State capitalism and social responsibility in China's banking industry

China’s financial system has experienced a series of major reforms in recent years. Efforts have been made towards introducing the shareholding system in state-owned commercial banks, restructuring of securities firms, re-organising equity of joint venture insurance companies, further improving the corporate governance structure, managing financial risks and ultimately establishing a system to protect investors (Xinhua, 2010). Financial product innovation, with the further opening up of financial markets and the development of the insurance and bond market, has increased liquidity as well as reduced financial risks. The U.S. subprime crisis indicated the benefit of financial innovations for the economy, but without proper control, they may lead to unexpected consequences. Kirkpatrick (2009) argues that failures and weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements and insufficient accounting standards and regulatory requirements attributed to the financial crisis. Similar to the financial crises of the last decade, the global financial crisis which sparked in 2008, surfaced a variety of significant corporate governance failures: the dysfunction of market mechanisms, the lack of transparency and accountability, misaligned compensation arrangements and the late response of government, all which encouraged management short-termism, poor risk management, as well as some fraudulent schemes. The unique characteristics of the Chinese banking system are an interesting point for studying post-crisis corporate governance reform. Considering that China modelled its governance system on the Anglo-American system, this paper examines the impact of the financial crisis on corporate governance reform in developed economies, and particularly, China’s reform of its financial sector. The paper further analyses the Chinese government’s role in bank supervision and risk management. In this regard, the paper contributes to the corporate governance literature within the Chinese context by providing insights into the contributing factors to the corporate governance failure that led to the global financial crisis. It also provides policy recommendations for China’s policy makers to seriously consider. The results suggest a need for the re-examination of corporate governance adequacy and the institutionalisation of business ethics. The paper’s next section provides a review of China’s financial system with reference to the financial crisis, followed by a critical evaluation of a capitalistic system and a review of Anglo-American and Continental European models. It then analyses the need for a new corporate governance model in China by considering the bank failures in developed economies and the potential risks and inefficiencies in a current State controlled system. The paper closes by reflecting the need for Chinese policy makers to continually develop, adapt and rewrite corporate governance practices capable of meeting the new challenge, and to pay attention to business ethics, an issue which goes beyond regulation.

Developing “Best Practices” for bankers’ pay in line with Basel III

This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.

Regulatory reform and productivity change in Indian banking

This paper examines the impact of regulatory reform on productivity growth and its components for Indian banks in 1992-2009. We estimate parametric and non-parametric efficiency frontiers, followed by Divisia and Malmquist indexes of Total Factor Productivity respectively. To account for technology heterogeneity among ownership types we utilise a metafrontier approach. Results are consistent across methodologies and show sustained productivity growth, driven mainly by technological progress. Furthermore, results indicate that different ownership types react differently to changes in the operating environment. The position of foreign banks becomes increasingly dominant and their production technology becomes the best practice in the industry.

An examination of cross-border strategies in banking

The paper examines the process of bank internationalisation and explores how banks become international organisations and what this involves. It also makes an assessment of the significance of their international operations and determines whether banks are truly global organisations. The empirical data are based on the 60 largest banks in the world and content analysis is used to categorise the information into the eight international strategies of Atamer, Calori, Gustavsson, and Menguzzato-Boulard [Internationalisation strategies. In R. Calori, T. Atamer, & P. Nunes (Eds.), The dynamics of international competition – from practice to theory, strategy series (pp. 162–206). London: Sage (2000)] and Bryan, Fraser, Oppenheim, and Rall [Race for the World strategies to build a great global firm. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press (1999)]. The findings suggest that the majority of banks focus on countries or geographic regions in which they have some sort of cultural or economic affinity. Moreover, apart from a relatively small number of very large banks, they are international rather than truly global organisations.