Right ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices mediate adaptive decisions under ambiguity by integrating choice utility and outcome evaluation.

The Iowa gambling task (IGT) is one of the most influential behavioral paradigms in reward-related decision making and has been, most notably, associated with ventromedial prefrontal cortex function. However, performance in the IGT relies on a complex set of cognitive subprocesses, in particular integrating information about the outcome of choices into a continuously updated decision strategy under ambiguous conditions. The complexity of the task has made it difficult for neuroimaging studies to disentangle the underlying neurocognitive processes. In this study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging in combination with a novel adaptation of the task, which allowed us to examine separately activation associated with the moment of decision or the evaluation of decision outcomes. Importantly, using whole-brain regression analyses with individual performance, in combination with the choice/outcome history of individual subjects, we aimed to identify the neural overlap between areas that are involved in the evaluation of outcomes and in the progressive discrimination of the relative value of available choice options, thus mapping the two fundamental cognitive processes that lead to adaptive decision making. We show that activation in right ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was predictive of adaptive performance, in both discriminating disadvantageous from advantageous decisions and confirming negative decision outcomes. We propose that these two prefrontal areas mediate shifting away from disadvantageous choices through their sensitivity to accumulating negative outcomes. These findings provide functional evidence of the underlying processes by which these prefrontal subregions drive adaptive choice in the task, namely through contingency-sensitive outcome evaluation.

The EU societal awareness of landscape indicator: a review of its meaning, utility and performance across different scales

There is increasing recognition that agricultural landscapes meet multiple societal needs and demands beyond provision of economic and environmental goods and services. Accordingly, there have been significant calls for the inclusion of societal, amenity and cultural values in agri-environmental landscape indicators to assist policy makers in monitoring the wider impacts of land-based policies. However, capturing the amenity and cultural values that rural agrarian areas provide, by use of such indicators, presents significant challenges. The EU social awareness of landscape indicator represents a new class of generalized social indicator using a top-down methodology to capture the social dimensions of landscape without reference to the specific structural and cultural characteristics of individual landscapes. This paper reviews this indicator in the context of existing agri-environmental indicators and their differing design concepts. Using a stakeholder consultation approach in five case study regions, the potential and limitations of the indicator are evaluated, with a particular focus on its perceived meaning, utility and performance in the context of different user groups and at different geographical scales. This analysis supplements previous EU-wide assessments, through regional scale assessment of the limitations and potentialities of the indicator and the need for further data collection. The evaluation finds that the perceived meaning of the indicator does not vary with scale, but in common with all mapped indicators, the usefulness of the indicator, to different user groups, does change with scale of presentation. This indicator is viewed as most useful when presented at the scale of governance at which end users operate. The relevance of the different sub-components of the indicator are also found to vary across regions.

Corruption and individual ethics: insights from a public procurement auction

This article proposes an auction model where two firms compete for obtaining the license for a public project and an auctioneer acting as a public official representing the political power, decides the winner of the contest. Players as firms face a social dilemma in the sense that the higher is the bribe offered, the higher would be the willingness of a pure monetary maximizer public official to give her the license. However, it implies inducing a cost of reducing all players’ payoffs as far as our model includes an endogenous externality, which depends on bribe. All players’ payoffs decrease with the bribe (and increase with higher quality). We find that the presence of bribe aversion in either the officials’ or the firms’ utility function shifts equilibrium towards more pro-social behavior. When the quality and bribe-bid strategy space is discrete, multiple equilibria emerge including more pro-social bids than would be predicted under a continuous strategy space.