Does anticipation training affect drivers' risk taking?

Skill and risk taking are argued to be independent and to require different remedial programs. However, it is possible to contend that skill-based training could be associated with an increase, a decrease, or no change in risk taking behavior. In 3 experiments, the authors examined the influence of a skill-based training program (hazard perception) on the risk taking behavior of car drivers (using video-based driving simulations). Experiment 1 demonstrated a decrease in risk taking for novice drivers. In Experiment 2, the authors examined the possibilities that the skills training might operate through either a nonspecific reduction in risk taking or a specific improvement in hazard perception. Evidence supported the latter. These findings were replicated in a more ecological context in Experiment 3, which compared advanced and nonadvanced police drivers.

Risk taking from the participant's perspective: the case of driving and accident risk

Although perceived health risk plays a prominent role in theories of health behavior, its empirical role in risk taking is less clear. In Study 1 (N = 129), 2 measures of drivers' risk-taking behavior were found to be unrelated to self-estimates of accident concern but to be related to self-ratings of driving skill and the perceived thrill of driving. In Study 2 (N = 405), out of a wide range of potential influences, accident concern had the weakest relationship with risk taking. The authors concluded that although health risk is a key feature in many theories of health behavior and a central focus for researchers and policy makers, it may not be such a prominent factor for those actually taking the risk.

The risk-taking and self-harm inventory for adolescents: Development and psychometric evaluation

In this study, we report on the development and psychometric evaluation of the Risk-Taking (RT) and Self-Harm (SH) Inventory for Adolescents (RTSHIA), a self-report measure designed to assess adolescent RT and SH in community and clinical settings. 651 young people from secondary schools in England ranging in age from 11.6 years to 18.7 years and 71 young people referred to mental health services for SH behavior in London between the ages of 11.9 years and 17.5 years completed the RTSHIA along with standardized measures of adolescent psychopathology. Two factors emerged from the principal axis factoring, and RT and SH were further validated by a confirmatory factor analysis as related, but different, constructs, rather than elements of a single continuum. Inter-item and test–retest reliabilities were high for both components (Cronbach's α = .85, rtt = .90; Cronbach's α .93, rtt = .87), and considerable evidence emerged in support of the measure's convergent, concurrent, and divergent validity. The findings are discussed with regard to potential usefulness of the RTSHIA for research and clinical purposes with adolescents.

Risk-taking and inhibitory control in behaviourally inhibited and disinhibited preschool children

The temperament style Behavioural Inhibition (BI) has been implicated as a risk factor for the development of internalising disorders such as anxiety. Of interest is what factors influence the developmental trajectories of both inhibited and disinhibited children and the development of psychopathology. One such factor is risk-taking behaviour. Using the computer based Balloon Analogue Risk Task, we assessed risk taking behaviour in behaviourally inhibited (n = 27) and behaviourally disinhibited (n = 43) children. This is the first study to examine the relationship between BI, executive functioning and risk-taking. The results indicated Behavioural Inhibition was not related to risk-taking but that inhibitory control predicted reward focused results. These findings illustrate how inhibitory control affects risk-taking and risk avoidance in both inhibited and disinhibited children.

Risk-taking for others under accountability

We let subjects take risky decisions that affect themselves and a passive recipient. Adding a requirement to justify their choices significantly reduces loss aversion. This indicates that such an accountability mechanism may be effective at debiasing loss aversion in agency relations.

Risk taking for oneself and others: a structural model approach

Economic theory makes no predictions about social factors affecting decisions under risk. We examine situations in which a decision maker decides for herself and another person under conditions of payoff equality, and compare them to individual decisions. By estimating a structural model, we find that responsibility leaves utility curvature unaffected, but accentuates the subjective distortion of very small and very large probabilities for both gains and losses. We also find that responsibility reduces loss aversion, but that these results only obtain under some specific definitions of the latter. These results serve to generalize and reconcile some of the still largely contradictory findings in the literature. They also have implications for financial agency, which we discuss.

Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts: experimental evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk preferences or incentives. Even when compensated through restricted company stock, experimental CEOs take large amounts of excessive risk. This contradicts classical financial theory, but can be explained through risk preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. Compensation through options further increases risk taking as expected. We show that this effect is driven mainly by the personal asset position of the experimental CEO, thus having deleterious effects on company performance.

Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability

Performance-contingent compensation by means of stock options may induce risk-taking in agents that is excessive from the point of view of the company or the shareholders. We test whether increasing shareholder control may be an effective checking mechanism to rein in such excessive risk-taking. We thus tell one group of experimental CEOs that they may have to justify their decision-making processes in front of their shareholders. This indeed reduces risk-taking and increases the performance of the companies they manage. Implications are discussed.

Effects of presenting the baseline risk when communicating absolute and relative risk reductions

This study compares relative and absolute forms of presenting risk information about influenza and the need for vaccination. It investigates whether differences in people's risk estimates and their evaluations of risk information, as a result of the different presentation formats, are still apparent when they are provided with information about the baseline level of risk. The results showed that, in the absence of baseline information, the relative risk format resulted in higher ratings of satisfaction, perceived effectiveness of vaccination, and likelihood of being vaccinated. However, these differences were not apparent when baseline information was presented. Overall, provision of baseline information resulted in more accurate risk estimates and more positive evaluations of the risk messages. It is recommended that, in order to facilitate shared and fully informed decision making, information about baseline level of risk should be included in all health communications specifying risk reductions, irrespective of the particular format adopted.

Drivers' ratings of different components of their own driving skill: a greater illusion of superiority for skills that relate to accident involvement

Different components of driving skill relate to accident involvement in different ways. For instance, while hazard-perception skill has been found to predict accident involvement, vehicle-control skill has not. We found that drivers rated themselves superior to both their peers and the average driver on 18 components of driving skill (N = 181 respondents). These biases were greater for hazard-perception skills than for either vehicle-control skills or driving skill in general. Also, ratings of hazard-perception skill related to self-perceived safety after overall skill was controlled for. We suggest that although drivers appear to appreciate the role of hazard perception in safe driving, any safety benefit to be derived from this appreciation may be undermined by drivers' inflated opinions of their own hazard-perception skill. We also tested the relationship between illusory beliefs about driving skill and risk taking and looked at ways of manipulating drivers' illusory beliefs.

A behavioral comparison between motorcyclists and a matched group of non-motorcycling car drivers: factors influencing accident risk

Motorcyclists and a matched group of non-motorcycling car drivers were assessed on behavioral measures known to relate to accident involvement. Using a range of laboratory measures, we found that motorcyclists chose faster speeds than the car drivers, overtook more, and pulled into smaller gaps in traffic, though they did not travel any closer to the vehicle in front. The speed and following distance findings were replicated by two further studies involving unobtrusive roadside observation. We suggest that the increased risk-taking behavior of motorcyclists was only likely to account for a small proportion of the difference in accident risk between motorcyclists and car drivers. A second group of motorcyclists was asked to complete the simulator tests as if driving a car. They did not differ from the non-motorcycling car drivers on the risk-taking measures but were better at hazard perception. There were also no differences for sensation seeking, mild social deviance, and attitudes to riding/driving, indicating that the risk-taking tendencies of motorcyclists did not transfer beyond motorcycling, while their hazard perception skill did. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

The lottery-panel task for bi-dimensional parameter-free elicitation of risk attitudes

We propose first, a simple task for the eliciting attitudes toward risky choice, the SGG lottery-panel task, which consists in a series of lotteries constructed to compensate riskier options with higher risk-return trade-offs. Using Principal Component Analysis technique, we show that the SGG lottery-panel task is capable of capturing two dimensions of individual risky decision making i.e. subjects’ average risk taking and their sensitivity towards variations in risk-return. From the results of a large experimental dataset, we confirm that the task systematically captures a number of regularities such as: A tendency to risk averse behavior (only around 10% of choices are compatible with risk neutrality); An attraction to certain payoffs compared to low risk lotteries, compatible with over-(under-) weighting of small (large) probabilities predicted in PT and; Gender differences, i.e. males being consistently less risk averse than females but both genders being similarly responsive to the increases in risk-premium. Another interesting result is that in hypothetical choices most individuals increase their risk taking responding to the increase in return to risk, as predicted by PT, while across panels with real rewards we see even more changes, but opposite to the expected pattern of riskier choices for higher risk-returns. Therefore, we conclude from our data that an “economic anomaly” emerges in the real reward choices opposite to the hypothetical choices. These findings are in line with Camerer's (1995) view that although in many domains, paid subjects probably do exert extra mental effort which improves their performance, choice over money gambles is not likely to be a domain in which effort will improve adherence to rational axioms (p. 635). Finally, we demonstrate that both dimensions of risk attitudes, average risk taking and sensitivity towards variations in the return to risk, are desirable not only to describe behavior under risk but also to explain behavior in other contexts, as illustrated by an example. In the second study, we propose three additional treatments intended to elicit risk attitudes under high stakes and mixed outcome (gains and losses) lotteries. Using a dataset obtained from a hypothetical implementation of the tasks we show that the new treatments are able to capture both dimensions of risk attitudes. This new dataset allows us to describe several regularities, both at the aggregate and within-subjects level. We find that in every treatment over 70% of choices show some degree of risk aversion and only between 0.6% and 15.3% of individuals are consistently risk neutral within the same treatment. We also confirm the existence of gender differences in the degree of risk taking, that is, in all treatments females prefer safer lotteries compared to males. Regarding our second dimension of risk attitudes we observe, in all treatments, an increase in risk taking in response to risk premium increases. Treatment comparisons reveal other regularities, such as a lower degree of risk taking in large stake treatments compared to low stake treatments and a lower degree of risk taking when losses are incorporated into the large stake lotteries. Results that are compatible with previous findings in the literature, for stake size effects (e.g., Binswanger, 1980; Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Silvestre, 1999; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1990; Holt & Laury, 2002; Kachelmeier & Shehata, 1992; Kühberger et al., 1999; B. J. Weber & Chapman, 2005; Wik et al., 2007) and domain effect (e.g., Brooks and Zank, 2005, Schoemaker, 1990, Wik et al., 2007). Whereas for small stake treatments, we find that the effect of incorporating losses into the outcomes is not so clear. At the aggregate level an increase in risk taking is observed, but also more dispersion in the choices, whilst at the within-subjects level the effect weakens. Finally, regarding responses to risk premium, we find that compared to only gains treatments sensitivity is lower in the mixed lotteries treatments (SL and LL). In general sensitivity to risk-return is more affected by the domain than the stake size. After having described the properties of risk attitudes as captured by the SGG risk elicitation task and its three new versions, it is important to recall that the danger of using unidimensional descriptions of risk attitudes goes beyond the incompatibility with modern economic theories like PT, CPT etc., all of which call for tests with multiple degrees of freedom. Being faithful to this recommendation, the contribution of this essay is an empirically and endogenously determined bi-dimensional specification of risk attitudes, useful to describe behavior under uncertainty and to explain behavior in other contexts. Hopefully, this will contribute to create large datasets containing a multidimensional description of individual risk attitudes, while at the same time allowing for a robust context, compatible with present and even future more complex descriptions of human attitudes towards risk.

Paying for long-term performance: restructuring bankers’ pay for risk regulation

The purpose of this paper is to propose hybrid capital securities as a new approach to compensation for senior bank executives and risk-takers instead of cash or equity-based compensation currently adopted by the industry. The global financial turmoil indicated that misaligned pay-for-performance compensation arrangements encouraged management short-termism and rewarded excessive risk-taking behaviour in Anglo-Saxon system. Rather than regulating specific instruments and processes, we believe that it is much more efficient to overhaul the compensation scheme to align it with risk management and governance. This empirical paper investigates the European hybrid market by employing data from the Merrill Lynch Global Index System from 2000 to 2010. Our paper contributes to both literature and practices by designing a structured scheme to tie the executive’s interests to long-term performance of the bank, the goal of regulators and the economy at large which consequently reduce the probability of future bank failures.

Responsibility effects in decision making under risk

We systematically explore decision situations in which a decision maker bears responsibility for somebody else's outcomes as well as for her own in situations of payoff equality. In the gain domain we confirm the intuition that being responsible for somebody else's payoffs increases risk aversion. This is however not attributable to a 'cautious shift' as often thought. Indeed, looking at risk attitudes in the loss domain, we find an increase in risk seeking under responsibility. This raises issues about the nature of various decision biases under risk, and to what extent changed behavior under responsibility may depend on a social norm of caution in situations of responsibility versus naive corrections from perceived biases. To further explore this issue, we designed a second experiment to explore risk-taking behavior for gain prospects offering very small or very large probabilities of winning. For large probabilities, we find increased risk aversion, thus confirming our earlier finding. For small probabilities however, we find an increase of risk seeking under conditions of responsibility. The latter finding thus discredits hypotheses of a social rule dictating caution under responsibility, and can be explained through flexible self-correction models predicting an accentuation of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes predicted by prospect theory. An additional accountability mechanism does not change risk behavior, except for mixed prospects, in which it reduces loss aversion. This indicates that loss aversion is of a fundamentally different nature than probability weighting or utility curvature. Implications for debiasing are discussed.