The regulation of cyber warfare under the jus ad bellum

This chapter evaluates the potential for legal regulation of the resort to cyber warfare between states under the ‘jus ad bellum’ (the law on the use of force). Debate in the literature has largely concerned whether cyber warfare falls within the scope of Article 2(4) UNC. The first part of this chapter sets out this debate. It then goes on to argue that the ‘Article 2(4) debate’ often misses the fact that an act of cyber warfare can be considered a breach of a different legal rule: the principle of non-intervention. The chapter further considers some of the issues in applying either the prohibition of the use of force or the principle of non-intervention to cyber warfare, and then concludes by arguing that the debate should be reoriented to focus on another existing international legal obligation: the duty to prevent cyber-attacks.

Remote law-making? American drone strikes and the development of jus ad bellum

There is growing concern amongst international lawyers that the United States’ use of unmanned armed vehicles to conduct lethal targeting operations against non-state actors is setting a dangerous precedent for the future and might lead to an erosion of important rules under international law. Taking seriously these concerns, this article examines in more detail the potential precedent created by the US through its lethal drone strikes and the provided justifications, for the purpose of the development of jus ad bellum. In identifying the claims made by the US under different theories of customary international law as qualified practice or expressions of opinio juris that can lead to an alteration of the law should they be accepted by the international community, this article takes a first step towards a more extensive debate on the potential effects of the US drone strikes on the development of international law.

Military targeting in the context of self-defence actions

In order to bring conceptual clarity to a particular dimension of the relationship between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello regimes, this article explores the independent sources of a military targeting rule in both branches of international law. The aim is not to displace the jus in bello as the ‘lead’ regime on how targeting decisions must be made, or to undermine the traditional separation between these regimes. Rather, conceptual light is shed on a sometimes assumed but generally neglected dimension of the jus ad bellum’s necessity and proportionality criteria that may, in limited circumstances, have significance for our understanding of human protection during war, by covering possible gaps in the jus in bello targeting rules.