Late persistence of the Acheulian in southern Britain in an MIS 8 interstadial: evidence from Harnham, Wiltshire

This paper presents evidence of the discovery of a new Middle Pleistocene site in central southern England, with undisturbed evidence of hominin occupation well-dated to an interstadial towards the end of Marine Isotope Stage 8, c. 250,000 BP. The site consists of a preserved remnant of a river terrace and its alluvial floodplain overlain by chalk-rich bankside deposits, all abutting a Chalk bedrock riverbank. It preserves an area of occupation with activity focused on the riverbank, complemented by occasional activity on a palaeo-landsurface developed on the surface of the alluvial floodplain. Lithic technology at the site consists almost entirely of handaxe manufacture, allowing attribution to an Acheulian industrial tradition. Mammalian and other palaeo-environmental remains are present and associated with the occupation horizons, including large mammal bones showing signs of hominin interference. Dating was based on OSL determinations on the sediments and amino acid racemisation of molluscan remains, supported by biostratigraphic indications. Besides being a rare instance of an undisturbed Palaeolithic palaeo-landscape covering several hectares, the site contributes to wider Quaternary research concerns over the ability of Middle Pleistocene hominins to tolerate colder climatic episodes in higher latitudes, and over settlement history and changing lithic industrial traditions of northwest Europe in relation to climate change and British peninsularity. It is suggested that the Harnham evidence may represent an insular population that had persisted in southern Britain since MIS 10/9, which became locally extinct during the glacial maximum 8.2 marking the end of MIS 8.

Modifying willingness to pay estimates where respondents mis-report their preferences

The likelihood for the Logit model is modified, so as to take account of uncertainty associated with mis-reporting in stated preference experiments estimating willingness to pay (WTP). Monte Carlo results demonstrate the bias imparted to estimates where there is mis-reporting. The approach is applied to a data set examining consumer preferences for food produced employing a nonpesticide technology. Our modified approach leads to WTP that are substantially downwardly revised.

Exposing the myth of the 1:5:200 ratio relating initial cost, maintenance and staffing costs of office buildings

In an attempt to focus clients' minds on the importance of considering the construction and maintenance costs of a commercial office building (both as a factor in staff productivity and as a fraction of lifetime staff costs) there is an often-quoted ratio of costs of 1:5:200, where for every one pound spent on construction cost, five are spent on maintenance and building operating costs and 200 on staffing and business operating costs. This seems to stem from a paper published by the Royal Academy of Engineering, in which no data is given and no derivation or defence of the ratio appears. The accompanying belief that higher quality design and construction increases staff productivity, and simultaneously reduces maintenance costs, how ever laudable, appears unsupported by research, and carries all the hallmarks of an "urban myth". In tracking down data about real buildings, a more realistic ratio appears to depend on a huge variety of variables, as well as the definition of the number of "lifetime" years. The ill-defined origins of the original ratio (1:5:200) describing these variables have made replication impossible. However, by using published sources of data, we have found that for three office buildings, a more realistic ratio is 1:0.4:12. As there is nothing in the public domain about what comprised the original research that gave rise to 1:5:200, it is not possible to make a true comparison between these new calculations and the originals. Clients and construction professionals stand to be misled because the popularity and widespread use of the wrong ratio appears to be mis-informing important investment and policy decisions.