Public-private partnership's procurement criteria: the case of managing stakeholders' value creation in Kazakhstan

The article presents the study of the criteria that Kazakhstan's government used for granting a public–private partnership (PPP) contract to a private investor for construction and operation of eleven kindergartens in the city of Karaganda during 14 years. From the perspective of value creation for critical stakeholders, there was often misalignment between bidders' views of these criteria and the perceived value for citizens and the government. The latter may significantly enhance the creation of shared values in a PPP by actively engaging stakeholders in the design of the bids' assessment criteria.

Quick abnormal-bid-detection method for construction contract auctions

Noncompetitive bids have recently become a major concern in both public and private sector construction contract auctions. Consequently, several models have been developed to help identify bidders potentially involved in collusive practices. However, most of these models require complex calculations and extensive information that is difficult to obtain. The aim of this paper is to utilize recent developments for detecting abnormal bids in capped auctions (auctions with an upper bid limit set by the auctioner) and extend them to the more conventional uncapped auctions (where no such limits are set). To accomplish this, a new method is developed for estimating the values of bid distribution supports by using the solution to what has become known as the German Tank problem. The model is then demonstrated and tested on a sample of real construction bid data, and shown to detect cover bids with high accuracy. This paper contributes to an improved understanding of abnormal bid behavior as an aid to detecting and monitoring potential collusive bid practices.