Modelling phosphorus dynamics in multi-branch river systems: A study of the Black River, Lake Simcoe, Ontario, Canada

High rates of nutrient loading from agricultural and urban development have resulted in surface water eutrophication and groundwater contamination in regions of Ontario. In Lake Simcoe (Ontario, Canada), anthropogenic nutrient contributions have contributed to increased algal growth, low hypolimnetic oxygen concentrations, and impaired fish reproduction. An ambitious programme has been initiated to reduce phosphorus loads to the lake, aiming to achieve at least a 40% reduction in phosphorus loads by 2045. Achievement of this target necessitates effective remediation strategies, which will rely upon an improved understanding of controls on nutrient export from tributaries of Lake Simcoe as well as improved understanding of the importance of phosphorus cycling within the lake. In this paper, we describe a new model structure for the integrated dynamic and process-based model INCA-P, which allows fully-distributed applications, suited to branched river networks. We demonstrate application of this model to the Black River, a tributary of Lake Simcoe, and use INCA-P to simulate the fluxes of P entering the lake system, apportion phosphorus among different sources in the catchment, and explore future scenarios of land-use change and nutrient management to identify high priority sites for implementation of watershed best management practises.

Support for the far right in the 2014 European Parliament Elections: a comparative perspective

The May 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections were characterised by the success of far-right Eurosceptic parties, including the French Front National, UKIP, the Danish People’s Party, the Hungarian Jobbik, the Austrian FPÖ, the True Finns and the Greek Golden Dawn. However, a closer look at the results across Europe indicates that the success of far-right parties in the EP elections is neither a linear nor a clear-cut phenomenon: (1) the far right actually declined in many European countries compared to the 2009 results; (2) some of the countries that have experienced the worst of the economic crisis, including Spain, Portugal and Ireland, did not experience a significant rise in far-right party support; and (3) ‘far right’ is too broad an umbrella term, covering parties that are too different from each other to be grouped in one single party family.

The rise of the far right in debtor and creditor European countries: the case of European Parliament elections

While the 2014 European Parliament elections were marked by the rise of far right-wing parties, the different patterns of support that we observe across Europe and across time are not directly related to the economic crisis. Indeed, economic hardship seems neither sufficient nor necessary for the rise of such parties to occur. Using the cross-national results for the 2004, 2009 and 2014 EP elections in order to capture time and country variations, we posit the economy affects the rise of far right-wing parties in more complex ways. Specifically, we compare the experience of high debt countries (the ‘debtors’) and the others (the ‘creditors’) and explore the relationship between far right-wing party success on the one hand, and unemployment, inequality, immigration, globalization and the welfare state on the other hand. Our discussion suggests there might be a trade off between budgetary stability and far right-wing party support, but the choice between Charybdis and Scylla may be avoided if policy makers carefully choose which policies should bear the brunt of the fiscal adjustment.

Risks, costs and labour markets: explaining cross-national patterns of far right party success in European Parliament elections

What is the impact of the economy on cross national variation in far right-wing party support? This paper tests several hypotheses from existing literature on the results of the last three EP elections in all EU member states. We conceptualise the economy affects support because unemployment heightens the risks and costs that the population faces, but this is crucially mediated by labour market institutions. Findings from multiple regression analyses indicate that unemployment, real GDP growth, debt and deficits have no statistically significant effect on far right-wing party support at the national level. By contrast, labour markets influence costs and risks: where unemployment benefits and dismissal regulations are high, unemployment has no effect, but where either one of them is low, unemployment leads to higher far right-wing party support. This explains why unemployment has not led to far right-wing party support in some European countries that experienced the 2008 Eurozone crisis.