community level REDD has been implemented in one multiple-village pilot in Tanzania. Our findings suggest that considerable attention has been paid to monitoring, reporting, verification, and equity. Though no explicit mechanism ensures individual compliance with the group PES, the development of village level institutions, “social fencing,” and a shared future through equal REDD payments factor into community decisions that influence the level of community compliance that the program will eventually achieve. However, few villages allocate funds for explicit enforcement efforts to protect the forest from illegal activities undertaken by outsiders.