La fontaine bouillonnante et la tombe de Lancelot l'Ancien: modalités textuelles et iconographiques de la construction cyclique dans le Lancelot-Graal

La tête du roi Lancelot l'Ancien, l'aïeul du chevalier Lancelot, assassiné par le duc de Belle Garde, est plongée dans une fontaine merveilleuse bouillonnante, tandis que son corps, gardé par deux lions, est conservé dans un tombeau extraordinaire dont suintent des gouttes de sang aux propriétés curatives. Sur le plan textuel, les références aux merveilles qui suivent la mort de Lancelot l'Ancien dans l'Estoire del saint Graal, le Lancelot et la Queste del Saint Graal témoignent de la construction du cycle du Lancelot-Graal par l'intégration d'une dimension à la fois historique et généalogique. Or l'iconographie des manuscrits enluminés du cycle du Graal privilégie davantage la mise en série d'épisodes apparentés que la construction d'une logique véritablement cyclique. Le remploi de compositions ou de motifs iconographiques renforce la cohérence de l'univers chevaleresque et merveilleux ainsi créé sans pour autant impliquer d'effet de circularité.

Small wars in the age of Clausewitz: the watershed between partisan war and people's war

Around the time of Clausewitz’s writing, a new element was introduced into partisan warfare: ideology. Previously, under the ancien régime, partisans were what today we would call special forces, light infantry or cavalry, almost always mercenaries, carrying out special operations, while the main action in war took place between regular armies. Clausewitz lectured his students on such ‘small wars’. In the American War of Independence and the resistance against Napoleon and his allies, operations carried out by such partisans merged with counter-revolutionary, nationalist insurgencies, but these Clausewitz analysed in a distinct category, ‘people's war’. Small wars, people's war, etc. should thus not be thought of as monopoly of either the political Right or the Left.

Profits, malversations, restitutions. Les bénéfices des financiers durant la guerre de la Ligue d’Augsbourg et la taxe de Chamillart

Profit, embezzlement, restitution. The role of the traitants in the Nine Years War and Chamillart’s tax on financial benefits The aim of this article is to revisit the question of the financiers in Old Regime France. It starts with an analysis of the discourses about the financiers under the Absolute monarchy that underlines the complexity of their relationship with the government and the public. It then reviews the secondary literature and highlights the existence of competing historical interpretations (functional, political, utilitarian), which raise the question of their overall capacity to account for the role and impact of the financiers at different times. On this ground, the article focuses on a specific group of financiers, the so-called traitants d’affaires extraordinaires, during the Nine Years War. Further to a description of the specific role and scope of the activities of the various financiers responsible for helping the monarchy to raise the funds it needed to pay for its peace and wartime expenditure, the article examines the conditions and profits granted by the king in his contracts with the traitants whose services were hired for the purpose of selling royal offices in the public and advancing the revenue to the Treasury. It also explores the contractual arrangements of the companies established by the financiers to manage their operations as well as the rights and the responsibilities of their various stakeholders. These bases being laid, the article relies on the administrative correspondence relating to the traités during the Nine Years War to address a range of issues, in particular the extent to which these contracts, and other control procedures, were robust enough to deter fraud. The accounts of two traitants’ companies offer an opportunity to analyse and compare the structure of their income and expenditure (including the volume and cost of the promissory notes sold in the public to finance their payments to the Treasury), to explore the strategies of the contractors, to calculate their net profits and further discuss the problem of embezzlement. The article ends with the study of the context and debates which led to the introduction by finance minister Michel Chamillart, in 1700, of a shortfall tax on the financial profits of the gens d’affaires or traitants, the method used to determine its rate (50 % of the net benefits), its distribution among the various stakeholders (including the bailleurs de fonds or backers), and the related procedures. In total, the article argues that the relationship between the monarchy, society and the financiers under the Ancien Regime was not static and, therefore, suggests that the broad question of control and fraud must be examined against changing circumstances. With regard specifically to the Nine Years War, the article concludes that within the constraints of the Absolute monarchy, contractors offered valuable services by raising capital for the benefit of a king who ruled over a country which, at the time, was by far the wealthiest in Europe, and where ministers failed to foresee long wars of attrition and whose financial strategy was limited by the very existence of privilege. Overall, the traités were too costly to be a viable system of war financing. In these conditions, the substantial fortunes made by a handful of very successful traitants suffice to explain that the government easily gave in to public criticism against the wealth of the financiers and felt compelled, when peace resumed, to cancel the advantageous conditions offered in the treaties by taxing financial profits.

Los historiadores y los financieros de la Francia del Antiguo Régimen

This article proposes a brief historiographical survey of works on the financiers of Ancien Regime France. It argues that the historians’ main conclusions vary according to the period they study and their main research issue (e.g. the building of the Absolute monarchy, financial crises, economic growth). It suggests that the new consensus about the social origins of the financiers does not fully clarify the question of their perception by the public and their role in the monarchy. It notes that the activities of the financiers were varied and evolved over time, and that the technical aspects of their activities remain poorly known, making it difficult to offer a simple answer to the broad question of their worth and their cost for the monarchy.