What do patients want to know about their medicines, and what do doctors want to tell them?: a comparative study

A two phase study is reported. In the first phase, we asked a number of doctors to rate a list of information categories (identified by Berry, Gillie and Banbury 1995) in terms of how important they felt it was for the items to be included in an explanation to a patient about a drug prescription. In the second phase, we presented a large sample of people with a scenario about visiting their doctor and being prescribed medication, together with an explanation about the prescription which was said to be provided by the doctor. Four different explanations were compared, which were either based on what people in our earlier study wanted to know about drug prescriptions or on what the doctors thought it was important lo tell them. We also manipulated whether or not the explanations conveyed negative information (e.g. about the possible side effects of the medication). The results showed that people 'preferred' the explanations based on what the participants in the earlier study wanted to know about their medicines, rather than those based on what the doctors thought they should be told. They also 'preferred' the explanations that did not convey negative information, rather than those that did convey some negative information. In addition, the inclusion of negative information affected ratings of likely compliance with the prescribed medication.

Time to decide? Simplicity and congruity in comparative judgment

What is the relationship between magnitude judgments relying on directly available characteristics versus probabilistic cues? Question frame was manipulated in a comparative judgment task previously assumed to involve inference across a probabilistic mental model (e.g., “which city is largest” – the “larger” question – versus “which city is smallest” – the “smaller” question). Participants identified either the largest or smallest city (Experiments 1a, 2) or the richest or poorest person (Experiment 1b) in a three-alternative forced choice (3-AFC) task (Experiment 1) or 2-AFC task (Experiment 2). Response times revealed an interaction between question frame and the number of options recognized. When asked the smaller question, response times were shorter when none of the options were recognized. The opposite pattern was found when asked the larger question: response time was shorter when all options were recognized. These task-stimuli congruity results in judgment under uncertainty are consistent with, and predicted by, theories of magnitude comparison which make use of deductive inferences from declarative knowledge.