The implications of climate policy for the impacts of climate change on global water resources

This paper assesses the implications of climate policy for exposure to water resources stresses. It compares a Reference scenario which leads to an increase in global mean temperature of 4oC by the end of the 21st century with a Mitigation scenario which stabilises greenhouse gas concentrations at around 450ppm CO2e and leads to a 2oC increase in 2100. Associated changes in river runoff are simulated using a global hydrological model, for four spatial patterns of change in temperature and rainfall. There is a considerable difference in hydrological change between these four patterns, but the percentages of change avoided at the global scale are relatively robust. By the 2050s, the Mitigation scenario typically avoids between 16 and 30% of the change in runoff under the Reference scenario, and by 2100 it avoids between 43 and 65%. Two different measures of exposure to water resources stress are calculated, based on resources per capita and the ratio of withdrawals to resources. Using the first measure, the Mitigation scenario avoids 8-17% of the impact in 2050 and 20-31% in 2100; with the second measure, the avoided impacts are 5-21% and 15-47% respectively. However, at the same time, the Mitigation scenario also reduces the positive impacts of climate change on water scarcity in other areas. The absolute numbers and locations of people affected by climate change and climate policy vary considerably between the four climate model patterns.

To what extent are EU steel companies susceptible to competitive loss due to climate policy?

In recognition of their competitive vulnerability, a set of special rules have been devised for managing sectors such as steel and cement within the EU ETS. These rules basically seek to set sector specific performance benchmarks and reward top performers. However, the steel sector as a whole will receive the vast majority of its allowances for free in Phase III. Perceptions of competitive vulnerability have been largely based on inherently hypothetical analyses which rely heavily on counterfactual scenario and abatement cost estimates often provided by firms themselves. This paper diverges from these approaches by providing a qualitative assessment of the two key reasons underpinning the competitive vulnerability argument of the EU Steel Companies based on interviews and case study involving the three largest producers of steel within the EU – AcerlorMittal, Corus, and ThyssenKrupp. We find that these arguments provide only partial and weak justifications for competitive loss and discriminatory treatment in the EUETS. This strategy is difficult to counter by governments due to information asymmetry; and it appears to have proved very successful insofar as it has helped the industry to achieve free allocation in Phases I-III of EU ETS by playing up the risk of carbon leakage.

A global assessment of the effects of climate policy on the impacts of climate change

This study presents the first global-scale multi-sectoral regional assessment of the magnitude and uncertainty in the impacts of climate change avoided by emissions policies. The analysis suggests that the most stringent emissions policy considered here – which gives a 50% chance of remaining below a 2oC temperature rise target - reduces impacts by 20-65% by 2100 relative to a ‘business-as-usual’ pathway (A1B) which reaches 4oC, and can delay impacts by several decades. Effects vary between sector and region, and there are few noticeable effects of mitigation policy by 2030. The impacts avoided by 2100 are more strongly influenced by the date and level at which emissions peak than the rate of decline of emissions, with an earlier and lower emissions peak avoiding more impacts. The estimated proportion of impacts avoided at the global scale is relatively robust despite uncertainty in the spatial pattern of climate change, but the absolute amount of avoided impacts is considerably more variable and therefore uncertain.

The national dialogue on behaviour change in UK climate policy: some observations on responsibility, agency and political dimensions

This chapter explores the politics around the role of agency in the UK climate change debate. Government interventions on the demand side of consumption have increasingly involved attempts to obtain greater traction with the values, attitudes and beliefs of citizens in relation to climate change and also in terms of influencing consumer behaviour at an individual level. With figures showing that approximately 40% of the UK’s carbon emissions are attributable to household and transport behaviour, policy initiatives have progressively focused on the facilitation of “sustainable behaviours”. Evidence suggests however, that mobilisation of pro-environmental attitudes in addressing the perceived “value-action gap” has so far had limited success. Research in this field suggests that there is a more significant and nuanced “gap” between context and behaviour; a relationship that perhaps provides a more adroit reflection of reasons why people do not necessarily react in the way that policy-makers anticipate. Tracing the development of the UK Government’s behaviour change agenda over the last decade, we posit that a core reason for the limitations of this programme relates to an excessively narrow focus on the individual. This has served to obscure some of the wider political and economic aspects of the debate in favour of a more simplified discussion. The second part of the chapter reports findings from a series of focus groups exploring some of the wider political views that people hold around household energy habits, purchase and use of domestic appliances, and transport behaviour-and discusses these insights in relation to the literature on the agenda’s apparent limitations. The chapter concludes by considering whether the aims of the Big Society approach (recently established by the UK’s Coalition Government) hold the potential to engage more directly with some of these issues or whether they merely constitute a “repackaging” of the individualism agenda.

The effect of climate policy on the impacts of climate change on river flows in the UK

This paper compares the effects of two indicative climate mitigation policies on river flows in six catchments in the UK with two scenarios representing un-mitigated emissions. It considers the consequences of uncertainty in both the pattern of catchment climate change as represented by different climate models and hydrological model parameterisation on the effects of mitigation policy. Mitigation policy has little effect on estimated flow magnitudes in 2030. By 2050 a mitigation policy which achieves a 2oC temperature rise target reduces impacts on low flows by 20-25% compared to a business-as-usual emissions scenario which increases temperatures by 4oC by the end of the 21st century, but this is small compared to the range in impacts between different climate model scenarios. However, the analysis also demonstrates that an early peak in emissions would reduce impacts by 40-60% by 2080 (compared with the 4oC pathway), easing the adaptation challenge over the long term, and can delay by several decades the impacts that would be experienced from around 2050 in the absence of policy. The estimated proportion of impacts avoided varies between climate model patterns and, to a lesser extent, hydrological model parameterisations, due to variations in the projected shape of the relationship between climate forcing and hydrological response.

Observed adaptation to climate change: UK evidence of transition to a well-adapting society

This paper investigates whether and to what extent a wide range of actors in the UK are adapting to climate change, and whether this is evidence of a social transition. We document evidence of over 300 examples of early adopters of adaptation practice to climate change in the UK. These examples span a range of activities from small adjustments (or coping) to building adaptive capacity, implementing actions and creating deeper systemic change in public and private organisations in a range of sectors. We find that adaptation in the UK has been dominated by government initiatives and has principally occurred in the form of research into climate change impacts. These actions within government stimulate a further set of actions at other scales in public agencies, regulatory agencies and regional government (or in the devolved administrations), though with little real evidence of climate change adaptation initiatives trickling down to local government level. The water supply and flood defence sectors, requiring significant investment in large scale infrastructure such as reservoirs and coastal defences, have invested more heavily in identifying potential impacts and adaptations. Economic sectors that are not dependent on large scale infrastructure appear to be investing far less effort and resources in preparing for climate change. We conclude that while the government-driven top-down targeted adaptation approach has generated anticipatory action at low cost, it may also have created enough niche activities to allow for diffusion of new adaptation practices in response to real or perceived climate change. These results have significant implications for how climate policy can be developed to support autonomous adaptors in the UK and other countries.

Transport impacts on atmosphere and climate: metrics

The transport sector emits a wide variety of gases and aerosols, with distinctly different characteristics which influence climate directly and indirectly via chemical and physical processes. Tools that allow these emissions to be placed on some kind of common scale in terms of their impact on climate have a number of possible uses such as: in agreements and emission trading schemes; when considering potential trade-offs between changes in emissions resulting from technological or operational developments; and/or for comparing the impact of different environmental impacts of transport activities. Many of the non-CO2 emissions from the transport sector are short-lived substances, not currently covered by the Kyoto Protocol. There are formidable difficulties in developing metrics and these are particularly acute for such short-lived species. One difficulty concerns the choice of an appropriate structure for the metric (which may depend on, for example, the design of any climate policy it is intended to serve) and the associated value judgements on the appropriate time periods to consider; these choices affect the perception of the relative importance of short- and long-lived species. A second difficulty is the quantification of input parameters (due to underlying uncertainty in atmospheric processes). In addition, for some transport-related emissions, the values of metrics (unlike the gases included in the Kyoto Protocol) depend on where and when the emissions are introduced into the atmosphere – both the regional distribution and, for aircraft, the distribution as a function of altitude, are important. In this assessment of such metrics, we present Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) as these have traditionally been used in the implementation of climate policy. We also present Global Temperature Change Potentials (GTPs) as an alternative metric, as this, or a similar metric may be more appropriate for use in some circumstances. We use radiative forcings and lifetimes from the literature to derive GWPs and GTPs for the main transport-related emissions, and discuss the uncertainties in these estimates. We find large variations in metric (GWP and GTP) values for NOx, mainly due to the dependence on location of emissions but also because of inter-model differences and differences in experimental design. For aerosols we give only global-mean values due to an inconsistent picture amongst available studies regarding regional dependence. The uncertainty in the presented metric values reflects the current state of understanding; the ranking of the various components with respect to our confidence in the given metric values is also given. While the focus is mostly on metrics for comparing the climate impact of emissions, many of the issues are equally relevant for stratospheric ozone depletion metrics, which are also discussed.

Time of emergence of climate signals

The time at which the signal of climate change emerges from the noise of natural climate variability (Time of Emergence, ToE) is a key variable for climate predictions and risk assessments. Here we present a methodology for estimating ToE for individual climate models, and use it to make maps of ToE for surface air temperature (SAT) based on the CMIP3 global climate models. Consistent with previous studies we show that the median ToE occurs several decades sooner in low latitudes, particularly in boreal summer, than in mid-latitudes. We also show that the median ToE in the Arctic occurs sooner in boreal winter than in boreal summer. A key new aspect of our study is that we quantify the uncertainty in ToE that arises not only from inter-model differences in the magnitude of the climate change signal, but also from large differences in the simulation of natural climate variability. The uncertainty in ToE is at least 30 years in the regions examined, and as much as 60 years in some regions. Alternative emissions scenarios lead to changes in both the median ToE (by a decade or more) and its uncertainty. The SRES B1 scenario is associated with a very large uncertainty in ToE in some regions. Our findings have important implications for climate modelling and climate policy which we discuss.

Breaking the impasse: towards a new regime for international climate governance

The reality of the current international order makes it imperative that a just and effective climate regime balance the historical responsibility of developed countries with the increasing absolute emissions from many developing nations. In this short outlook article, key pillars are proposed for a new international climate architecture that envisions replacing the current annex system with two new annexes –Annex α, for countries with high current emissions and historically high emissions, and Annex β, for countries with high current emissions and historically low emissions. Countries in both annexes would implement legally binding targets under this framework. Additionally, this proposal includes tweaks and revisions to funding and technology transfer mechanisms to correct for weaknesses and inequities under the current Kyoto architecture. The proposed framework stems from a belief that a top-down, international approach to climate policy remains the most effective for ensuring environmental integrity. Given the slow rate of institutional learning, reforming and improving the current system is held as a more efficient course of action than abandoning the progress already achieved. It is argued that the proposed framework effectively accommodates key equity, environmental integrity and political feasibility concerns.

Conspicuous redemption? Reflections on the promises and perils of the 'celebritization' of climate change

With rising public awareness of climate change, celebrities have become an increasingly important community of non nation-state ‘actors’ influencing discourse and action, thereby comprising an emergent climate science–policy–celebrity complex. Some feel that these amplified and prominent voices contribute to greater public understanding of climate change science, as well as potentially catalyze climate policy cooperation. However, critics posit that increased involvement from the entertainment industry has not served to influence substantive long-term advancements in these arenas; rather, it has instead reduced the politics of climate change to the domain of fashion and fad, devoid of political and public saliency. Through tracking media coverage in Australia, Canada, the United States, and United Kingdom, we map out the terrain of a ‘Politicized Celebrity System’ in attempts to cut through dualistic characterizations of celebrity involvement in politics. We develop a classification system of the various types of climate change celebrity activities, and situate movements in contemporary consumer- and spectacle-driven carbon-based society. Through these analyses, we place dynamic and contested interactions in a spatially and temporally-sensitive ‘Cultural Circuits of Climate Change Celebrities’ model. In so doing, first we explore how these newly ‘authorized’ speakers and ‘experts’ might open up spaces in the public sphere and the science/policy nexus through ‘celebritization’ effects. Second, we examine how the celebrity as the ‘heroic individual’ seeking ‘conspicuous redemption’ may focus climate change actions through individualist frames. Overall, this paper explores potential promises, pitfalls and contradictions of this increasingly entrenched set of ‘agents’ in the cultural politics of climate change. Thus, as a form of climate change action, we consider whether it is more effective to ‘plant’ celebrities instead of trees.

Observed adaptation to climate change as initiated transition

This paper investigates whether and to what extent a wide range of actors in the UK are adapting to climate change, and whether this is evidence of a social transition. We document evidence of over 300 examples of early adopters of adaptation practice to climate change in the UK. These examples span a range of activities from small adjustments (or coping), to building adaptive capacity, to implementing actions and to creating deeper systemic change in public and private organisations in a range of sectors. We find that adaptation in the UK has been dominated by government initiatives and has principally occurred in the form of research into climate change impacts. These government initiatives have stimulated a further set of actions at other scales in public agencies, regulatory agencies and regional government (and the devolved administrations), though with little real evidence of climate change adaptation initiatives trickling down to local government level. The sectors requiring significant investment in large scale infrastructure have invested more heavily than those that do not in identifying potential impacts and adaptations. Thus we find a higher level of adaptation activity by the water supply and flood defence sectors. Sectors that are not dependent on large scale infrastructure appear to be investing far less effort and resources in preparing for climate change. We conclude that the UK government-driven top-down targeted adaptation approach has generated anticipatory action at low cost in some areas. We also conclude that these actions may have created enough niche activities to allow for diffusion of new adaptation practices in response to real or perceived climate change. These results have significant implications for how climate policy can be developed to support autonomous adaptors in the UK and other countries.

Climate change projections using the IPSL-CM5 Earth System Model: from CMIP3 to CMIP5

We present the global general circulation model IPSL-CM5 developed to study the long-term response of the climate system to natural and anthropogenic forcings as part of the 5th Phase of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP5). This model includes an interactive carbon cycle, a representation of tropospheric and stratospheric chemistry, and a comprehensive representation of aerosols. As it represents the principal dynamical, physical, and bio-geochemical processes relevant to the climate system, it may be referred to as an Earth System Model. However, the IPSL-CM5 model may be used in a multitude of configurations associated with different boundary conditions and with a range of complexities in terms of processes and interactions. This paper presents an overview of the different model components and explains how they were coupled and used to simulate historical climate changes over the past 150 years and different scenarios of future climate change. A single version of the IPSL-CM5 model (IPSL-CM5A-LR) was used to provide climate projections associated with different socio-economic scenarios, including the different Representative Concentration Pathways considered by CMIP5 and several scenarios from the Special Report on Emission Scenarios considered by CMIP3. Results suggest that the magnitude of global warming projections primarily depends on the socio-economic scenario considered, that there is potential for an aggressive mitigation policy to limit global warming to about two degrees, and that the behavior of some components of the climate system such as the Arctic sea ice and the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation may change drastically by the end of the twenty-first century in the case of a no climate policy scenario. Although the magnitude of regional temperature and precipitation changes depends fairly linearly on the magnitude of the projected global warming (and thus on the scenario considered), the geographical pattern of these changes is strikingly similar for the different scenarios. The representation of atmospheric physical processes in the model is shown to strongly influence the simulated climate variability and both the magnitude and pattern of the projected climate changes.

New use of global warming potentials to compare cumulative and short-lived climate pollutants

Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have requested guidance on common greenhouse gas metrics in accounting for Nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to emission reductions1. Metric choice can affect the relative emphasis placed on reductions of ‘cumulative climate pollutants’ such as carbon dioxide versus ‘short-lived climate pollutants’ (SLCPs), including methane and black carbon2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Here we show that the widely used 100-year global warming potential (GWP100) effectively measures the relative impact of both cumulative pollutants and SLCPs on realized warming 20–40 years after the time of emission. If the overall goal of climate policy is to limit peak warming, GWP100 therefore overstates the importance of current SLCP emissions unless stringent and immediate reductions of all climate pollutants result in temperatures nearing their peak soon after mid-century7, 8, 9, 10, which may be necessary to limit warming to “well below 2 °C” (ref. 1). The GWP100 can be used to approximately equate a one-off pulse emission of a cumulative pollutant and an indefinitely sustained change in the rate of emission of an SLCP11, 12, 13. The climate implications of traditional CO2-equivalent targets are ambiguous unless contributions from cumulative pollutants and SLCPs are specified separately.

Hitting emissions targets with (statistical) confidence in multi-instrument Emissions Trading Schemes

A means of assessing, monitoring and controlling aggregate emissions from multi-instrument Emissions Trading Schemes is proposed. The approach allows contributions from different instruments with different forms of emissions targets to be integrated. Where Emissions Trading Schemes are helping meet specific national targets, the approach allows the entry requirements of new participants to be calculated and set at a level that will achieve these targets. The approach is multi-levelled, and may be extended downwards to support pooling of participants within instruments, or upwards to embed Emissions Trading Schemes within a wider suite of policies and measures with hard and soft targets. Aggregate emissions from each instrument are treated stochastically. Emissions from the scheme as a whole are then the joint probability distribution formed by integrating the emissions from its instruments. Because a Bayesian approach is adopted, qualitative and semi-qualitative data from expert opinion can be used where quantitative data is not currently available, or is incomplete. This approach helps government retain sufficient control over emissions trading scheme targets to allow them to meet their emissions reduction obligations, while minimising the need for retrospectively adjusting existing participants’ conditions of entry. This maintains participant confidence, while providing the necessary policy levers for good governance.

Model inter-comparison between statistical and dynamic model assessments of the long-term stability of blanket peat in Great Britain (1940-2099)

We compared output from 3 dynamic process-based models (DMs: ECOSSE, MILLENNIA and the Durham Carbon Model) and 9 bioclimatic envelope models (BCEMs; including BBOG ensemble and PEATSTASH) ranging from simple threshold to semi-process-based models. Model simulations were run at 4 British peatland sites using historical climate data and climate projections under a medium (A1B) emissions scenario from the 11-RCM (regional climate model) ensemble underpinning UKCP09. The models showed that blanket peatlands are vulnerable to projected climate change; however, predictions varied between models as well as between sites. All BCEMs predicted a shift from presence to absence of a climate associated with blanket peat, where the sites with the lowest total annual precipitation were closest to the presence/absence threshold. DMs showed a more variable response. ECOSSE predicted a decline in net C sink and shift to net C source by the end of this century. The Durham Carbon Model predicted a smaller decline in the net C sink strength, but no shift to net C source. MILLENNIA predicted a slight overall increase in the net C sink. In contrast to the BCEM projections, the DMs predicted that the sites with coolest temperatures and greatest total annual precipitation showed the largest change in carbon sinks. In this model inter-comparison, the greatest variation in model output in response to climate change projections was not between the BCEMs and DMs but between the DMs themselves, because of different approaches to modelling soil organic matter pools and decomposition amongst other processes. The difference in the sign of the response has major implications for future climate feedbacks, climate policy and peatland management. Enhanced data collection, in particular monitoring peatland response to current change, would significantly improve model development and projections of future change.