Do autocratic states trade less?

Does the political regime of a country influence its involvement in international trade? A theoretical model that predicts that autocracies trade less than democracies is developed, and the predictions of the model are tested empirically using a panel of more than 130 countries for 1962–2000. In contrast to the existing literature, data on the regime type of individual countries are used rather than information about the congruence of the regime type of pairs of trading countries. In line with the model, autocracies are found to import substantially less than democracies, even after controlling for official trade policies. This finding is very stable and does not depend on a particular setup or estimation technique.

Internationalized regimes: a second dimension of regime hybridity

Traditional approaches have conceptualized political regimes almost exclusively with reference to domestic-level political factors. However, many current and historical political regimes have entailed a major role for international actors, and in some cases the external influence has been so great that regimes have become internationalized. This article explores the concept of internationalized regimes and argues that they should be seen as a distinct form of hybrid regime type that demonstrates a distinct dimension of hybridity. Until now, regime hybridity has been conceived of along a single dimension of domestic politics: the level of competitiveness. Yet, some regimes are characterised by a different type of hybridity, in which domestic and international authority are found together within a single political system. The article explores the dynamics of internationalized regimes within three settings, those of international occupation, international administration and informal empire.

Breaking the impasse: towards a new regime for international climate governance

The reality of the current international order makes it imperative that a just and effective climate regime balance the historical responsibility of developed countries with the increasing absolute emissions from many developing nations. In this short outlook article, key pillars are proposed for a new international climate architecture that envisions replacing the current annex system with two new annexes –Annex α, for countries with high current emissions and historically high emissions, and Annex β, for countries with high current emissions and historically low emissions. Countries in both annexes would implement legally binding targets under this framework. Additionally, this proposal includes tweaks and revisions to funding and technology transfer mechanisms to correct for weaknesses and inequities under the current Kyoto architecture. The proposed framework stems from a belief that a top-down, international approach to climate policy remains the most effective for ensuring environmental integrity. Given the slow rate of institutional learning, reforming and improving the current system is held as a more efficient course of action than abandoning the progress already achieved. It is argued that the proposed framework effectively accommodates key equity, environmental integrity and political feasibility concerns.