Beyond the American century: Walter Lippmann and American grand strategy, 1943-1950

As the United States became a world Power, journalist and intellectual Walter Lippmann feared that it would become its own worst enemy. During and after the Second World War, he tried to steer the country towards coherent statecraft, to define the national interest and the limits of power, and give geopolitical expression to the role of the United States as the core of an Atlantic strategic system. But in response to world war, the Truman Doctrine, and the Korean War, he became pessimistic about the country's ability to conduct strategy effectively. In the prophetic tradition, he believed that a fatal symbiosis between America's growing strength and domestic politics led it towards crisis. Though at times ahistorical, Lippmann's concept of strategy deserves attention for its dialogue between power and identity, for its questioning of “ends” as well as means, and for its focus on the danger of self-defeating behaviour.

A reconstructed Siberian High index since A. D. 1599 from Eurasian and North American tree rings

The long-term variability of the Siberian High, the dominant Northern Hemisphere anticyclone during winter, is largely unknown. To investigate how this feature varied prior to the instrumental record, we present a reconstruction of a Dec-Feb Siberian High (SH) index based on Eurasian and North American tree rings. Spanning 1599-1980, it provides information on SH variability over the past four centuries. A decline in the instrumental SH index since the late 1970s, related to Eurasian warming, is the most striking feature over the past four hundred years. It is associated with a highly significant (p < 0.0001) step change in 1989. Significant similar to 3-4 yr spectral peaks in the reconstruction fall within the range of variability of the East Asian winter monsoon (which has also declined recently) and lend further support to proposed relationships between these largescale features of the climate system.

The British ‘failure’ that never was? The Anglo-American ‘productivity gap’ in large-scale interwar retailing—evidence from the department store sector

Interwar British retailing has been characterized as having lower productivity, less developed managerial hierarchies and methods, and weaker scale economies than its US counterpart. This article examines comparative productivity for one major segment of large-scale retailing in both countries—the department store sector. Drawing on exceptionally detailed contemporary survey data, we show that British department stores in fact achieved superior performance in terms of operating costs, margins, profits, and stock-turn. While smaller British stores had lower labour productivity than US stores of equivalent size, TFP was generally higher for British stores, which also enjoyed stronger scale economies. We also examine the reasons behind Britain's surprisingly strong relative performance, using surviving original returns from the British surveys. Contrary to arguments that British retailers faced major barriers to the development of large-scale enterprises, that could reap economies of scale and scope and invest in machinery and marketing to support the growth of their primary sales functions, we find that British department stores enthusiastically embraced the retail ‘managerial revolution’—and reaped substantial benefits from this investment.