Effect of micronutrient supplementation on mood in nursing home residents

One third of older people in nursing and/or residential homes have significant symptoms of depression. In younger people, deficiencies in selenium, vitamin C and folate are associated with depression. This study examines the association between micronutrient status and mood before and after supplementation. The objective was to determine whether the administration of selenium, vitamin C and folate improved mood in frail elderly nursing home residents. Mood was assessed using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression rating scale (HAD), and Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS). Micronutrient supplementation was provided for 8 weeks in a double-blinded randomised controlled trial. Significant symptoms of depression (29%) and anxiety (24%) were found at baseline. 67% of patients had low serum concentrations of vitamin C, but no-one was below the reference range for selenium. Depression was significantly associated with selenium levels, but not with folate or vitamin C levels. No individual with a HAD depression score of >= 8, had selenium levels >1.2 mu M. In those patients with higher HAD depression scores, there was a significant reduction in the score and a significant increase in serum selenium levels after 8 weeks of micronutrient supplementation. Placebo group scores were unchanged. This small study concluded that depression was associated with low levels of selenium in frail older individuals. Following 8 weeks of micronutrient supplementation, there was a significant increase in selenium levels and improved symptoms of depression occurred in a subgroup. Copyright (C) 2008 S. Karger AG, Basel

Haldane's Mackindergarten: a radical experiment in British military education

This article critically evaluates a course that was conceived and run at the LSE by Sir Halford Mackinder for officers of the Britsh Army between 1907 and 1932.There is an examination of the nature of the syllabus,the aims and objectives of this course.An explanation is also given as to why the army cut it seven years before the outbreak of the Second World War.

Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory

Military doctrine is one of the conceptual components of war. Its raison d’être is that of a force multiplier. It enables a smaller force to take on and defeat a larger force in battle. This article’s departure point is the aphorism of Sir Julian Corbett, who described doctrine as ‘the soul of warfare’. The second dimension to creating a force multiplier effect is forging doctrine with an appropriate command philosophy. The challenge for commanders is how, in unique circumstances, to formulate, disseminate and apply an appropriate doctrine and combine it with a relevant command philosophy. This can only be achieved by policy-makers and senior commanders successfully answering the Clausewitzian question: what kind of conflict are they involved in? Once an answer has been provided, a synthesis of these two factors can be developed and applied. Doctrine has implications for all three levels of war. Tactically, doctrine does two things: first, it helps to create a tempo of operations; second, it develops a transitory quality that will produce operational effect, and ultimately facilitate the pursuit of strategic objectives. Its function is to provide both training and instruction. At the operational level instruction and understanding are critical functions. Third, at the strategic level it provides understanding and direction. Using John Gooch’s six components of doctrine, it will be argued that there is a lacunae in the theory of doctrine as these components can manifest themselves in very different ways at the three levels of war. They can in turn affect the transitory quality of tactical operations. Doctrine is pivotal to success in war. Without doctrine and the appropriate command philosophy military operations cannot be successfully concluded against an active and determined foe.

‘Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 70s and 80s: Findings in the East German Archives’

This article draws on Warsaw Treaty Organisation and East German military archives to demonstrate that the WTO's military exercises until the mid-1990s always envisaged an offensive strategy with the aim of reaching the Channel in a few days. Only gradually did this change under Gorbachev and to include also defensive strategies, very much against the opposition of East Germany.

Denial of change: the 'Military Revolution' as seen by contemporaries

Writers on military matters from the 14th century until the late 18th century either regretted the decadence of their times compared with Antiquity, or they saw no great change in military affairs since Antiquity. Few saw a revolutionary change ushered in by gunpowder, although this number increased since the great "querelle" about the Ancients and the Moderns under Louis XIV. In the early 19th century, the balance tipped, and few would have denied that technology had profoundly changed warfare. All this is a far cry, however, from any contemporary perception of a "Military Revolution" in the 16th and 17th centuries.