Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory

Military doctrine is one of the conceptual components of war. Its raison d’être is that of a force multiplier. It enables a smaller force to take on and defeat a larger force in battle. This article’s departure point is the aphorism of Sir Julian Corbett, who described doctrine as ‘the soul of warfare’. The second dimension to creating a force multiplier effect is forging doctrine with an appropriate command philosophy. The challenge for commanders is how, in unique circumstances, to formulate, disseminate and apply an appropriate doctrine and combine it with a relevant command philosophy. This can only be achieved by policy-makers and senior commanders successfully answering the Clausewitzian question: what kind of conflict are they involved in? Once an answer has been provided, a synthesis of these two factors can be developed and applied. Doctrine has implications for all three levels of war. Tactically, doctrine does two things: first, it helps to create a tempo of operations; second, it develops a transitory quality that will produce operational effect, and ultimately facilitate the pursuit of strategic objectives. Its function is to provide both training and instruction. At the operational level instruction and understanding are critical functions. Third, at the strategic level it provides understanding and direction. Using John Gooch’s six components of doctrine, it will be argued that there is a lacunae in the theory of doctrine as these components can manifest themselves in very different ways at the three levels of war. They can in turn affect the transitory quality of tactical operations. Doctrine is pivotal to success in war. Without doctrine and the appropriate command philosophy military operations cannot be successfully concluded against an active and determined foe.

A battle of elephants: (I)legitimate ethical voices?

In this paper, we aim to distil myriad stakeholder voices through a Foucaudian theoretical apparatus in the establishment of ethical stakeholder voices amidst a takeover of a Ghanaian National Bank with ownership control by the state National Pension Fund and Insurance Company. Resonating with Foucault’s position that, the prove and an actual practice of ethical principles despite risk is non-existent within a democracy, this paper reveals how stakeholders in a takeover further their own interest to the neglect of the very germane societal expectation of a salient stakeholder role. We further fill an existing gap within the stakeholder literature that posit of stakeholders as always possessing the right and ethical voices. We conclude that, despite Foucault’s last lecture of The Courage of Truth: The Government of the Self and others having proven of a robust apparatus in distilling ethical voices from non-ethical within the realm of a democratic field, its idealist nature demands a counterfactual position.