No country for honest men: political philosophers and real politics

There are limits on the duty to tell the truth. Sometimes, because of the undesirable consequences of honesty, we are morally required not to reveal certain truths and can even be required to lie. In this article, we explore the implications of this uncontroversial claim for the practice of political philosophers. We argue that, given the consequences of misunderstandings and misrepresentations that might occur, political philosophers will sometimes be under a moral duty not to disseminate their research and, in highly exceptional cases, have a moral duty to lie outright.

Should we be utopophobes about democracy in particular?

In his book Democratic Authority, David Estlund puts forward a case for democracy, which he labels epistemic proceduralism, that relies on democracy's ability to produce good – that is, substantively just – results. Alongside this case for democracy Estlund attacks what he labels ‘utopophobia’, an aversion to idealistic political theory. In this article I make two points. The first is a general point about what the correct level of ‘idealisation’ is in political theory. Various debates are emerging on this question and, to the extent that they are focused on ‘political theory’ as a whole, I argue, they are flawed. This is because there are different kinds of political concept, and they require different kinds of ideal. My second point is about democracy in particular. If we understand democracy as Estlund does, then we should see it as a problem-solving concept – the problem being that we need coercive institutions and rules, but we do not know what justice requires. As democracy is a response to a problem, we should not allow our theories of it, even at the ideal level, to be too idealised – they must be embedded in the nature of the problem they are to solve, and the beings that have it.

Reforming the House of Lords: difficult but not impossible

Despite apparent cross-party and public support, Nick Clegg’s plan to reform the House of Lords is dead. This article asks what explains its demise and analyses whether comprehensive Lords reform is ever likely to get off the ground in the future.

Should kids pay their own way?

Children are expensive to raise. Ensuring that they are raised such that they are able to lead a minimally decent life costs time and money, and lots of both. Who is responsible for bearing the costs of the things that children are undoubtedly owed? This is a question that has received comparatively little scrutiny from political philosophers, despite children being such a drain on public and private finances alike. To the extent that there is a debate, two main views can be identified. The Parents Pay view says that parents, responsible for the existence of the costs, must foot the bill. The Society Pays view says that a next generation is a benefit to all, and so to allow parents to foot the bill alone is the worst kind of free-riding. In this paper, I introduce a third potentially liable party currently missing from the debate: children themselves. On my backward-looking view, we are entitled to ask people to contribute to the raising of children on the basis that they have benefited from being raised themselves.

Playing Kant at the Court of King Arthur

This article contrasts the sense in which those whom Bernard Williams called ‘political realists’ and John Rawls are committed to the idea that political philosophy has to be distinctively political. Distinguishing the realist critique of political moralism from debates over ideal and non-ideal theory, it is argued that Rawls is more realist than many realists realise, and that realists can learn more about how to make a distinctively political vision of how our life together should be organised from his theorising, although it also points to a worrying tendency among Rawlsians to reach for inappropriately moralised arguments. G. A. Cohen’s advocacy of socialism and the second season of HBO’s The Wire are used as examples to illustrate these points.

Ideology and the by-passing of the planning system: case studies of Canary Wharf, London and The Globe, Stockholm

This paper explores the relationship between political ideology and planning in Britain and Sweden, with particular emphasis on the by-passing of the planning system. The prevailing ideology in each country over the last ten years is outlined and the impact on planning identified. The argument is then given in greater depth through case studies of two major projects. For Britain, this involves setting out the main features of Thatcherism and the way that this has changed the purposes underlying planning and created a diversified planning system. This is followed by a case study of Canary Wharf. For Sweden, the consensus culture and the emphasis on participation and decentralisation are discussed. The new planning legislation of 1987 is outlined. These aspects are then contrasted with the fiscal crisis and the development of 'negotiation planning'. These themes are illustrated by a case study of the Globe in Stockholm.

Political economy of state-building: power after peace

The purpose of this volume is to examine and evaluate the impact of international state-building interventions on the political economy of post-conflict countries over the last 20 years. It analyses how international interventions have shaped political and economic dynamics and structures – both formal and informal – and what kind of state, and what kind of state-society relations have been created as a result, through three different lenses: first, through the approaches taken by different international actors like the UN, the International Financial Institutions, or the European Union, to state-building; second, through detailed analysis of key state-building policies; and third, through a wide range of country case studies. Amongst the recurring themes that are highlighted by the book’s focus on the political economy of state-building, and that help to explain why international state-building interventions have tended to fall short of the visions of interveners and local populations alike are evidence of important continuities between war-time and “post-conflict” economies and authority structures, which are often consolidated as a consequence of international involvement; tensions arising from what are often the competing interests and values held by different interveners and local actors; and, finally, the continuing salience of economic and political violence in state-building processes and war-to-peace transitions. The book aims to offer a more nuanced understanding of the complex impact of state-building practices on post-conflict societies, and of the political economy of post-conflict state-building.