Linguistic epistemology and the notion of monolingualism

This article has several interrelated goals, all of which relate to an attempt at understanding why monolingualism is taken to be the default norm in linguistic inquiry (from sociolinguistics to formal linguistic theorizing). With others, I will take the position that comparing instances of multilingualism to so-called monolingualism is an unfair and inevitably inaccurate comparison since, among other variables, the social environments and access to input of multilinguals compared to monolinguals is most often unavoidably different (cf. Cruz-Ferreira 2006; Edwards 2004). Additionally, I will attempt to demonstrate that even so-called monolinguals have access to a variety of grammars related to different registers of speech and, therefore, are not truly monolingual in the sense that they poses one monolithic grammatical competence. Taken together, the present discussion questions both the default status of monolingualism as well as the functional adequacy of the term monolingualism.

Beyond description to pattern: The contribution of Batesonian epistemology to critical realist research

This paper proposes a limitation to epistemological claims to theory building prevalent in critical realist research. While accepting the basic ontological and epistemological positions of the perspective as developed by Roy Bhaskar, it is argued that application in social science has relied on sociological concepts to explain the underlying generative mechanisms, and that in many cases this has been subject to the effects of an anthropocentric constraint. A novel contribution to critical realist research comes from the work and ideas of Gregory Bateson. This is in service of two central goals of critical realism, namely an abductive route to theory building and a commitment to interdisciplinarity. Five aspects of Bateson’s epistemology are introduced: (1) difference, (2) logical levels of abstraction, (3) recursive causal loops, (4) the logic of metaphor, and (5) Bateson’s theory of mind. The comparison between Bateson and Bhaskar’s ideas is seen as a form of double description, illustrative of the point being raised. The paper concludes with an appeal to critical realists to start exploring the writing and outlook of Bateson himself.