Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory

Military doctrine is one of the conceptual components of war. Its raison d’être is that of a force multiplier. It enables a smaller force to take on and defeat a larger force in battle. This article’s departure point is the aphorism of Sir Julian Corbett, who described doctrine as ‘the soul of warfare’. The second dimension to creating a force multiplier effect is forging doctrine with an appropriate command philosophy. The challenge for commanders is how, in unique circumstances, to formulate, disseminate and apply an appropriate doctrine and combine it with a relevant command philosophy. This can only be achieved by policy-makers and senior commanders successfully answering the Clausewitzian question: what kind of conflict are they involved in? Once an answer has been provided, a synthesis of these two factors can be developed and applied. Doctrine has implications for all three levels of war. Tactically, doctrine does two things: first, it helps to create a tempo of operations; second, it develops a transitory quality that will produce operational effect, and ultimately facilitate the pursuit of strategic objectives. Its function is to provide both training and instruction. At the operational level instruction and understanding are critical functions. Third, at the strategic level it provides understanding and direction. Using John Gooch’s six components of doctrine, it will be argued that there is a lacunae in the theory of doctrine as these components can manifest themselves in very different ways at the three levels of war. They can in turn affect the transitory quality of tactical operations. Doctrine is pivotal to success in war. Without doctrine and the appropriate command philosophy military operations cannot be successfully concluded against an active and determined foe.

Planning for the reuse of redundant defence estate: disposal processes, policy frameworks and development impacts

This paper reviews recent research and other literature concerning the planning and development of redundant defence estate. It concentrates on UK sources but includes reference to material from Europe and the North America were it is relevant for comparative purposes. It introduces the topic by providing a brief review of the recent restructuring of the UK defence estate and then proceeds to examine the various planning policy issues generated by this process; the policy frameworks used to guide it; comparable approaches to surplus land disposal and the appraisal of impacts; and ending the main body of the review with an analyse of the economic, social and environmental impacts of military base closure and redevelopment. It concludes that there is a significant body of work focusing on the reuse and redevelopment of redundant defence estate in the UK and abroad, but that much of this work is based on limited research or on personal experience. One particular weakness of the current literature is that it does not fully reflect the institutional difficulties posed by the disposal process and the day-to-day pressures which MOD personnel have to deal with. In doing this, it also under-emphasises the embedded cultures of individuals and professional groups who are required to operationalise the policies, procedures and practices for planning and redeveloping redundant defence estate.

How many Frenchmen did you kill? British bombing policy towards France (1940-1945)

The Allied bombing of France between 1940 and 1945 has received comparatively little attention from historians, although the civilian death toll, at about 60,000, was comparable to that of German raids on the UK. This article considers how Allied, and particularly British, bombing policy towards France was developed, what its objectives were and how French concerns about attacks on their territory were (or were not) addressed. It argues that while British policymakers were sensitive to the delicate political implications of attacking France, perceived military necessities tended to trump political misgivings; that Vichy, before November 1942, was a stronger constraint on Allied bombing than the Free French at any time and that the bombing programme largely escaped political control from May 1944.

‘NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat: A New Perspective on Western Threat Perception and Policy Making’

It has been argued that the US strategy paper NSC 68 of 1950 which ushered in the great Cold War rearmament process first in the US and then in NATO was a vast overreaction. This paper argues, by contrast, that given the intelligence about the Soviet Union's and its satellites' military buildup and the role of China in that period, this was a reasonable strategy to embrace.