Ideational change in the WTO and its impacts on EU agricultural policy institutions and the CAP

This paper argues that the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) introduced the market liberal paradigm as the ideational underpinning of the new farm trade regime. Though the immediate consequences in terms of limitations on agricultural support and protection were very modest, the Agreement did impact on the way in which domestic farm policy evolves. It forced EU agricultural policy makers to consider the agricultural negotiations when reforming the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The new paradigm in global farm trade resulted in a process of institutional layering in which concerns raised in the World Trade Organization (WTO) were gradually incorporated in EU agricultural institutions. This has resulted in gradual reform of the CAP in which policy instruments have been changed in order to make the CAP more WTO compatible. The underlying paradigm, the state-assisted paradigm, has been sustained though it has been rephrased by introducing the concept of multifunctionality.

MFN status and the choice of tariff regime

The gradualist approach to trade liberalization views the uniform tariffs implied by MFN status as an important step on the path to free trade. We investigate whether a regime of uniform tariffs will be preferable to discriminatory tariffs when countries engage in non-cooperative interaction in multilateral trade. The analysis includes product differentiation and asymmetric costs. We show that with the cost asymmetry the countries will disagree on the choice of tariff regime. When the choice of import tariffs and export subsidies is made sequentially the uniform tariff regime may not be sustainable, because of an incentive to deviate to a discriminatory regime. Hence, an international body is needed to ensure compliance with tariff agreement.

Do autocratic states trade less?

Does the political regime of a country influence its involvement in international trade? A theoretical model that predicts that autocracies trade less than democracies is developed, and the predictions of the model are tested empirically using a panel of more than 130 countries for 1962–2000. In contrast to the existing literature, data on the regime type of individual countries are used rather than information about the congruence of the regime type of pairs of trading countries. In line with the model, autocracies are found to import substantially less than democracies, even after controlling for official trade policies. This finding is very stable and does not depend on a particular setup or estimation technique.