Economic evidence in regulatory disputes: revisiting the court-regulatory agency relationship in the US and the UK

This article examines the issue of the appropriate scope of review of economic evidence enshrined in the discretionary assessments of utility regulators in the US and the UK. It advances a balance of institutional competencies approach to the question of the degree of deference owed to the regulatory agency’s economic assessments. In doing so, it revisits the doctrinal positions advanced in the US and UK for the substantive review of administrative discretion, so as to become attuned to the challenges posed by economic evidence. Drawing on insights from political science and economics, the suggested approach illuminates the institutional disadvantages of the courts that may warrant a high degree of deference. At the same time, however, it remains sensitive to the polycentric elements of regulatory disputes as well as to a number of institutional realties that may attenuate the weight of such comparative institutional disadvantages.

The role of rules-based compliance systems in the new EU regulatory landscape: perspectives of institutional change and agency

The financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the subsequent reaction of the G20 have created a new global regulatory landscape. Within the EU, change of regulatory institutions is ongoing. The research objective of this study is to understand how institutional changes to the EU regulatory landscape may affect corresponding institutionalized operational practices within financial organizations and to understand the role of agency within this process. Our motivation is to provide insight into these changes from an operational management perspective, as well as to test Thelen and Mahoney?s (2010) modes of institutional change. Consequently, the study researched implementations of an Investment Management System with a rules-based compliance module within financial organizations. The research consulted compliance and risk managers, as well as systems experts. The study suggests that prescriptive regulations are likely to create isomorphic configurations of rules-based compliance systems, which consequently will enable the institutionalization of associated compliance practices. The study reveals the ability of some agents within financial organizations to control the impact of regulatory institutions, not directly, but through the systems and processes they adopt to meet requirements. Furthermore, the research highlights the boundaries and relationships between each mode of change as future avenues of research.