A 'Kimberley protest': diamond mining, export sanctions, and poverty in Awatia, Ghana

The temporary suspension of diamond exports in Ghana in 2006 and 2007 is arguably the most significant move to address mounting criticisms of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), an international initiative aimed at stemming the flow of rough diamonds used to finance wars. The ban, which took effect in November 2006, was much praised, particularly in civil society circles, where it continues to be seen as a genuine effort to prevent the smuggling of ‘conflict diamonds’. At the time, Ghana was accused of harbouring stones originating from rebel-held territories in neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire. No evidence was found in support of the case that it was a repository for ‘conflict diamonds’, however, and exports resumed early in March 2007. This article examines the context for the accusations of Ghana’s implication in the smuggling of illicit diamonds, and draws on recent fieldwork to explain how the suspension has affected Akwatia, the country’s main diamondiferous area. The actions taken raise important questions about how suspected violators – particularly smaller diamond-producing nations – of the KPCS should be handled, and underscore how global compacts can have a host of negative repercussions at the village level.

On the determinants of optimal border enforcement

We extend the current immigration-enforcement literature by incorporating both the practice of people smuggling and a role for non-wage income into a two-country, dynamic general equilibrium model. We use the model economy to examine three questions. First, how does technological progress in the smuggling industry affect the level of migration and capital accumulation for a given level of enforcement? Second, do changes in border enforcement affect the level of migration, capital accumulation, and smuggling activity? Third, is the optimal level of enforcement sensitive to technological progress in the smuggling industry? We show that the government chooses to devote resources to border enforcement only if the deterrent effect on smugglers is large enough. Otherwise, it is not worth taxing host-country natives as the taxes paid will more than offset any income gain resulting from fewer migrants.