Enforcing service level agreements using an economically enhanced resource manager

Traditional resource management has had as its main objective the optimisation of throughput, based on parameters such as CPU, memory, and network bandwidth. With the appearance of Grid Markets, new variables that determine economic expenditure, benefit and opportunity must be taken into account. The SORMA project aims to allow resource owners and consumers to exploit market mechanisms to sell and buy resources across the Grid. SORMA’s motivation is to achieve efficient resource utilisation by maximising revenue for resource providers, and minimising the cost of resource consumption within a market environment. An overriding factor in Grid markets is the need to ensure that desired Quality of Service levels meet the expectations of market participants. This paper explains the proposed use of an Economically Enhanced Resource Manager (EERM) for resource provisioning based on economic models. In particular, this paper describes techniques used by the EERM to support revenue maximisation across multiple Service Level Agreements.

Enforcing service level agreements using an economically enhanced resource manager

Traditional resource management has had as its main objective the optimisation of throughput, based on pa- rameters such as CPU, memory, and network bandwidth. With the appearance of Grid Markets, new variables that determine economic expenditure, benefit and opportunity must be taken into account. The SORMA project aims to allow resource owners and consumers to exploit market mechanisms to sell and buy resources across the Grid. SORMA’s motivation is to achieve efficient resource utilisation by maximising revenue for resource providers, and minimising the cost of resource consumption within a market environment. An overriding factor in Grid markets is the need to ensure that desired Quality of Service levels meet the expectations of market participants. This paper explains the proposed use of an Economically Enhanced Resource Manager (EERM) for resource provisioning based on economic models. In particular, this paper describes techniques used by the EERM to support revenue maximisation across multiple Service Level Agreements.

From Rio to Copenhagen: multilateral agreements, disagreements and situated actions

Governing climate change is arguably one of the most complex problems, environmental or otherwise, that the global community has had to contend with. This chapter highlights the innovations in governance that have characterized the global climate change regime as it sought to respond to and manage these complexities, political imperatives and competing interests. We suggest that the key contestations and innovations within climate governance can be understood in terms of four themes/questions all of which relate to issues of justice and equity.

Self-licensing and financial rewards: is morality for sale?

This paper studies the impact of financially rewarding good deeds on self-licensing. We run a between-subjects experiment comprised of an adapted dictator game preceded by paid and unpaid pro-environmental tasks. We find that prefacing the dictator game with an unpaid good deed seems to establish a 'moral rectitude' which licenses subsequent selfish behaviour, whereas a paid good deed dampens this effect. Interestingly, the nature of the initial task has more of an effect on the binary option (give vs. not give) than on the amount donated.

Smug alert! Exploring self-licensing behaviour in a cheating game

We test experimentally a prediction of the ‘moral credit model’, in which committing a virtuous act creates moral credits that can license immoral behavior in a succeeding decision. We use a basic cheating experiment that was either preceded by a virtuous deed or not in a developing country context. We found that people who previously achieved a good deed cheat more. Gender and origin are also significant explicative variables for cheating.

Environmental agreements as a Hawk-Dove game with confirmed proposals

This paper aims at two different contributions to the literature on international environmental agreements. First, we model environmental agreements as a generic situation, characterized as a Hawk-Dove game with multiple asymmetric equilibria. Second, the article applies the theory on non-cooperative games with confirmed proposals, based on an alternating proposals bargaining protocol, as a way of overcoming the usual problems of coordination and bargaining failures in environmental agreement games, due to payoff asymmetry and equilibrium multiplicity.