Transreal logical space of all propositions

Transreal numbers provide a total semantics containing classical truth values, dialetheaic, fuzzy and gap values. A paraconsistent Sheffer Stroke generalises all classical logics to a paraconsistent form. We introduce logical spaces of all possible worlds and all propositions. We operate on a proposition, in all possible worlds, at the same time. We define logical transformations, possibility and necessity relations, in proposition space, and give a criterion to determine whether a proposition is classical. We show that proofs, based on the conditional, infer gaps only from gaps and that negative and positive infinity operate as bottom and top values.

Metacognitive experience and transfer of logical reasoning

The experiments examine the influence of metacognitive experience on the transfer of logical processes in a problem solving setting. Subjects were presented with two versions of Wason's (1966) selection task. Although they were able to perform successfully on the concrete tasks (following a minimal explanation of the correct solution on an initial trial), the majority were not able to transfer a successful method to the abstract tasks. Verbalization during, or following, the concrete tasks produced substantial transfer effects however. It is suggested that verbalization may lead to an increased awareness of past behaviour, particularly of those aspects necessary for successful solution.

John Lewis Partnership lessons in logical incrementalism and organic growth: a case study and interview with the Chairman, Mr Charlie Mayfield

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how strategy is developed and implemented in an organisation with an unusual ownership model. Partnerships are not a prevalent form of ownership but as this case demonstrates they can be extremely effective. Furthermore this case demonstrates how logical incrementalism can be used to implement major strategic decisions. Design/methodology/approach – The paper draws on company documentary evidence and a semi-structured interview with Mr Charlie Mayfield, Chairman of John Lewis Partnership. A chairman has a helicopter view of business whose perspectives are rarely captured by strategy researchers. This case study offers an insight into strategic thinking of a chairman and chief executive of a successful company. Research limitations/implications – The case study and interview offer a unique insight into the rationale behind strategic decisions within a successful partnership that has grown organically in a highly competitive retail market without high gearing. Originality/value – This case study sheds light on strategic moves within partnership. Furthermore, very few case studies offer insight into the thinking of a chief executive who has successfully managed a business in a turbulent environment.

The (il)logical problem of heritage speaker bilingualism and incomplete acquisition

This Forum challenges and problematizes the term incomplete acquisition, which has been widely used to describe the state of competence of heritage speaker (HS) bilinguals for well over a decade (see, e.g., Montrul, 2008). It is suggested and defended that HS competence, while often different from monolingual peers, is in fact not incomplete (given any reasonable definition by the word incomplete), but simply distinct for reasons related to the realities of their environment.

The role of necessity in international humanitarian and human rights law

The nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically in recent decades. In particular, it is increasingly the case that hostilities now occur alongside ‘everyday’ situations. This has led to a pressing need to determine when a ‘conduct of hostilities’ model (governed by international humanitarian law—IHL) applies and when a ‘law enforcement’ model (governed by international human rights law—IHRL) applies. This in turn raises the question of whether these two legal regimes are incompatible or whether they might be applied in parallel. It is on this question that the current paper focuses, examining it at the level of principle. Whilst most accounts of the principles underlying these two areas of law focus on humanitarian considerations, few have compared the role played by necessity in each. This paper seeks to address this omission. It demonstrates that considerations of necessity play a prominent role in both IHL and IHRL, albeit with differing consequences. It then applies this necessity-based analysis to suggest a principled basis for rationalising the relationship between IHL and IHRL, demonstrating how this approach would operate in practice. It is shown that, by emphasising the role of necessity in IHL and IHRL, an approach can be adopted that reconciles the two in a manner that is sympathetic to their object and purpose.

Logical and epistemic foundationalism about grounding: the triviality of facts and principles

In this paper, I seek to undermine G.A. Cohen’s polemical use of a metaethical claim he makes in his article, ‘Facts and Principles’, by arguing that that use requires an unsustainable equivocation between epistemic and logical grounding. I begin by distinguishing three theses that Cohen has offered during the course of his critique of Rawls and contractualism more generally, the foundationalism about grounding thesis, the justice as non-regulative thesis, and the justice as all-encompassing thesis, and briefly argue that they are analytically independent of each other. I then offer an outline of the foundationalism about grounding thesis, characterising it, as Cohen does, as a demand of logic. That thesis claims that whenever a normative principle is dependent on a fact, it is so dependent in virtue of some other principle. I then argue that although this is true as a matter of logic, it, as Cohen admits, cannot be true of actual justifications, since logic cannot tell us anything about the truth as opposed to the validity of arguments. Facts about a justification cannot then be decisive for whether or not a given argument violates the foundationalism about grounding thesis. As long as, independently of actual justifications, theorists can point to plausible logically grounding principles, as I argue contractualists can, Cohen’s thesis lacks critical bite.