Modelling the inorganic nitrogen behaviour in a small Mediterranean forested catchment, Fuirosos (Catalonia)

The aim of this work was to couple a nitrogen (N) sub-model to already existent hydrological lumped (LU4-N) and semi-distributed (LU4-R-N and SD4-R-N) conceptual models, to improve our understanding of the factors and processes controlling nitrogen cycling and losses in Mediterranean catchments. The N model adopted provides a simplified conceptualization of the soil nitrogen cycle considering mineralization, nitrification, immobilization, denitrification, plant uptake, and ammonium adsorption/desorption. It also includes nitrification and denitrification in the shallow perched aquifer. We included a soil moisture threshold for all the considered soil biological processes. The results suggested that all the nitrogen processes were highly influenced by the rain episodes and that soil microbial processes occurred in pulses stimulated by soil moisture increasing after rain. Our simulation highlighted the riparian zone as a possible source of nitrate, especially after the summer drought period, but it can also act as an important sink of nitrate due to denitrification, in particular during the wettest period of the year. The riparian zone was a key element to simulate the catchment nitrate behaviour. The lumped LU4-N model (which does not include the riparian zone) could not be validated, while both the semi-distributed LU4-R-N and SD4-R-N model (which include the riparian zone) gave satisfactory results for the calibration process and acceptable results for the temporal validation process.

Expecting moral philosophers to be reliable

Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryberg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and that philosophers’ experience in philosophy plausibly affects their intuitions. Consequently, the type of argument Ryberg offers fails to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy.

No country for honest men: political philosophers and real politics

There are limits on the duty to tell the truth. Sometimes, because of the undesirable consequences of honesty, we are morally required not to reveal certain truths and can even be required to lie. In this article, we explore the implications of this uncontroversial claim for the practice of political philosophers. We argue that, given the consequences of misunderstandings and misrepresentations that might occur, political philosophers will sometimes be under a moral duty not to disseminate their research and, in highly exceptional cases, have a moral duty to lie outright.

How distinctive is philosophers’ intuition talk?

The word “intuition” is one frequently used in philosophy. It is often assumed that the way in which philosophers use the word, and others like it, is very distinctive. This claim has been subjected to little empirical scrutiny, however. This article presents the first steps in a qualitative analysis of the use of intuition talk in the academy. It presents the findings of two preliminary empirical studies. The first study examines the use of intuition talk in spoken academic English. The second examines the use of intuition talk in written academic English. It considers what these studies tell us about the distinctiveness of philosophical language and methods and considers some implications for evaluative and ameliorative methodology.

Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive?

Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible iff X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implications. There are various reasons one might suspect that the relevant intuitions will not be widely shared among non-philosophers. This paper presents an initial empirical study of ordinary intuitions. The results of two experiments demonstrate that the counterintuitiveness of epistemic consequentialism is more than a philosophers' worry---the folk seem to agree!

Abduction by philosophers: reorienting philosophical methodology

A reorientation is needed in methodological debate about the role of intuitions in philosophy. Methodological debate has lost sight of the reason why it makes sense to focus on questions about intuitions when thinking about the methods or epistemology of philosophy. The problem is an approach to methodology which gives a near exclusive focus to questions about some evidential role that intuitions may or may not play in philosophers' arguments. A new approach is needed. Approaching methodological questions about the role of intuitions in philosophy with an abductive model of philosophical enquiry in mind will help ensure the debate doesn't lose sight of what motivates the debate.