Technological change and the challenges for regional development: building social capital in less-favoured regions

The relevance of regional policy for less favoured regions (LFRs) reveals itself when policy-makers must reconcile competitiveness with social cohesion through the adaptation of competition or innovation policies. The vast literature in this area generally builds on an overarching concept of ‘social capital’ as the necessary relational infrastructure for collective action diversification and policy integration, in a context much influenced by a dynamic of industrial change and a necessary balance between the creation and diffusion of ‘knowledge’ through learning. This relational infrastructure or ‘social capital’ is centred on people’s willingness to cooperate and ‘envision’ futures as a result of “social organization, such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1993: 35). Advocates of this interpretation of ‘social capital’ have adopted the ‘new growth’ thinking behind ‘systems of innovation’ and ‘competence building’, arguing that networks have the potential to make both public administration and markets more effective as well as ‘learning’ trajectories more inclusive of the development of society as a whole. This essay aims to better understand the role of ‘social capital’ in the production and reproduction of uneven regional development patterns, and to critically assess the limits of a ‘systems concept’ and an institution-centred approach to comparative studies of regional innovation. These aims are discussed in light of the following two assertions: i) learning behaviour, from an economic point of view, has its determinants, and ii) the positive economic outcomes of ‘social capital’ cannot be taken as a given. It is suggested that an agent-centred approach to comparative research best addresses the ‘learning’ determinants and the consequences of social networks on regional development patterns. A brief discussion of the current debate on innovation surveys has been provided to illustrate this point.

Varieties of capitalism and investments in human capital

This paper explores the relationship between national institutional archetypes and investments in training and development. A recent trend within the literature on comparative capitalism has been to explore the nature and extent of heterogeneity within the coordinated market economies (CMEs) of Europe. Based on a review of the existing comparative literature on training and development, and comparative firm-level survey evidence of differences in training and development practices, we both support and critique existing country clusters and argue for a more nuanced and flexible categorization.

Human capital and growth under political uncertainty

In this paper we show how political uncertainty may impede economic growth by reducing public investment in the formation of human capital, and how this negative effect of political uncertainty can be offset by a government contract. We present a model of growth with accumulation of human capital and government investment in education. We show that in a country with an unstable political system the government is reluctant to invest in human capital. Low government spending on education negatively affects productivity and slows growth. Furthermore, a politically unstable economy may be trapped in a stagnant equilibrium. We also demonstrate the role of a government retirement contract. Public investment in education and economic growth are higher when the future retirement compensation of the government depends on the future national income, in comparison with investment under zero or fixed retirement compensation.

The effect of the national setting on employment practice: the case of downsizing

Although there is now a sizeable body of academic literature that tries to explain cross-country differences in terms of corporate control, capital market development, investor protection and politics, there is as yet very little literature on the degrees of protection accorded to other corporate stakeholders such as employees, based on a systematic comparison of firm level evidence. We find that both theories of legal origin and the varieties of capitalism approach are poor predictors of the relative propensity of firms to make redundancies in different settings. However, the political orientation of the government in place and even more so the nature of the electoral system are relatively good explanators of this propensity. In other words, political structures and outcomes matter more than more rigid institutional features such as legal origin. We explore the reasons for this, drawing out the implications for both theory and practice.