The relative success of recognition-based inference in multichoice decisions

The utility of an "ecologically rational" recognition-based decision rule in multichoice decision problems is analyzed, varying the type of judgment required (greater or lesser). The maximum size and range of a counterintuitive advantage associated with recognition-based judgment (the "less-is-more effect") is identified for a range of cue validity values. Greater ranges of the less-is-more effect occur when participants are asked which is the greatest of to choices (m > 2) than which is the least. Less-is-more effects also have greater range for larger values of in. This implies that the classic two-altemative forced choice task, as studied by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002), may not be the most appropriate test case for less-is-more effects.

Civilian casualties and nuclear weapons: the application of the rule of distinction

This chapter considers the possible use in armed conflict of low-yield (also known as tactical) nuclear weapons. The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion maintained that it is a cardinal principle that a State must never make civilians an object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets. As international humanitarian law applies equally to any use of nuclear weapons, it is argued that there is no use of nuclear weapons that could spare civilian casualties particularly if you view the long-term health and environmental effects of the use of such weaponry.

Franz Neumann, the rule of law and the unfulfilled promise of classical liberal thought

This thesis draws on the work of Franz Neumann, a critical theorist associated with the early Frankfurt School, to evaluate liberal arguments about political legitimacy and to develop an original account of the justification for the liberal state.

The foundations of the rule of law

Formal conceptions of the rule of law are popular among contemporary legal philosophers. Nonetheless, the coherence of accounts of the rule of law committed to these conceptions is sometimes fractured by elements harkening back to substantive conceptions of the rule of law. I suggest that this may be because at its origins the ideal of the rule of law was substantive through and through. I also argue that those origins are older than is generally supposed. Most authors tend to trace the ideas of the rule of law and natural law back to classical Greece, but I show that they are already recognisable and intertwined as far back as Homer. Because the founding moment of the tradition of western intellectual reflection on the rule of law placed concerns about substantive justice at the centre of the rule of law ideal, it may be hard for this ideal to entirely shrug off its substantive content. It may be undesirable, too, given the rhetorical power of appeals to the rule of law. The rule of law means something quite radical in Homer; this meaning may provide a source of normative inspiration for contemporary reflections about the rule of law.

Conflicts of law and the mutual recognition of same-sex unions in the EU

My thesis uses legal arguments to demonstrate a requirement for recognition of same-sex marriages and registered partnerships between EU Member States. I draw on the US experience, where arguments for recognition of marriages void in some states previously arose in relation to interracial marriages. I show how there the issue of recognition today depends on conflicts of law and its interface with US constitutional freedoms against discrimination. I introduce the themes of the importance of domicile, the role of the public policy exception, vested rights, and relevant US constitutional freedoms. Recognition in the EU also depends on managing the tension between private international law and freedoms guaranteed by higher norms, in this case the EU Treaties and the European Convention on Human Rights. I set out the inconsistencies between various private international law systems and the problems this creates. Other difficulties are caused by the use of nationality as a connecting factor to determine personal capacity, and the overuse of the public policy exception. I argue that EU Law can constrain the use of conflicts law or public policy by any Member State where these are used to deny effect to same-sex unions validly formed elsewhere. I address the fact that family law falls only partly within Union competence, that existing EU Directives have had limited success at achieving full equality and that powers to implement new measures have not been used to their full potential. However, Treaty provisions outlawing discrimination on grounds of nationality can be interpreted so as to require recognition in many cases. Treaty citizenship rights can also be interpreted favourably to mandate recognition, once private international law is itself recognised as an obstacle to free movement. Finally, evolving interpretations of the European Convention on Human Rights may also support claims for cross-border recognition of existing relationships.

Less-is-more effects without the recognition heuristic

Inferences consistent with “recognition-based” decision-making may be drawn for various reasons other than recognition alone. We demonstrate that, for 2-alternative forced-choice decision tasks, less-is-more effects (reduced performance with additional learning) are not restricted to recognition-based inference but can also be seen in circumstances where inference is knowledge-based but item knowledge is limited. One reason why such effects may not be observed more widely is the dependence of the effect on specific values for the validity of recognition and knowledge cues. We show that both recognition and knowledge validity may vary as a function of the number of items recognized. The implications of these findings for the special nature of recognition information, and for the investigation of recognition-based inference, are discussed

An investigation into the mechanics of cutting using data from orthogonally cutting Nylon 66

Cutting force data for Nylon 66 has been examined in terms of various different models of cutting. Theory that includes significant work of separation at the tool tip was found to give the best correlation with experimental data over a wide range of rake angles for derived primary shear plane angle. A fracture toughness parameter was used as the measure of the specific work of separation. Variation in toughness with rake angle determined from cutting is postulated to be caused by mixed mode separation at the tool tip. A rule of mixtures using independently determined values of toughness in tension (mode 1) and shear (mode 11) is found to describe well the variation with rake angle. The ratio of modes varies with rake angle and, in turn, with the primary shear plane angle. Previous suggestions that cutting is a means of experimentally determining fracture toughness are now seen to be extended to identify the mode of fracture toughness as well.

Changing Standards? Children's awareness and knowledge of features of written standard English at ages 10-11

This paper reports the findings of a small-scale research project, which investigated the levels of awareness and knowledge of written standard English of 10- and 11-year-old children in two English primary schools over a six-year period, coinciding with the implementation in the schools of the National Literacy Strategy (NLS). A questionnaire was used to provide quantitative and qualitative data relating to: features of writing which were recognised as standard or non-standard; children's understanding of technical terminology; variations between boys' and girls' performance; and the impact of the NLS over time. The findings reveal variations in levels of recognition of different non-standard features, differences between girls' and boys' recognition, possible examples of language change, but no evidence of a positive impact of the NLS. The implications of these findings are discussed both in terms of changes in educational standards and changes to standard English.