The United Nations and the African Union: Assessing a partnership for peace in Darfur

In Resolution 1556, the Security Council, with the conflict in Darfur clearly in mind, determined that the ‘situation in Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace and security and to stability in the region’. This article focuses on the response by the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, and the African Union to the Darfur conflict. It begins by exploring the role of peacekeeping operations and regional arrangements or agencies in the overarching architecture of international peace and security. Having laid this frame of reference, it then looks at the modalities of peacekeeping in Darfur. These operations began with the African Union acting in isolation but have transitioned to an increasingly important role being played by the United Nations and a hybrid peacekeeping presence. Finally, this article asks whether, assuming that a legally dispositive conclusion can be drawn that genocide has taken place in Darfur since the outbreak of hostilities there in 2003, there exists a legal justification, or even obligation, for non-compliance by states with the sanctions regime established by Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1591. This regime of sanctions has played an important part in the Security Council's approach to Darfur but has been, unfortunately, left largely unexamined from the standpoint of international legality.

A little learning is a dangerous thing: an experimental demonstration of ignorance-driven inference

Studies of ignorance-driven decision making have been employed to analyse when ignorance should prove advantageous on theoretical grounds or else they have been employed to examine whether human behaviour is consistent with an ignorance-driven inference strategy (e. g., the recognition heuristic). In the current study we examine whether-under conditions where such inferences might be expected-the advantages that theoretical analyses predict are evident in human performance data. A single experiment shows that, when asked to make relative wealth judgements, participants reliably use recognition as a basis for their judgements. Their wealth judgements under these conditions are reliably more accurate when some of the target names are unknown than when participants recognize all of the names (a "less-is-more effect"). These results are consistent across a number of variations: the number of options given to participants and the nature of the wealth judgement. A basic model of recognition-based inference predicts these effects.