Orde Wingate and the British Army, 1922-1944

Major General Orde Wingate (1903–44) was the most controversial British military commander of the Second World War, due to his idiosynchratic leadership style, which led some to question his sanity, and his fiercely pro-Zionist stance. More than sixty years after his death he still splits opinion amongst soldiers, academics and writers.

Orde Wingate and the Special Night Squads: A Feasible Policy for Counter-Terrorism?

This article analyses the counter-terrorist operations carried out by Captain (later Major General) Orde Wingate in Palestine in 1938, and considers whether these might inform current operations. Wingate's Special Night Squads were formed from British soldiers and Jewish police specifically to counter terrorist and sabotage attacks. Their approach escalated from interdicting terrorist gangs to pre-emptive attacks on suspected terrorist sanctuaries to reprisal attacks after terrorist atrocities. They continued the British practice of using irregular units in counter-insurgency, which was sustained into the postwar era and contributed to the evolution of British Special Forces. Wingate's methods proved effective in pacifying terrorist-infested areas and could be applied again, but only in the face of 'friction' arising from changes in cultural attitudes since the 1930s, and from the political-strategic context of post-2001 counter-insurgent and counter-terrorist operations. In some cases, however, public opinion might not preclude the use of some of Wingate's techniques.

Orde Wingate, the Iron Wall and Counter-terrorism in Palestine, 1936-1939

A pamphlet published by the British Army's Strategic and Combat Studies Institute on the then Captain Orde Wingate's formation and command of the Anglo-Jewish Special Night Squads in the Palestine Arab revolt of 1936-1939, with a discussion of their long-term strategic and political implications.

Orde Wingate and the Theory behind the Chindit Operations: Some Recent Findings

This short paper discusses some of the theory behind the Chindit operations in Burma of 1943-44, drawing parallels between Wingate's theoretical concepts post 1990s concepts of 'manoeuvre warfare.'

Orde Wingate in the Sudan, 1928-1933: Formative Experiences of the Chindit Commander

This short paper looks at Orde Wingate's role in armed policing and counter-bandit operations in Sudan during his time with the Sudan Defence Force.

Orde Wingate in the Phony War and After, 1939-1940

An account of Wingate's time in the UK, from his return to Palestine to his departure for Ethiopia.

Orde Wingate, 'Guerrilla' Warfare and Long-Range Penetration, 1940-44

Major General Orde Wingate was a highly controversial figure in his time and remains so among historians. However, his eccentric and colourful personality has drawn attention away from the nature of his military ideas, the most important of which was his concept of long-range penetration, which originated from his observations of his operations in Italian-occupied Ethiopia in 1941, and evolved into the model he put into practice in the Chindit operations in Burma in 1943-44. A review of Wingate's own official writings on this subject reveals that long-range penetration combined local guerrilla irregulars, purpose-trained regular troops and airpower into large-scale offensive operations deep in the enemy rear, with the intention of disrupting his planning process and creating situations regular forces could exploit. This evolved organically from Major General Colin Gubbins' doctrine for guerrilla resistance in enemy occupied areas, and bears some resemblance to the operational model applied by US and Allied forces, post September 2001.

MI(R,)G(R) and British Covert Operations, 1939-42

The Military Intelligence (Research) Department of the British War Office was tasked in 1940 with encouraging and supporting armed resistance in occupied Europe and the Axis-controlled Middle East. The major contention of this paper is that, in doing so, MI(R) performed a key role in British strategy in 1940-42 and in the development of what are now known as covert operations. MI(R) developed an organic, but coherent doctrine for such activity which was influential upon the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and its own sub-branch, G(R), which applied this doctrine in practice in East Africa and the Middle East in 1940-41. It was also here that a number of key figures in the development of covert operations and special forces first cut their teeth, the most notable being Major Generals Colin Gubbins and Orde Wingate.

Lumbricus terrestris L. does not impact on the remediation efficiency of compost and biochar amendments

The aim of this study was to test the impact of compost and Biochar, with or without earthworms, on the mobility and availability of metals, and on the growth of grass to re-vegetate contaminated soil from the Parys Mountain mining site, Anglesey. We also determined if the addition of earthworms compromises remediation efforts. In a laboratory experiment, contaminated soil (1343 mg Cu kg−1, 2511 mg Pb kg−1 and 262 mg Zn kg−1) was remediated with compost and/or Biochar. After 77 days Lumbricus terrestris L. earthworms were added to the treatment remediated with both compost and Biochar, and left for 28 days. L. terrestris was not able to survive in the Biochar, compost or unamended treatments. A germination and growth bioassay, using Agrostis capillaris (Common Bent) was then run on all treatments for 28 days. The combination of Biochar and compost decreased water soluble Cu (from 5.6 to 0.2 mg kg−1), Pb (0.17 to less than 0.007 mg kg−1) and Zn (3.3 to 0.05 mg kg−1) in the contaminated soil and increased the pH from 2.7 to 6.6. The addition of L. terrestris to this treatment had no effect on the concentration of the water soluble metals in the remediated soil. The compost was the only treatment that resulted in germination and growth of A. capillaris suitable for re-vegetation purposes. However, the combination of compost, Biochar (with or without L. terrestris) produced the lowest concentrations of Cu (8 mg kg−1) and Zn (36 mg kg−1) in the aboveground biomass, lower than the compost treatment (15 mgCu kg−1 and 126 mgZn kg−1). The addition of Biochar and compost both separately and as co-amendments was effective in reducing the mobility and availability of metals. The addition of L. terrestris did not re-mobilise previously sequestered metals.