Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory

Military doctrine is one of the conceptual components of war. Its raison d’être is that of a force multiplier. It enables a smaller force to take on and defeat a larger force in battle. This article’s departure point is the aphorism of Sir Julian Corbett, who described doctrine as ‘the soul of warfare’. The second dimension to creating a force multiplier effect is forging doctrine with an appropriate command philosophy. The challenge for commanders is how, in unique circumstances, to formulate, disseminate and apply an appropriate doctrine and combine it with a relevant command philosophy. This can only be achieved by policy-makers and senior commanders successfully answering the Clausewitzian question: what kind of conflict are they involved in? Once an answer has been provided, a synthesis of these two factors can be developed and applied. Doctrine has implications for all three levels of war. Tactically, doctrine does two things: first, it helps to create a tempo of operations; second, it develops a transitory quality that will produce operational effect, and ultimately facilitate the pursuit of strategic objectives. Its function is to provide both training and instruction. At the operational level instruction and understanding are critical functions. Third, at the strategic level it provides understanding and direction. Using John Gooch’s six components of doctrine, it will be argued that there is a lacunae in the theory of doctrine as these components can manifest themselves in very different ways at the three levels of war. They can in turn affect the transitory quality of tactical operations. Doctrine is pivotal to success in war. Without doctrine and the appropriate command philosophy military operations cannot be successfully concluded against an active and determined foe.

Civilian casualties – do we really care? The failure of the revolution in military affairs of non-lethal weapons in the U.S., Russia and Israel

Causing civilian casualties during military operations has become a much politicised topic in international relations since the Second World War. Since the last decade of the 20th century, different scholars and political analysts have claimed that human life is valued more and more among the general international community. This argument has led many researchers to assume that democratic culture and traditions, modern ethical and moral issues have created a desire for a world without war or, at least, a demand that contemporary armed conflicts, if unavoidable, at least have to be far less lethal forcing the military to seek new technologies that can minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage. Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) – weapons that are intended to minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage – are based on the technology that, during the 1990s, was expected to revolutionise the conduct of warfare making it significantly less deadly. The rapid rise of interest in NLW, ignited by the American military twenty five years ago, sparked off an entirely new military, as well as an academic, discourse concerning their potential contribution to military success on the 21st century battlefields. It seems, however, that except for this debate, very little has been done within the military forces themselves. This research suggests that the roots of this situation are much deeper than the simple professional misconduct of the military establishment, or the poor political behaviour of political leaders, who had sent them to fight. Following the story of NLW in the U.S., Russia and Israel this research focuses on the political and cultural aspects that have been supposed to force the military organisations of these countries to adopt new technologies and operational and organisational concepts regarding NLW in an attempt to minimise enemy civilian casualties during their military operations. This research finds that while American, Russian and Israeli national characters are, undoubtedly, products of the unique historical experience of each one of these nations, all of three pay very little regard to foreigners’ lives. Moreover, while it is generally argued that the international political pressure is a crucial factor that leads to the significant reduction of harmed civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure, the findings of this research suggest that the American, Russian and Israeli governments are well prepared and politically equipped to fend off international criticism. As the analyses of the American, Russian and Israeli cases reveal, the political-military leaderships of these countries have very little external or domestic reasons to minimise enemy civilian casualties through fundamental-revolutionary change in their conduct of war. In other words, this research finds that employment of NLW have failed because the political leadership asks the militaries to reduce the enemy civilian casualties to a politically acceptable level, rather than to the technologically possible minimum; as in the socio-cultural-political context of each country, support for the former appears to be significantly higher than for the latter.

The Copenhagen principles on the handling of detainees: implications for the procedural regulation of internment

The Copenhagen Principles on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations were released in October 2012 after a five-year long process involving states and certain organizations. The Principles address a number of issues concerning the handling and transfer of detainees. They apply in military operations conducted by states abroad in the context of non-international armed conflicts and peace operations. This article focuses on those principles that address the procedural regulation of internment (ie preventive, security detention), as it is here that the current law is particularly unclear. On the one hand, the treaty provisions applicable in non-international armed conflicts contain no rules on the procedural regulation of internment, in comparison with the law of international armed conflict. On the other hand, the relevant rules under international human rights law (IHRL) appear derogable in such situations. This article demonstrates that the approach taken to this issue in the Copenhagen Principles is one which essentially draws on the procedural rules applicable to civilian internment in the international armed conflicts. These rules adopt standards that are lower than those under IHRL. Reference is then made to other recent practice, which illustrates that the Copenhagen Principles do not apply in a legal vacuum. In particular, two recent judicial developments highlight the continued relevance of human rights law and domestic law, respectively, in regulating detention operations in the context of international military operations. Compliance with the Copenhagen Principles may not, therefore, be sufficient for detention to be lawful.

MI(R,)G(R) and British Covert Operations, 1939-42

The Military Intelligence (Research) Department of the British War Office was tasked in 1940 with encouraging and supporting armed resistance in occupied Europe and the Axis-controlled Middle East. The major contention of this paper is that, in doing so, MI(R) performed a key role in British strategy in 1940-42 and in the development of what are now known as covert operations. MI(R) developed an organic, but coherent doctrine for such activity which was influential upon the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and its own sub-branch, G(R), which applied this doctrine in practice in East Africa and the Middle East in 1940-41. It was also here that a number of key figures in the development of covert operations and special forces first cut their teeth, the most notable being Major Generals Colin Gubbins and Orde Wingate.

Orde Wingate and the Theory behind the Chindit Operations: Some Recent Findings

This short paper discusses some of the theory behind the Chindit operations in Burma of 1943-44, drawing parallels between Wingate's theoretical concepts post 1990s concepts of 'manoeuvre warfare.'

Orde Wingate, 'Guerrilla' Warfare and Long-Range Penetration, 1940-44

Major General Orde Wingate was a highly controversial figure in his time and remains so among historians. However, his eccentric and colourful personality has drawn attention away from the nature of his military ideas, the most important of which was his concept of long-range penetration, which originated from his observations of his operations in Italian-occupied Ethiopia in 1941, and evolved into the model he put into practice in the Chindit operations in Burma in 1943-44. A review of Wingate's own official writings on this subject reveals that long-range penetration combined local guerrilla irregulars, purpose-trained regular troops and airpower into large-scale offensive operations deep in the enemy rear, with the intention of disrupting his planning process and creating situations regular forces could exploit. This evolved organically from Major General Colin Gubbins' doctrine for guerrilla resistance in enemy occupied areas, and bears some resemblance to the operational model applied by US and Allied forces, post September 2001.

International construction and Brazilian contractors’ operations

The international construction market is very complex, and requires strong structure and strategy for companies wanting to operate overseas. This article investigates characteristics of international construction. The international operation of Brazilian contractors is explored via results from a qualitative study which was carried out using case studies. The case studies comprised ten big Brazilian contractors, six of which operate abroad. The study identified the patterns of international operation, the competitive advantages of these contractors, as well as the difficulties faced by them in the international construction market. Four of the contractors studied operate only in the domestic market. The study of these cases revealed both obstacles and motivations for future international operations. The study revealed that despite the existing competitive advantages, Brazilian contractors' presence in the international market is limited. The main reason for that is probably their main competitive disadvantage: the lack of financial support from the government.

Memory operations in rapid serial visual presentation

Short-term memory (STM) has often been considered to be a central resource in cognition. This study addresses its role in rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) tasks tapping into temporal attention-the attentional blink (AB). Various STM operations are tested for their impact on performance and, in particular, on the AB. Memory tasks were found to exert considerable impact on general performance but the size of the AB was more or less immune to manipulations of STM load. Likewise, the AB was unaffected by manipulating the match between items held in STM and targets or temporally close distractors in the RSVP stream. The emerging picture is that STM resources, or their lack, play no role in the AB. Alternative accounts assuming serial consolidation, selection for action, and distractor-induced task-set interference are discussed.

A swarm pattern transformation method based on macroscopic parameter operations

The work reported in this paper is motivated by biomimetic inspiration - the transformation of patterns. The major issue addressed is the development of feasible methods for transformation based on a macroscopic tool. The general requirement for the feasibility of the transformation method is determined by classifying pattern formation approaches an their characteristics. A formal definition for pattern transformation is provided and four special cases namely, elementary and geometric transformation based on repositioning all and some robotic agents are introduced. A feasible method for transforming patterns geometrically, based on the macroscopic parameter operation of a swarm is considered. The transformation method is applied to a swarm model which lends itself to the transformation technique. Simulation studies are developed to validate the feasibility of the approach, and do indeed confirm the approach.

Virtual reality Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) exposure therapy results with active duty Iraq war combatants

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is reported to be caused by traumatic events that are outside the range of usual human experience including (but not limited to) military combat, violent personal assault, being kidnapped or taken hostage and terrorist attacks. Initial data suggests that at least 1 out of 6 Iraq War veterans are exhibiting symptoms of depression, anxiety and PTSD. Virtual Reality (VR) delivered exposure therapy for PTSD has been used with reports of positive outcomes. The aim of the current paper is to present the rationale and brief description of a Virtual Iraq PTSD VR therapy application and present initial findings from its use with PTSD patients. Thus far, Virtual Iraq consists of a series of customizable virtual scenarios designed to represent relevant Middle Eastern VR contexts for exposure therapy, including a city and desert road convoy environment. User-centered design feedback needed to iteratively evolve the system was gathered from returning Iraq War veterans in the USA and from a system deployed in Iraq and tested by an Army Combat Stress Control Team. Results from an open clinical trial at San Diego Naval Medical Center of the first 18 treatment completers indicate that 14 no longer meet PTSD diagnostic criteria at post-treatment, with only one not maintaining treatment gains at 3 month follow-up. Clinical tests are also currently underway at Ft. Lewis, Emory University, Weill Cornell Medical College, Walter Reed Army Medical Center and 10 other sites. Other sites are preparing to use the application for a variety of PTSD and VR research purposes.