Orde Wingate and the Special Night Squads: A Feasible Policy for Counter-Terrorism?

This article analyses the counter-terrorist operations carried out by Captain (later Major General) Orde Wingate in Palestine in 1938, and considers whether these might inform current operations. Wingate's Special Night Squads were formed from British soldiers and Jewish police specifically to counter terrorist and sabotage attacks. Their approach escalated from interdicting terrorist gangs to pre-emptive attacks on suspected terrorist sanctuaries to reprisal attacks after terrorist atrocities. They continued the British practice of using irregular units in counter-insurgency, which was sustained into the postwar era and contributed to the evolution of British Special Forces. Wingate's methods proved effective in pacifying terrorist-infested areas and could be applied again, but only in the face of 'friction' arising from changes in cultural attitudes since the 1930s, and from the political-strategic context of post-2001 counter-insurgent and counter-terrorist operations. In some cases, however, public opinion might not preclude the use of some of Wingate's techniques.

Atrocities in theory and practice: An introduction

Classical counterinsurgency theory – written before the 19th century – has generally strongly opposed atrocities, as have theoreticians writing on how to conduct insurgencies. For a variety of reasons – ranging from pragmatic to religious or humanitarian – theoreticians of both groups have particularly argued for the lenient treatment of civilians associated with the enemy camp, although there is a marked pattern of exceptions, for example, where heretics or populations of cities refusing to surrender to besieging armies are concerned. And yet atrocities – defined here as acts of violence against the unarmed (non-combatants, or wounded or imprisoned enemy soldiers), or needlessly painful and/or humiliating treatment of enemy combatants, beyond any action needed to incapacitate or disarm them – occur frequently in small wars. Examples abound where these exhortations have been ignored, both by forces engaged in an insurgency and by forces trying to put down a rebellion. Why have so many atrocities been committed in war if so many arguments have been put forward against them? This is the basic puzzle for which the individual contributions to this special issue are seeking to find tentative answers, drawing on case studies.

The international law implications of the Turkish/Kurdish conflict

This article considers the threaties and customs governing armed conflict in the context of the long standing insurgency in southeast Turkey. The first part of the article analyzes the existing treaty and customary law concerning the threshold of an armed conflict and concludes that the insurgency in Southeast Turkey existing since 1984 rises to the level of an armed conflict based on criteria identified both in treaty and customary international law. The next consideration is the classification of this conflict and this part concludes that this situation is a non-international armed conflict due to lack of involvement of forces of another country. Finally, this article considers international humanitarian law applicable to this non-international armed conflict and reveals that as a result of the monumental International Committee of the Red Cross customary humanitarian law study, particularly with respect to the law of targeting, that the rules applicable to international and non-international armed conflict have never been closer.

National experiences with insurgencies and counterinsurgencies: are there “National styles”?

There are clearly identifiable patterns in the way in which insurgents operate in certain geographic areas and cultures, and in which states deal with them. These have been stressed by writing about national "ways of war", strategic culture, or national styles. Nevertheless, there have been important ruptures and changes in some of these, so that for Britain, for example, three successive phases corresponding to patterns can be identified. For France, two pronounced rivaling traditions coincided over two centuries. Algerians by contrast changed fundamentally in their fighting style with the different political ideologies they were following. Palestinian insurgency against Israel is also marked by change in approach. Russia and China possibly show the longest continuity in their handling of insurgencies.

Small wars and insurgencies in theory and practice, 1500-1850

In early modern times, warfare in Europe took on many diverse and overlapping forms. Our modern notions of ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ warfare, of ‘major war’ and ‘small war’, have their roots in much greater diversity than such binary notions allow for. While insurgencies go back to time immemorial, they have become conceptually fused with ‘small wars’. This is a term first used to denote special operations, often carried out by military companies formed from special ethnic groups and then recruited into larger armies. In its Spanish form, guerrilla, the term ‘small war’ came to stand for an ideologically-motivated insurgency against the state authorities or occupying forces of another power. There is much overlap between the phenomena of irregular warfare in the sense of special operations alongside regular operations, and irregular warfare of insurgents against the regular forces of a state. This book demonstrates how long the two phenomena were in flux and fed on each other, from the raiding operations of the 16th century to the ‘small wars’ or special operations conducted by special units in the 19th century, which existed alongside and could merge with a popular insurgency. This book is based on a special issue of the journal Small Wars & Insurgencies.

The Spanish Guerrilla 1808-1814 as a model for people’s wars and resistance movements

Transforming the meaning of the term 'guerrilla' which had once meant feud or private warfare, and then irregular war conducted by special forces on behalf of a state or government, the Spanish Guerrilla (part of the Peninsular War) against Napoleon became the model to be emulated by insurgency movements across the world. Even though the term itself continued to be used, even in Spanish, for special operations, in henceforth became imbued with an ideological dimension, which is how it would be used especially in the 20th century.