The utility of aerial pan-trapping for assessing insect pollinators across vertical strata

Insect pollinators provide a critical ecosystem service by pollinating many wild flowers and crops. It is therefore essential to be able to effectively survey and monitor pollinator communities across a range of habitats, and in particular, sample the often stratified parts of the habitats where insects are found. To date, a wide array of sampling methods have been used to collect insect pollinators, but no single method has been used effectively to sample across habitat types and throughout the spatial structure of habitats. Here we present a method of ‘aerial pan-trapping’ that allows insect pollinators to be sampled across the vertical strata from the canopy of forests to agro-ecosystems. We surveyed and compared the species richness and abundance of a wide range of insect pollinators in agricultural, secondary regenerating forest and primary forest habitats in Ghana to evaluate the usefulness of this approach. In addition to confirming the efficacy of the method at heights of up to 30 metres and the effects of trap color on catch, we found greatest insect abundance in agricultural land and higher bee abundance and species richness in undisturbed forest compared to secondary forest.

Shared authority: courts and legislatures in legal theory

This book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers which impose a moral duty on participants to respect each other's contributions. Moreover this collaborative task will often involve citizens taking an active role in their interaction with the law.