3 resultados para Self-reflexivity
em CentAUR: Central Archive University of Reading - UK
Resumo:
This study aims to explore how Chinese overseas doctoral students adjust to a different academic, social and cultural environment, using Giddens’ theoretical framework of self-identity (1991). The findings indicate the participants proactively used various coping strategies in meeting challenges, and adapting to new social environments. Continuity and stability of self-identity were achieved either culturally or academically through self-reflexivity, autonomy, creativity, authenticity, and reliance on an ontological identity. The result is to challenge the grand narrative of essentialised “problematic Chinese learners”.
Resumo:
This essay considers the interest shared by William Hogarth and Charles Dickens on the idea of instrumentality in the art of realism. Taking his cue from eighteenth-century epistemological philosophy, Hogarth developed an idea of beauty and realism as insisting upon the need for human subjectivity or perspective. Naïve realism was a style that troubled both Hogarth and Dickens and both men developed forms in which caricature, melodrama and exaggeration is crucial to the development of verisimilitude. Considering the progress pieces and the writings of Hogarth as a preface to the style of Dickens, I argue that Nicholas Nickleby developed an extraordinary self-reflexivity. Both Nicholas and his uncle Ralph form part of a narrative study of the implications of filtering perception through the distorting lens of the individual.
Resumo:
In A Compendium of the Characteristics of Categories (Padārthadharmasaṃgraha) the classical Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda (6th c. CE) presents an innovative metaphysics of the self. This article examines the defining metaphysical and axiological features of this conception of self and the dualist categorial schema in which it is located. It shows how this idea of the self, as a reflexive and ethical being, grounds a multinaturalist view of natural order and offers a conception of agency that claims to account for all the reflexive features of human mental and bodily life. Finally, it discusses the ends of self’s reflexivity and of human life as a return to the true self. It argues that at the heart of Praśastapāda’s metaphysics of self is the idea that ethics is metaphysics, and that epistemic practice is ethical practice.