The philosophy of W. Ross Ashby and its relationship to 'The Matrix'

Ashby was a keen observer of the world around him, as per his technological and psychiatrical developments. Over the years, he drew numerous philosophical conclusions on the nature of human intelligence and the operation of the brain, on artificial intelligence and the thinking ability of computers and even on science in general. In this paper, the quite profound philosophy espoused by Ashby is considered as a whole, in particular in terms of its relationship with the world as it stands now and even in terms of scientific predictions of where things might lead. A meaningful comparison is made between Ashby's comments and the science fiction concept of 'The Matrix' and serious consideration is given as to how much Ashby's ideas lay open the possibility of the matrix becoming a real world eventuality.

Political instability and the persistence of religion in Greece: the policy implications of the cultural defence paradigm

This paper examines the implications of ‘cultural defence’ in the nature of democracy and the stability of the political system in Greece. It focuses on the Greek Orthodox Church’s maintenance of power and political relevance by virtue of its strong link to national identity. We argue that the inhibition of secularization in Greece as a result of cultural defence has significant policy implications, especially in times of crises, when the role of nationalism as a cohesive factor against perceived threats is intensified. The paper further explores three policy/politics areas: (1) political orientation; (2) religious pluralism; and (3) education.

On the significance of the basic structure: a priori baseline views and luck egalitarianism

This paper uses the exploration of the grounds of a common criticism of luck egalitarianism to try to make an argument about both the proper subject of theorising about justice and how to approach that subject. It draws a distinction between what it calls basic structure views and a priori baseline views, where the former take the institutional aspects of political prescriptions seriously and the latter do not. It argues that objections to luck egalitarianism on the grounds of its harshness can in part be explained by this blindness to relevant features of institutions. Further, it may be that luck egalitarianism cannot regard its own enactment as just. A related objection to Dworkin’s equality of resources, which claims that it cannot pick a particular institutional background to set the costs of resources and so is radically indeterminate, is also presented. These results, I argue, give us good reason to reject all a priori baseline views.

Rawls and Rousseau: 'amour-propre' and the strains of commitment

In this paper I try to illuminate the Rawlsian architectonic through an interpretation of what Rawls’ Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy say about Rousseau. I argue that Rawls’ emphasis there when discussing Rousseau on interpreting amour-propre so as to make it compatible with a life in at least some societies draws attention to, and helps explicate, an analogous feature of his own work, the strains of commitment broadly conceived. Both are centrally connected with protecting a sense of self which is vital for one’s own agency. This allows us to appreciate better than much of the literature presently does the requirement for Rawls that justice and the good are congruent, that a society of justice does not disfigure citizens’ ability to live out lives relatively unmarked by relations of domination. Some comments on G. A. Cohen’s critiques of Rawls are made.