EU free movement law and the legal recognition of same-sex relationships: the case for mutual recognition

This article seeks to examine the cross-border legal recognition of same-sex relationships in the EU. Although the Member States maintain an exclusive competence in the field of family law and, thus, it is up to them to determine whether they will provide a legal status to same-sex couples within their territory, they need to exercise their powers in that field in a way that does not violate EU law. This, it is suggested, requires that Member States mutually recognize the legal status of same-sex couples and do not treat same-sex couples worse than opposite-sex couples, if the basis of the differentiation is, merely, the (homosexual) sexual orientation of the two spouses/partners. Nonetheless, the current legal framework does not make it clear that Member States are under such an obligation. The main argument of the article, therefore, is that the EU must adopt a more hands-on approach towards this issue.

The Léger ruling as another example of the ECJ’s disappointingly reticent approach to the protection of the rights of LGB persons under EU law

In the 1980s, in the midst of the AIDS epidemic, many countries introduced lifetime bans on blood donations by men who had sexual relations with men (MSM). These blanket bans have, recently, begun to be challenged and, as a result, many countries have either relaxed them or completely abolished them. The case under examination (Léger ) is another instance of questioning the legality of such a ban. In particular, in this case, the European Court of Justice was called on to rule on whether a measure such as the French lifetime exclusion from blood donation of the MSM population that was at issue before the referring court is contrary to EU law. The Court ruled that although discriminatory on the ground of sexual orientation, such a ban may be justified in certain circumstances, and left it to the national court to make the final decision. This article seeks to analyse the case and to explain why, in the author’s view, the Court can be accused of—once more—not going far enough in the protection of lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) rights.