Rich and famous: recognition-based judgment in the Sunday Times rich list

Recognition as a cue to judgment in a novel, multi-option domain (the Sunday Times Rich List) is explored. As in previous studies, participants were found to make use of name recognition as a cue to the presumed wealth of individuals. Names that were recognized were judged to be the richest name from amongst the set presented at above chance levels. This effect persisted across situations in which more than one name was recognized; recognition was used as an inclusion criterion for the sub-set of names to be considered the richest of the set presented. However, when the question was reversed, and a “poorest” judgment was required, use of recognition as an exclusion criterion was observed only when a single name was recognized. Reaction times when making these judgments also show a distinction between “richest” and “poorest” questions with recognition of none of the options taking the longest time to judge in the “richest” question condition and full recognition of all the names presented taking longest to judge in the “poorest” question condition. Implications for decision-making using simple heuristics are discussed.

Time to decide? Simplicity and congruity in comparative judgment

What is the relationship between magnitude judgments relying on directly available characteristics versus probabilistic cues? Question frame was manipulated in a comparative judgment task previously assumed to involve inference across a probabilistic mental model (e.g., “which city is largest” – the “larger” question – versus “which city is smallest” – the “smaller” question). Participants identified either the largest or smallest city (Experiments 1a, 2) or the richest or poorest person (Experiment 1b) in a three-alternative forced choice (3-AFC) task (Experiment 1) or 2-AFC task (Experiment 2). Response times revealed an interaction between question frame and the number of options recognized. When asked the smaller question, response times were shorter when none of the options were recognized. The opposite pattern was found when asked the larger question: response time was shorter when all options were recognized. These task-stimuli congruity results in judgment under uncertainty are consistent with, and predicted by, theories of magnitude comparison which make use of deductive inferences from declarative knowledge.

Inverse amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex responses to surprised faces

Here we show inverse fMRI activation patterns in amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) depending upon whether subjects interpreted surprised facial expressions positively or negatively. More negative interpretations of surprised faces were associated with greater signal changes in the right ventral amygdala, while more positive interpretations were associated with greater signal changes in the ventral mPFC. Accordingly, signal change within these two areas was inversely correlated. Thus, individual differences in the judgment of surprised faces are related to a systematic inverse relationship between amygdala and mPFC activity, a circuitry that the animal literature suggests is critical to the assessment of stimuli that predict potential positive vs negative outcomes.

Contextual modulation of amygdala responsivity to surprised faces

We recently demonstrated a functional relationship between fMRI responses within the amygdala and the medial prefrontal cortex based upon whether subjects interpreted surprised facial expressions positively or negatively. In the present fMRI study, we sought to assess amygdala-medial prefrontal cortex responsivity when the interpretations of surprised faces were determined by contextual experimental stimuli, rather than subjective judgment. Subjects passively viewed individual presentations of surprised faces preceded by either a negatively or positively valenced contextual sentence (e. g., She just found $500 vs. She just lost $500). Negative and positive sentences were carefully matched in terms of length, situations described, and arousal level. Negatively cued surprised faces produced greater ventral amygdala activation compared to positively cued surprised faces. Responses to negative versus positive sentences were greater within the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, whereas responses to positive versus negative sentences were greater within the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. The present study demonstrates that amygdala response to surprised facial expressions can be modulated by negatively versus positively valenced verbal contextual information. Connectivity analyses identified candidate cortical-subcortical systems subserving this modulation.

Individual Differences in Amygdala and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Activity are Associated with Evaluation Speed and Psychological Well-being

Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined whether individual differences in amygdala activation in response to negative relative to neutral information are related to differences in the speed with which such information is evaluated, the extent to which such differences are associated with medial prefrontal cortex function, and their relationship with measures of trait anxiety and psychological well-being (PWB). Results indicated that faster judgments of negative relative to neutral information were associated with increased left and right amygdala activation. In the prefrontal cortex, faster judgment time was associated with relative decreased activation in a cluster in the ventral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, BA 24). Furthermore, people who were slower to evaluate negative versus neutral information reported higher PWB. Importantly, higher PWB was strongly associated with increased activation in the ventral ACC for negative relative to neutral information. Individual differences in trait anxiety did not predict variation in judgment time or in amygdala or ventral ACC activity. These findings suggest that people high in PWB effectively recruit the ventral ACC when confronted with potentially aversive stimuli, manifest reduced activity in subcortical regions such as the amygdala, and appraise such information as less salient as reflected in slower evaluative speed.

Less-is-more effects without the recognition heuristic

Inferences consistent with “recognition-based” decision-making may be drawn for various reasons other than recognition alone. We demonstrate that, for 2-alternative forced-choice decision tasks, less-is-more effects (reduced performance with additional learning) are not restricted to recognition-based inference but can also be seen in circumstances where inference is knowledge-based but item knowledge is limited. One reason why such effects may not be observed more widely is the dependence of the effect on specific values for the validity of recognition and knowledge cues. We show that both recognition and knowledge validity may vary as a function of the number of items recognized. The implications of these findings for the special nature of recognition information, and for the investigation of recognition-based inference, are discussed

A method of weighting indicators in building energy efficiency assessment

This paper identifies the indicators of energy efficiency assessment in residential building in China through a wide literature review. Indicators are derived from three main sources: 1) The existing building assessment methods; 2)The existing Chinese standards and technology codes in building energy efficiency; 3)Academia research. As a result, we proposed an indicator list by refining the indicators in the above sources. Identified indicators are weighted by the group analytic hierarchy process (AHP) method. Group AHP method is implemented following key steps: Step 1: Experienced experts are selected to form a group; Step 2: A survey is implemented to collect the individual judgments on the importance of indicators in the group; Step 3: Members’ judgments are synthesized to the group judgments; Step 4: Indicators are weighted by AHP on the group judgments; Step 5: Investigation of consistency estimation shows that the consistency of the judgment matrix is accepted. We believe that the weighted indicators in this paper will provide important references to building energy efficiency assessment.

The relative success of recognition-based inference in multichoice decisions

The utility of an "ecologically rational" recognition-based decision rule in multichoice decision problems is analyzed, varying the type of judgment required (greater or lesser). The maximum size and range of a counterintuitive advantage associated with recognition-based judgment (the "less-is-more effect") is identified for a range of cue validity values. Greater ranges of the less-is-more effect occur when participants are asked which is the greatest of to choices (m > 2) than which is the least. Less-is-more effects also have greater range for larger values of in. This implies that the classic two-altemative forced choice task, as studied by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002), may not be the most appropriate test case for less-is-more effects.