Understanding the long term success of UK construction firms: the extent and role of 'hidden' corporate social responsibility

The construction sector is often described as lagging behind other major industries. At first this appears fair when considering the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). It is argued that CSR is ill-defined, with firms struggling to make sense of and engage with it. Literature suggests that the short-termism view of construction firms renders the long-term, triple-bottom-line principle of CSR untenable. This seems to be borne out by literature indicating that construction firms typically adopt a compliance-based approach to CSR instead of discretionary CSR which is regarded as adding most value to firms and benefiting the broadest group of stakeholders. However, this research conducted in the UK using a regional construction firm offers a counter argument whereby discretionary CSR approaches are well embedded and enacted within the firms’ business operations even though they are not formally articulated as CSR strategies and thus remain 'hidden'. This raises questions in the current CSR debate. First, is ‘hidden’ CSR relevant to the long term success of construction firms? and to what extent do these firms need to reinvent themselves to formally take advantage of the CSR agenda?

The coevolution of two phytoplankton species on a single resource: allelopathy as a pseudo-mixotrophy

Without the top-down effects and the external/physical forcing, a stable coexistence of two phytoplankton species under a single resource is impossible — a result well known from the principle of competitive exclusion. Here I demonstrate by analysis of a mathematical model that such a stable coexistence in a homogeneous media without any external factor would be possible, at least theoretically, provided (i) one of the two species is toxin producing thereby has an allelopathic effect on the other, and (ii) the allelopathic effect exceeds a critical level. The threshold level of allelopathy required for the coexistence has been derived analytically in terms of the parameters associated with the resource competition and the nutrient recycling. That the extra mortality of a competitor driven by allelopathy of a toxic species gives a positive feed back to the algal growth process through the recycling is explained. And that this positive feed back plays a pivotal role in reducing competition pressures and helping species succession in the two-species model is demonstrated. Based on these specific coexistence results, I introduce and explain theoretically the allelopathic effect of a toxic species as a ‘pseudo-mixotrophy’—a mechanism of ‘if you cannot beat them or eat them, just kill them by chemical weapons’. The impact of this mechanism of species succession by pseudo-mixotrophy in the form of alleopathy is discussed in the context of current understanding on straight mixotrophy and resource-species relationship among phytoplankton species.

Contribution to collective harms and responsibility

In the present contribution, I discuss the claim, endorsed by a number of authors, that contributing to a collective harm is the ground for special responsibilities to the victims of that harm. Contributors should, between them, cover the costs of the harms they have inflicted, at least if those harms would otherwise be rights-violating. I raise some doubts about the generality of this principle before moving on to sketch a framework for thinking about liability for the costs of harms in general. This framework uses a contractualist framework to build an account of how to think about liability for costs on the basis of the presumably attractive thought that individual agents should have as much control over their liabilities as is compatible with others having like control. I then use that framework to suggest that liability on the basis of contribution should be restricted to cases in which the contributors could have avoided their contribution relatively costlessly, in which meeting the liability is not crippling for them, and in which such a liability would not have chilling effects, either on them or on third parties. This account of the grounds for contributory liability also has the advantage of avoiding a number of awkward questions about what counts as a contribution by shifting the issue away from often unanswerable questions about the precise causal genesis of some harm or other. Instead, control over conduct, which plausibly has some relation to the harm, becomes crucial. On the basis of this account, I then investigate whether a number of uses of the contributory principle are entirely appropriate. I argue that contributory liability is not appropriate for cases of collective harms committed by coordinated groups in the way that, for example, Iris Marion Young and Thomas Pogge have suggested and that further investigation of how members of such groups may be liable will be needed.