Earl of Aylesford v Morris (1873)

A Characteristic of a landmark case is that it stands for a proposition of law. In Earl of Aylesford v Morris,1 Lord Selborne held that where there existed an inequality between contracting parties, with weakness on one side and an extortionate advantage taken of that weakness on the other, the contract could not stand unless the party claiming the benefit of the contract could rebut the presumption by establishing that the transaction was ‘fair, just and reasonable’. This chapter examines the historical circumstances behind the formulation of this proposition.

The United States in Southern Africa: Chester Crocker's linkage strategy 1981-1988

Chester Crocker was appointed as Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in 1981. He had criticised the inconsistencies of US African policy and proposed a renewed emphasis on the balance between America's global interests with specific regional priorities. While the focus of Congressmen, journalists and public opinion centred on the issue of apartheid, it was the Namibian War of Independence (South African Border War) that initially drew the attention of the Reagan administration, and it was the resolution of this war that remained the priority for the US government in this region throughout Crocker's time in office.

The politics of fiscal policy during economic downturns, 1981-2010

This article investigates fiscal policy responses to the Great Recession in historical perspective. We explore general trends in the frequency, size and composition of fiscal stimulus as well as the impact of government partisanship on fiscal policy outputs during the four international recessions of 1980-81, 1990-91, 2001-02 and 2008-09. Encompassing 17-23 OECD countries, our analysis calls into question the idea of a general retreat from fiscal policy activism since the early 1980s. The propensity of governments to respond to economic downturns by engaging in fiscal stimulus has increased over time and we do not observe any secular trend in the size of stimulus measures. At the same time, OECD governments have relied more on tax cuts to stimulate demand in the two recessions of the 2000s than they did in the early 1980s or early 1990s. Regarding government partisanship, we do not find any significant direct partisan effects on either the size or the composition of fiscal stimulus for any of the four recession episodes. However, the size of the welfare state conditioned the impact of government partisanship in the two recessions of the 2000s, with Left-leaning governments distinctly more prone to engage in discretionary fiscal stimulus and/or spending increases in large welfare states, but not in small welfare states.