Materiality, subjectification, and government: the geographies of Britain's Motorway Code

In this paper I provide a critical discussion of Foucault's work on government and governmentality. I argue that geographers have tended to overlook the ways in which practices of self-government and subjectification are performed in relation to programmes of government, and suggest that they should examine the technical devices which are embedded in networks of government. Drawing upon these observations I suggest how geographers might proceed, tracing the geographies of a specific artefact: the British government's 1958 Motorway Code. I examine how the code was designed to serve as a technology of government that could shape the conduct of fairly mobile and distant subjects, enabling them to govern their conduct and the movements of their vehicles.

Policy making without legislating: the self-regulation of commercial property leasing

The terms of a commercial property lease covers aspects such as rent, alterations to premises and the ability to leave; consequently they have a significant impact on cash flow and the ability of a business to develop. In contrast to the heavily-legislated residential sector, commercial landlords and tenants in the UK are largely free to negotiate the terms of their contract. Yet, since the property crash of 1989/90, successive governments have taken an interest in commercial leasing; in particular there is a desire to see landlords being more flexible. UK Government policy in this area has been pursued through industry self-regulation rather than legislation; since 1995 there have been three industry codes of practice on leasing. These codes are sanctioned by government and monitored by them. Yet, 15 years after the first code was launched, many in the industry see the whole code concept as ineffective and unlikely to ever achieve changes to certain aspects of landlord behaviour. This paper is the first step in considering the lease codes in the wider context of industry self-regulation. The aim of the paper is twofold: First a framework is created using the literature on industry self-regulation from various countries and industries which suggests key criteria to explain the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of self-regulation. This is then applied to the UK lease codes based on research carried out by the authors for the UK Government to monitor the success of all three codes. The outcome is a clearer understanding of the possibilities and limitations of using a voluntary solution to achieve policy aims within the property industry.

The challenge of self-regulation in commercial property leasing: a study of lease codes in the UK.

Purpose – UK Government policy to address perceived market failure in commercial property leasing has largely been pursued through industry self-regulation. Yet, it is proving difficult to assess whether self-regulation on leasing has been a “success”, or even to determine how to evaluate this. The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for this and a clearer understanding of self-regulation in commercial leasing. Design/methodology/approach – A literature review suggests key criteria to explain the (in)effectiveness of self-regulation. UK lease codes are analysed in the light of this literature, drawing on previous research carried out by the authors on the operation of these codes. Findings – Lease codes appear to be failing as an effective system of self-regulation. While there are influential market actors championing them, the fragmentation of the leasing process lessens this influence. The structures are not there to ensure implementation, monitor compliance and record views of affected stakeholders. Research limitations/implications – This work adds to the literature on self-regulation in general, and provides an insight into its operation in a previously unexplored industry. Research is needed into the experience of other countries in regulating the property industry by voluntary means. Social implications – There are institutional limitations to self-regulation within the property industry. This has implications for policy makers in considering the advantages and limitation of using a voluntary solution to achieve policy aims within the commercial leasing market. Originality/value – This paper provides a first step in considering the lease codes in the wider context of industry self-regulation and is relevant to policy makers and industry bodies.

The role of industry bodies in changing market practices through self-regulation: commercial property leasing in the UK

The UK government has sought to make changes to commercial property leasing practices. This has been the case since the recession of the 1990s. Industry self-regulation using an industry code of practice has been the vehicle for these changes. However, the code has had little direct success in changing practices. This is despite repeated threats of legislation as a constant backdrop to this initiative. The focus for this research is on the role of the industry bodies in the code initiative. They have been central to self-regulation in commercial leasing. Thus, the aim is to investigate the role of industry bodies in the process of institutional change. The context is industry self-regulation. The specific setting is commercial leasing. The main industry bodies in focus are the British Property Federation and Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors. An existing model of institutional change forms the framework for the research. A chronological narrative is constructed from secondary data. This is analysed, identifying the actions of the industry bodies within the conceptual stages of the model. The analysis shows that the industry bodies had not acted as convincing agents of change for commercial leasing. In particular there was a lack of theorisation, a key stage in the process. The industry bodies did not develop a framework necessary to guide their members through the change process. These shortcomings of the industry bodies are likely to have contributed to the failure of the Code. However, the main conclusion is that, if industry self-regulation is led by government, then the state must work with industry bodies to harness their potential as champions and drivers of institutional change. This is particularly important in achieving change in institutionalised environments.