Neocolonialism and international law, with specific reference to customary counterterrorism obligations and the principle of self-defence

Has international law ever, and, if it has not, can it ever, truly freed itself from the strictures of neocolonialism and the drive by a privileged elite to dominate the world scene? This article begins by inquiring into the nature of neocolonialism and, in so doing, pays particular attention to the writings of former Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah. It then proceeds to determine how neocolonialist designs surface in international law today by briefly looking at two aspects of international law in particular, namely customary international law, with specific reference to the counterterrorism context, and the principle of self-defence. In the final analysis, this article argues for a necessary and eternal scepticism of international law and the agendas of its privileged gatekeepers. Like classic State power, it opens itself to, and often operates as, neocolonial overreach, and to quote Nkrumah, “[t]he cajolement, the wheedlings, the seductions and the Trojan horses of neo-colonialism must be stoutly resisted, for neo-colonialism is a latter-day harpy, a monster which entices its victims with sweet music.”

Neural stem cells, inflammation and NF-kappaB: basic principle of maintenance and repair or origin of brain tumours?

Several recent reports suggest that inflammatory signals play a decisive role in the self-renewal, migration and differentiation of multipotent neural stem cells (NSCs). NSCs are believed to be able to ameliorate the symptoms of several brain pathologies through proliferation, migration into the area of the lesion and either differentiation into the appropriate cell type or secretion of anti-inflammatory cytokines. Although NSCs have beneficial roles, current evidence indicates that brain tumours, such as astrogliomas or ependymomas are also caused by tumour-initiating cells with stem-like properties. However, little is known about the cellular and molecular processes potentially generating tumours from NSCs. Most pro-inflammatory conditions are considered to activate the transcription factor NF-kappaB in various cell types. Strong inductive effects of NF-kappaB on proliferation and migration of NSCs have been described. Moreover, NF-kappaB is constitutively active in most tumour cells described so far. Chronic inflammation is also known to initiate cancer. Thus, NF-kappaB might provide a novel mechanistic link between chronic inflammation, stem cells and cancer. This review discusses the apparently ambivalent role of NF-kappaB: physiological maintenance and repair of the brain via NSCs, and a potential role in tumour initiation. Furthermore, it reveals a possible mechanism of brain tumour formation based on inflammation and NF-kappaB activity in NSCs.

Climate justice in a carbon budget

The fact of a carbon budget given commitment to limiting global-mean temperature increase to below 2°C warming relative to pre-industrial levels makes CO2 emissions a scarce resource. This fact has significant consequences for the ethics of climate change. The paper highlights some of these consequences with respect to (a) applying principles of distributive justice to the allocation of rights to emissions and the costs of mitigation and adaptation, (b) compensation for the harms and risks of climate change, (c) radical new ideas about a place for criminal justice in tackling climate change, and (d) catastrophe ethics.

Can I be a luck egalitarian and a Rawlsian?

Luck egalitarianism and Rawlsianism have been presented as competing answers to the same question: the question of distributive justice. In this paper, I show how they are in fact not different theories of the same thing, but rather different theories of different things - different answers to different questions. I trace the history of luck egalitarian thinking and try to show why Rawlsianism and luck egalitarianism were taken to be the same kind of project. I then examine different ways that one could consistently endorse (some version of) luck egalitarianism and (some version of/elements of) Rawls' theory.

Whose land was it anyway? The Crichel Down Rules and the sale of public land

The guiding principle of compulsory purchase of interests in land in England and Wales is that of fairness, best stated in the words of Lord Justice Scott in Horn v Sunderland Corporation when he said that the owner has “the right to be put, so far as money can do it, in the same position as if his land had not been taken from him”. In many instances, land acquired by compulsion subsequently becomes surplus to the requirements of the acquiring authority. This may be because the intended development scheme was scrapped, or substantially modified, or that after the passage of time the use of the land for which the purchase took place is no longer required. More controversially it may be that for ‘operational reasons’ the acquiring authority knowingly purchased more land than was required for the scheme. Under these circumstances, the Crichel Down Rules (‘the Rules’) require government departments and other statutory bodies to offer back to the former owners or their successors, any land previously so acquired by, or under the threat of, compulsory purchase.